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ABSTRACT 
Rinderpest, the most dreaded bovine plague, struck the cattle of the BaSotho in British 
Basutoland early in 1897. By December the murrain had spent itself, having reduced the 
cattle population by half As it did so, the rinderpest claimed the primary historical 
significance of an epidemic. By sharpening behaviour and illuminating latent or 
developing tendencies, the rinderpest helped to reveal the nooks and crannies of 
contemporary historical processes that would have otherwise eluded historical visibility. 
This thesis brings out the complexities and ambiguities surrounding the epidemic. It uses 
the crisis occasioned by the panzootic in its multifaceted manifestations as a prism 
through which we might view the complex aspects of contemporary historical processes. 
It goes beyond the narrow limits of the crisis itself to discerning the broader and wider 
historical patterns that the rinderpest helped to highlight. 
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PREFACE 
This study has been a long time in gestation. Consequently, I have, in the interim, 
accumulated innumerable debt. My supervisor, Professor Paul Maylam, stood firmly by 
every bit of my effort, dispensing invaluable advice. lowe him special gratitude for 
refusing to abandon me to my fate even when I began exhibiting the classical symptoms 
of rinderpest. Professor John Rowe, of the History Department at Northwestern 
University in the United States where the topic was first conceived, was my academic 
advisor and helped guide my ftrst paces as a researcher. 
Archivists at many research centres in Lesotho. South Africa and overseas helped to 
guide me through the maze of extensive reSearch material in their holdings. Some, gave 
me special favours, allowing me to continue my research even after closing hours. 
Various funding bodies provided the wherewithal for the research. Worthy of special 
mention are the African-American Institute, New York, which provided the wherewithal 
for my post-graduate study at Northwestern University, and the British Council which 
assisted financially during a brief research stay in London. 
I 
A glance at the footnotes reveals that. little structured oral tradition is used for reasons 
that will become apparent in the discussion on the sources. Notwithstanding, numerous 
informal conversations were conducted with BaSotho people in almost every district of 
the country during the fteld research. I appreciative highly the time they so generously 
gave me. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Early in 1896 the BaSotho in the British Protectorate of Basutoland heard that a dreaded 
bovine plague known was approaching their country from the north. The chilling news 
received immediate and dramatic attention. A mood of tense apprehension pervaded the 
proceedings of the BaSotho annual gathering (the pitso) which discussed the impending 
doom in October. All speakers rose to anticipate the scale of the looming tragedy. By 
November 1896, the cautious optimism of the earlier months had given way to ominous 
forebodings when the murrain disease appeared temporarily in the northern districts of 
the country. There was tension matched only by the return ofthe panzootic in April 1897. 
The latter sealed the fate of the country. By December 1898, the panzootic had spent 
itself, having reduced the cattle population dfBasutoland by hal£ 
This thesis explores the history of this panzootic in Basutoland. It studies its trajectory, 
eavesdropping on the popular interpretations of its origins and spread. It investigates the 
varied social responses and reactions to the disease, exploring the historical setting in 
which the disease occurred. The thesis also investigates the social context of the 
epidemic. It examines how the disease influenced the way the society viewed itself and 
its wider world, and, in turn, shaped the way the society defined and interpreted it. 
Further, it illuminates the complex changes that were impinging on BaSotho society 
during this period and how they affected the impact of the disease and the ability to 
survive it. 
Besides being about the history of the rinderpest, the thesis is also about historical 
methodology. It builds on and reflects a set of premises that underlie a growing body of 
literature on the social history of disease. This literature views epidemics as one of the 
key contingencies of ~history. Epidemics are historically specific. They have 
characteristics of the period in which they occur, undergo a complex' dialectical 
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interaction with that period, affecting, and being influenced by, the human history of 
which they are a part. Epidemics often are magnifying glasses that uniquely reflect 
and expose underlying social forces, ongoing but subterranean tensions and conflicts, 
complex, and at times, paradoxical social processes. An epidemic provides a 
convenient point of entry that assists us to understand more deeply the society in 
which it occurs.l 
The history of disease and epidemics has emerged as an important theme in African 
history. Historians studying local economies and their relationship to regional and 
long-distance trade, population densities and movements, ecological environments 
and the impact of colonialism and industrialisation, have acknowledged these as 
significant epidemiological factors? Barring a few notable exceptions,3 historians of 
South Africa have neglected this important theme. This is despite earlier 
ethnographers and anthropologists identifying disease as a most profound effect of the 
process of industrialisation and consequent rural impoverishment in South Africa 4 
IThe literature on the social history of disease, famine, and epidemics is too vast to list it 
here. See bibliography, especially, Alexander, Barber, Brandt, Calvi, Carmichael, Carpenter, 
Cartwright, Chevalier, Cipola, Clatts, Crosby, Deaux, Dirks, Durey, Evans, Gallant, Kiple, 
Langer, Luckin, Lyons, McGrew, McNeil, Miller, Mishler, Morris, Rosebury, Rosenberg, 
Seale, Slack, Spitzer, Sussman, Ziegler. 
J 
2For the expanding literature on the history of disease in Africa, see bibliography: Aidoo, 
Caldwell, Curtin, Dawson, Dias, Thimmet, Feirman, Hartwig, Hartwig & Patterson, 
Kjekshus, Lyons, Miller, Patterson, Prins, Tsey & Short, Vail. 
3F.F. Collins, "The History of South Africa's First Tuberculosis Epidemic", South African 
Medical Journal, 62 (1982); J. Crush, A. Jeeves, D. Yudelman, South Africa's Labour 
Empire: A History of Black Migrancy to the Gold Mines (Cape Town, 1991); S. Marks & N. 
Andersson, "Typhus and Social Control in South Africa, 1917-1950", in R. McLeod & M. 
Lewis, Disease, Medicine and Empire: Perspectives on Western Medicine and the Experience 
of European Expansion (London, 1988), 257-283; R. Packard, White PlaMe. Black Labour: 
Tuberculosis and the Political Economy of Health and Disease in South Africa (Los Angeles, 
1989); H. Phillips, "Black October: The Impact of the Spanish Influenza Epidemic of 1918 on 
South Africa", Unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Cape Town, 1984; M.W. Swanson, 
"The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in the Cape Colony, 
1900-1909", Journal of African History, 18 (1977), 387-412. 
4H. Kuper, Uniform ()f-Colour (Johannesburg, 1947); I. Schapera, Migrant Labour and 
, 
, 
J 
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Apartheid has been acknowledged as a system replete with state violence. Yet its 
more silent violence - socially generated disease - has not yet received systematic 
analysis by social scientists.5 
That there is no systematic study of the history of stock diseases in Southern Africa is 
even more perplexing.6 Systematic medical research in South Africa owes its 
inception to the ravages of stock disease. The first Bacteriological Institute in South 
Africa was established in 1891 in Grahamstown, to investigate stock diseases.7 With a 
few notable exceptions,8 the rinderpest panzootic of 1896-8, especially, has suffered 
from a lack of sustained historical analysis. While reference to it in historical accounts 
is almost pervasive, it is invariably cursory. Van Onselen's work, though pioneering, 
is exploratory. Only a little-known unpublished thesis has attempted anything like a 
systematic study of the social history of this catastrophic panzootic.9 However, it 
Tribal Life (London, 1947) 
SFor an admirable beginning, see C. De Beer, The South African Disease: Apartheid, 
Health and Health Services (London, 1986); S. Marks & N. Andersson, "Diseases of 
Apartheid", in J. Lonsdale (ed), South Africa in Question (London, 1988); S. Marks & N. 
Andersson, "The Epidemiology and Culture of Violence", in N. Manganyi & A. du Toit 
(eds.), Political Violence and the Struggle in South Africa (Halfway House,1990), 26-69 
, 
~otable exceptions include G. Campbell, "Disease, Cattle and Slaves: The Development of 
Trade Between Natal and Madagascar, 1875-1904", African Economic History, 19 (1990-91), 
105-134; P.F. Cranfield, Science and Empire: East Coast Fever in Rhodesia and Transvaal 
(Cambridge, 1991); M.W. Henning, Aniinal Diseases in South Africa (Pretoria, 1956); Giblin, 
J.L., "East Coast Fever in Socio-historical Context: A Case Study from Tanzania", 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 23, 3 (1990),401-421; For a recent major 
attempt to fill this lacuna, see J.A.W. Coetzer, G.R. Thomson, R.C. Tustin (eds), Infectious 
Diseases of Livestock with Special Reference to Southern Africa (Oxford, 1994). 
7 Anon, "Alexander Eddington", Journal of the Medical Association of South Africa, 2 
(1928); E. Burrows, A History of Medicine in South Africa (1958). 
8R. Mack, "The Great African Cattle Plague Epidemic of the 1890s", Tropical Animal 
Health and Production, 2 (1970), 210-219; T.P. Ofcansky, "The 1889-97 Rinderpest Epidemic 
and the Rise of British and German Colonialism in Eastern and Southern Africa", Journal of 
African Studies, 8 (1981), 31-38; C. Van Onselen, "ReacJions to Rinderpest in Southern 
Africa, 1896-7", Journal of African History, 13,3 (1972), 387-412 
9J.p. Kotze, "Die Runderpes in die Transvaal<en die Omniddellike Gevolge Daarvan 1896-
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confines itself to the impact of the murrain among Transvaal Afrikaner farmers. The 
study focuses exclusively on the impact of the epidemic without relating the disease 
to the wider historical question of society's response to epidemics. A study of 
ecological disasters in Natal also emphasises the role of the rinderpest during the 
decline of the African peasantry.IO It, too, falls short of setting the epizootic within its 
sociaL economic and political context. 
This lacuna is perplexing considering the crucial role cattle played in the lives of 
African societies. The decimation of cattle in a dramatic and sweeping epizootic 
struck at the very fabric of these societies. Economically the rinderpest was 
tantamount to the "Great Wall Street Crash"; it threatened to wipe out the only capital 
of the people and to restrict future capital accumulation. The epidemic spelt the virtual 
collapse of the entire transport system of African societies throughout Southern 
Africa. By destroying the means of agricultural production in its decimation of the 
plough-drawing oxen, the rinderpest threatened subsistence and especially the export 
of grain on which many African societies had come to depend. For societies where 
economic, social and political standing was measured in cattle, the rinderpest 
threatened social and political stability. 
\ 
The dearth of historical studies on livestock is not peculiar to Southern, African 
historiography. Despite their ubiquity and their role in the lives of agro-pastoralists, 
cattle remain an under researched topic. II Historians of the western world, with 
99", (Magister in die Lettere en Wysbegeerte in Geskiendenis, Randse Afrikaanse 
Universiteit, Johannesburg, 1974). 
IOC. Ballard, "The Repercussions of Rinderpest: Plague and Peasant Decline in Colonial 
Natal", International Journal of African Historical Studies, 19, 3 (1986), 
llFor some isolated systematic studies of pastoralist social formations, mainly on nomadic 
peoples, see, Equippe Ecologie et Anthropologie des Societes Pastorales (eds), Pastoral 
Production and Society (Cambridge, 1979); H. Hedlund, "Contradictions in the 
- Peripheralization of a Pastoral Society: The Maasai", Review of African Political Economy, 
15116 (1979), 15-34; G. Kilman, The Barabang: East African Cattle Herdsmen (New York, 
1970); P. Rigby, PersistentPastoralists: Nomadic Societies in Transition (London, 1985); LV. 
xi. 
abundant sources to pennit reconstructing economic changes at the national and local 
levels, have also complained of a similar benign neglect.12 Cattle diseases, especially, 
have not been subjected to serious study, prompting the complaint that they are the 
"great neglected diseases of mankind".l3 This thesis is a contribution toward filling 
this lacuna. 
Primary sources on the rinderpest in Basutoland are extensive. The rinderpest crisis 
attracted universal attention as it impinged upon every aspect of society. It stimulated 
colonial officials, local European traders and missionaries, BaSotho chiefs and 
officials, newspaper reporters and private individuals to pour out a vast mass of 
writing on the subject. The thesis, therefore, depends largely on archival collections. 
These include official papers and missionary and personal collections. 
The thesis also relies a great deal on published contemporary sources, especially 
Annual Reports, Blue Books, Select Committee Reports and Parliamentary Papers. 
All contemporary South African newspapers, including missionary periodicals, 
devoted pages to the rinderpest crisis. Their editorials and readers' submissions 
provide invaluable information especially on public responses to the crisis. 
, 
Oral research was conducted after the completion of the archival phase of th~ project. 
It soon dawned that oral evidence, ~efined here as oral evidence recounting events 
before the adult life of the informant, seldom contradicted written evidence. No one 
Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 
1600-1900 (philadelphia, 1982); I. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and 
Politics among the Northern Somali of the Hom of Africa (Oxford, 1961); T. Monod, 
Pastoralism in Tropical Africa (Oxford, 1975). 
l2For a recent explicit statement, see M. Overton & B.M. Campbell, "Norfork Livestock 
Farming, 1250-1740: A Comparative Study of Manorial Accounts and Probate Inventories", 
Journal of Historical Geography, 18,4 (1992),377-396. 
13J. Pino, "The Neglected Diseases of Livestock", in M. RiStic & J. Kreier (eds), Babesiosis 
(New York, 1981),454-554. 
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could be found who was alive during the 1897 outbreak: and who could recount 
personally remembered events. Experience in the field also confirmed many of the 
limitations of oral history that have been noted by other researchers. These included 
repetition of published evidence, unreliability of memory, outright ignorance, over-
simplification, lack of perspective, and the influence ofhindsight.14 
Despite their abundance, the sources are disappointing in quality, especially on the 
long-term impact of the epidemic. Part ofthe reason is that any focus on the epidemic 
was overshadowed by the South African War that began close on the heels of the 
rinderpest in September 1899. The epidemiological pattern of the rinderpest further 
limited the quality of the source material. The rinderpest imposed a serious challenge 
to people's explanatory faculties. It was a new disease with unknown causes. Its 
outbreak: was sudden and dramatic, its trajectory sweeping. Its devastating mortality 
gave people little chance for deliberation. When it passed, it disappeared as 
mysteriously as it had come. 
The absence of knowledge of pre-rinderpest cattle epizootics also distorted 
contemporary evaluations of the impact of the rinderpest. Those who observed the 
effects of the rinderpest lacked a comparative standard against which to measure the 
impact of the epizootic. Thus, their evaluations of the 1896-8 rinderp~st may be 
misleading without knowledge of the effects of pre-rinderpest outbreaks .. 
Their elitist character also restricts the sources. Colonial administrators who generated 
most of the sources used in this thesis were in contact more with the local ruling elite 
than with the ordinary villagers scattered across the landscape. The imperial 
administration had made only feeble attempts to concern itself with the lot of the 
ordinary populace. The very structure of imperial administration could not put civil 
society firmly on its~agenda. Its resources, in personnel and finance, were meagre. It 
14See e.g. A. Seldom & J. Pappworth, By Word of Mouth: 'Elite' Oral History (London, 
1983); P. Thompson,~The Voice of the Past: Oral History (Oxford, 1978). 
I 
t. 
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depended entirely on a reconstituted chiefly hierarchy. Its future was also transitory, 
its objectives limited merely to maintaining law-and-order. The sources generated by 
the colonial and local elite therefore tell us little about the experience of the ordinary 
BaSotho who were outside official lines of communication. 
This study takes heed of Marc Bloch's counsel that ''the deeper the research, the more 
the light of evidence must converge from sources of many different kinds".lS It thus 
uses a variety of, at times intractable, source materials to weave together the story of 
society's response to a devastating epidemic. The thesis also benefits from the proven 
methodological value of illuminating "a whole social system and a set of values by 
the searchlight of recording in elaborate detail a single event".16 
I~. Bloch, The Hisforian's Craft (Manchester, 1954),67. 
I~. Le Roy Ladurie, The Mind and Method of the Historian, tr. B. and S. Reynolds 
(London, 1982), 2. ._ 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
THE RINDERPEST IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
Early in 1896, transport riders leading their wagon oxen south from Bulawayo watched 
with shock as their oxen suddenly dropped dead in their yokes. Panic-stricken, they 
abandoned their wagons, driving the remaining oxen southwards through the bush. Rev. 
Coillard, the missionary to Lewanika, later travelling south along this well-trodden 
"Missionary Road", found "hundreds of carcasses [lying] here and there, on the roadside 
or piled up in the fields." He also saw close to a thousand ox-wagons still laden with 
merchandise, but without their teams of oxen. "Never within the memory of men", he 
affirmed, "had such a thing been seen."r 
The panzootic that was devouring transport oxen was the same rinderpest murrain that 
had been ravaging northern Zambesia in the preceding decade. The first description of its 
symptoms appeared in a telegram the acting Secretary of the British South Africa 
Company in Bulawayo sent to the Imperial Secretary in Cape Town: 
Running at eyes and nose, small paunch very hard and dry, intestines full 
of blood, mucus bloody, discharge of mucus from anus, slight~congestion 
of lungs, gall slightly inflated and enlarged. It has been satisfactorily 
proved that it can be in system for 14 days before it can be detectbd. 
When symptoms once appear. death follows rapidly. No cases of recovery 
yet recorded. 2 
Thus, a cattle owner would happily see his apparently healthy herd of cattle off to 
pasture at sunrise. Upon returning home with the herd in the afternoon, his herd-boy 
ICoillard, F., On the Threshold of Central Africa (London, 1897),626. 
2British Parliamentary Papers (B.P.P .), C. -8141: Corremondence Relating to the Outbreak 
of Rinderpest in Sout.ll- Africa in March 1896, J.A. Stevens, Bulawayo, to the Imperial 
Secretary, Cape Town, 9 March 1896, enclosure 1 in N~. 2, in Hercules Robinson (high 
commissioner, Cape Town) to Joseph Chamberlain (secretary of state for Colonies, London), 
11 March 1896. 
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would report that a certain heifer appeared sick and listless. The owner would greet the 
news without much apprehension. He knew from experience that seldom in a large herd 
of cattle did one of them escape the infection of one or other of the prevalent bovine 
diseases. 
At sunrise, however, he would hurry to the kraal where he would behold the sick heifer. 
It was breathing heavily and groaning at intervals, evidently in great pain. A mass of 
thick, unclean, mucous discharge oozed from its nostrils. It was watering in the eyes and 
, 
salivating from the mouth. Its ears drooped backwards. When he called its name, the 
heifer would turn an appealing eye towards him, revealing its agony. The visible mucous 
membranes of the eyes, nostrils and mouth had become red and inflamed. 
These symptoms appeared about six days after the first stage of infection. During the 
incubation phase of infection, there were no outward symptoms. During the next stage, 
the prodromal phase, the animal's temperature rose, setting in an acute fever. The 
purexia phase followed, during which the symptoms worsened, with a total loss of 
.. 
appetite. The second day after the appearance of these visible symptoms, profuse 
diarrhoea occurred and mouth lesions developed. The infected animal then went into the 
stage of an apparent convalescence. During this phase, the fever subsided and the mouth , 
lesions healed. By this time, however, it had become too dehydrated and emaciated from 
J 
the loss of fluids, the avoidance of drinking water and the total loss of appetite. Death 
often followed within six to twelve days. 
Later veterinary research was to identify the disease as a highly virulent infection by a 
minute virus of the paramyxoviridae family that lodges in the membranes of the 
respiratory and digestive tracts. Once in the body, it spreads throughout the blood system 
to all tissues. The infective agent of the disease is highly fragile and easily loses its 
infective power when exposed to heat, light or putrefaction. It thus survives for only a 
short time outside the animal's body. 
3 
The virus's most effective transmission is through nasal swabbing, secondarily through 
inspiration of infected droplets. Once it has penetrated a mucous membrane, it enters the 
body via the tonsils and the respiratory tracts, and then goes to the bronchial lymph 
nodes. Here it spills into the blood stream. It then spreads through all tissues of the body 
targeting especially the epithelial cells of the alimentary, respiratory and urogenital 
tracts. The sequel is stomatitis, extensive gastro-enteritis and an acute fever. The virus 
also targets circulating lymphocytes, suppressing the victim's normal immunity system, 
thus exposing the host to other latent infections. 
1.1: Typical appearance of a sick animal 
(Courtesy of the Onderstepoort Veterinary Library) 
1.2: The last stages of rinderpest 
(Courtesy of the Onderstepoort Veterinary Library) 
4 
The virus affects only species of even-toed ungulates, the most susceptible hosts being 
water buffalo, cattle, eland, giraffe, hippopotamus, impala, kudu and wilde beeste. It also 
occurs in a less virulent form in sheep, goats and pigs. It is transmitted upon a 
susceptible animal coming into contact with the virus in the breath, secretions and 
excretions of a sick animaL The virus is more virulent and spreads more rapidly among 
hosts that have never been exposed to infection, with an inevitable high mortality tate 
often exceeding 90 per cent.3 
Conflicting European travellers' accounts and the fact that the panzootic was only 
diagnosed when it reached Bulawayo in 1896 render any historical reconstruction of the 
trajectory of the panzootic throughout Africa a difficult task. For Africa north of the 
Zambesi, we depend for our evidence on the conflicting, impressionistic and imprecise 
observations of European travellers. These travellers lacked veterinary knowledge and 
could not diagnose the disease precisely. English travellers thus described the disease as 
"a great cattle plague", while their French counterparts referred to it generally as peste 
bovine. The term "rinderpest" is itself imprecise - it being a general German word for 
"cattle plague". 
Local sources on outbreaks of cattle disease, and on rinderpest specifically, are also 
imprecise. The main impediment to knowing whether different loeal people were 
referring to the same panzootic is the multiplicity of terms each used to refer to ~e same 
disease. Naming a disease by the place of its immediate origin, as the BaTswana did, 
3 Agricultural Journal of the Cape of Good Hope, 16 September, 1897, p 277-284; On the 
aetiology, pathogenesis, clinical signs and pathology of the disease, see, D.C. Blood, 
"Rinderpest", in D.C. Blood and O.M. Radostis, Veterinary Medicine: A Textbook of the 
Diseases of Cattle, Sheep, Pigs, Goats and Horses, 7th ed. (London, 1989), 937-38; lA. 
Idnani, "Transmission of Rinderpest by Expired Air", Indian Journal of Veterinary Science, 
14 (1944), 220; P.B.Rossiter, "Rinderpest", in Coetzer, Thomson, Tustin (eds.), Infectious 
Diseases of Livestock. ii, chapter 7, 738-748; G.R Scott, "Rinderpest", in J.W. Davis, L.H 
Karstad, D.O. Trainer (eds.), Infectious Diseases of Wild Mammals, 2nd edn. (Ames, 1981), 
18-30; Agricultural Joum~J, 16 September, 1897, 277-284; K. Yamanouchi, "Comparative 
Aspects of Pathogenicity of Measles, Canine Distemper and Rinderpest Virus", Japanese 
Journal of Medical Science and Biology, 33 (1980), 53-54. 
5 
exacerbates the problem. The following list of terms used for the rinderpest typifies the 
problem of nomenclature, and therefore of precise identification: 
1.3: Names for Rinderpest 
ETHNIC GROUP OR LANGUAGE TERM FOR RINDERPEST 
Bashi Kuyirha (the killing of cows) 
Buhaya Omobyamo ya ngonde (same) 
-
I1a1Mukoni Ka-nkolomwena 
Karamajong Lopit 
Lango Geng or edeke 
~"" 
Lonyoro Kisotoka 
Maasai Ollodua 
Nandi Kiptaitet 
Ndebele Ulenkanyama (to destroy meat) 
Plateau Tonga Moolomoka \ 
Shona Muringanyama (to destroy meat) 
Southern Sotho Renepese or Lefu la Likhomo (cattle plague 
or a disease of cattle) 
Tswana Bolowane (a disease from Bulawayo) 
Turkana Lukio 
Wakonde Kinbumpa 
Zulu Isiqimu or Umaqimulana 
~. 
j 
J 
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The origin of the rinderpest, however, was undoubtedly Central Asia, more especially 
India, where it had been endemic for a long time. panzootics of rinderpest had swept 
Europe in the eighteenth century, leaving close on two hundred million head of cattle 
dead in their wake. The most recent outbreak in Europe before the African panzootic of 
1884-98 was the incursion into Great Britain between 1865 and 1867.4 
Contemporary studies apportioned the blame for the introduction of rinderpest to Africa 
between Italy, Britain and Germany. Italy and Britain used cattle as draft and pack 
animals, imported frof!1 India or Arabia and probably infected with rinderpest, in their 
military expeditions in Africa around this period. The British did so in the Gordon relief 
expedition at Khartoum in 1884-5, the Italians in their Somaliland campaigns in 1887, 
1888 and 1889.5 The case against Germany also has some foundation. Late in 1889, a 
German legion, with pack and draft oxen acquired from Aden and Bombay, was 
quartered on the East African Coast.6 These animals were most likely infected with 
rinderpest. Around the same time, Masai warriors raided the coast for cattle, bringing 
what could have been infected herds into the interior. Within months between 90-95 per 
cent ofMasai herds were wiped out.7 
4R.H. Dunlop and DJ. Williams, Veterinary Medicine: An Illustrated History (St. Louis, 
1996), 277-81; S. Hall, "'The Great Cattle Plague of 1865", British Veterinary Journal, 122 
(1966), 259-66; C.S. Orwin and E.H. Whetham, History of British AgriJUlture, 1846-1914 
(London, 1964),200-2. J 
5Perciva1, R.B., A Game Ranger's Notebook (London, 1924); idem, in Cumming, E.D. 
(Ed.), A Game Ranger on Safari (London, 1928); Mettarn, R.W.V., "A Short History of 
Rinderpest with Special Reference to Africa", Uganda Journal. v (1937), p 22-26; Thome, M., 
Peste Bovine: Historique Rapport Annual, 1964, Ministers de 1 agriculture et la production 
animals, Republic de Tchad: Direction d'elevage, Fasc. 7, Fort Larny; Henning, M.W., 
Animal Diseases in South Africa (pretoria, 1956) ii, 829-30. 
6Great Britain War Office, Intelligence Division, Handbook of British East Africa, Includ-
ing Zanzibar, Uganda and the Territory of the British East African Company, hmso, 1893. 
70. Bauman, Durch Massailand Zur Neilguelle (Berlin, 1894), in H. Kjekshus, Ecology 
Control and Economic Development in East African History: 'The Case of Tanganyika. 1850-
1950 (London, 1977), 12~ J. Ford, The Role of the Trypanosomiases in African Ecology: A 
Study of the Tsetse Fly Problem (Oxford, 1971), W. Littlewood, "Cattle Plague in Egypt in 
1903-04-05", Journal of Comparative Pathology, 18 (1905), 312-321; T.P. Ofcansky, "'The 
7 
The complicated trajectory of the rinderpest once it appeared on the continent should not 
concern us here.!! On its southward journey, it appears to have been checked for some 
time by the Zambesi River. Here, it was known as "Zambesi cattle fever", an endemic 
local affliction. Its belated crossing of the river was probably due to the lack of an 
intensive network of cattle communication across the river. Another factor was probably 
the difficulty of cattle passing through a tsetse-infected zone.9 Once it had crossed that 
boundary, early in 1896, the extensive ox-wagon transport system between Bulawayo 
and southern entrepots accelerated its relentless and swift spread, helped by wild game. 
1889-97 Rinderpest Epidemic and the Rise of British and German Colonialism in Eastern and 
Southern Africa", Journal of African Studies, 8 (1981), 32; A.B. Percival, "Game and 
Disease", Journal of the East Africa and Uganda Natural History Society. 13 (1918), 310; 
131. 
8For some contemporary accounts of the ravages of the rinderpest throughout the continent, 
see, W.A. Chanlers, Through Jungle and Desert: Travels in East Africa (London, 1896); L. 
Dec1e, Three Years in Savage Africa (London, 1898), 565-572; E. Gedge, "A Recent 
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ings of the Royal Geographical Society, xiv, 8 (1892),513-533; J.J. Harrison, "A Journey 
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disease, see, J.H. Driberg, The Lango. a Nilotic Tribe of Uganda ~ndon, 1923), 91; 
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"Kenya 1900-1953", in D.H.L. Rollinson and J.F.F. Callear (eds.), A History of the Overseas 
Veterinary Services, Part Two (London), 1973; 141; R. Pankhurst, "The Great Ethiopian 
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Onselen, "Reactions to Rinderpest in Southern Africa, 1896-7", Journal of African History, 
xiii (1972),473-88. 
9George Fleming, former principal veterinary surgeon of .the British anny, to The Times, 
quoted in Agricultural Journal, ix, no., 17,20 August 1896. 
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Within twenty-five days, it spread throughout the Bechuanaland Protectorate. At this 
rate, it had travelled five hundred miles at the astonishing speed of20 miles a day. 10 
1.4: Probable trajectory of the rinderpest 
(Source: R Mack, ''The Great African Cattle Plague Epidemic") 
J 
1~.p.p., C.-8141: Correspondence, Robinson to Chamberlain, 26 March 1896, 1; Cape 
Parliamentary Papers 1c.p.p.), G. 33-'97: Special Report on Rinderpest in South Africa by 
the Colonial Veterinary Surgeon, from March 1896, to February, 1897, p 6-11; D. Hutcheon, 
"Rinderpest in South Africa: A Short Description of its History, General. Characters and 
Methods ofTreatment'':''(Cape Town, 1902), P 5-6. 
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Authorities in South African tenitories reacted belatedly to the advancing catastrophe. 
The alarm was raised only when the murrain appeared in Bulawayo, thus directly 
threatening the herds of the British South Africa Company and those of Europeans in 
South Africa. After receiving a description of the symptoms of the disease and 
confirming that it was indeed the dreaded rinderpest, the Cape government's chief 
veterinary surgeon, Duncan Hutcheon, urged the under-secretary for agriculture to take 
"prompt and decisive action". "Nothing short of the absolute destruction of everything 
capable of conveying the infection", he advised, '\vill prevent the spread of such a 
scourge". II 
Meanwhile, Hutcheon hastily sent one of his senior veterinarians, Otto Henning, to 
Rhodesia to diagnose the disease. When Henning reached Palapye in the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate, he investigated the disease, confirming that it was indeed the rinderpest. He 
~ 
tried to haIt the disease at Palapye by arranging for the slaughter of all sick animals, 
including those suspected to be infected. He also recommended regulations to control the 
southward-bound movement of cattle. Besides traffic and quarantine regulations, he 
advised that all transport oxen from the north and within the Protectorate should be 
killed immediately and owners compensated. 12 The British resident commissioner of the 
Protectorate, Newton, urged the Colonial Office to make funds available for 
compensating owners of slaughtered animals. "It is better to begin' spending even as 
much as 50,000 pounds at once", he argued, "than to suffer an annual loss to be incurred 
to the whole of South Africa, of more than double that sum.,,1J 
With a skeletal police force at its disposal, however, the Protectorate's administration 
was unequal to the task of enforcing these regulations. Moreover, on advice from the 
IIc.p.p., G.33-'97, Special Report, 7. 
IlIbid., 7-8 
13B.P.P., C.-8141, Corr~spondence, Newton to Robinson, in Robinson to Chamberlain, 5 
April, 1896. -
10 
high commISSIoner In Cape Town, the British government eschewed the plan of 
wholesale slaughter and refused funds for compensating owners of slaughtered animals. 
"It seems to me unjust", Robinson counselled, "to ask British tax payers to compensate 
cattle owners ... for destruction of cattle, which, if not slaughtered, are bound to die". 14 
Meanwhile, when Henning found that the disease had spread as far south as Gaborone, 
he proposed leaving the "natives to fight their own battle and to confine our efforts to 
protect European and neighbouring states".'5 In a similar state of panic, the Transvaal 
government sent its underemployed veterinarian, Doctor Arnold Theiler, to Salisbury to 
diagnose the disease. En route he witnessed the carnage, observing '''odies of [stinking] 
trek oxen [lying] in the river beds", and scores of derelict ox-wagons. The misery of the 
wagon owners was "heartbreaking" as "their wagons and oxen were all they 
possessed".16 When he returned, he called upon President Kruger to take immediate 
action. 17 The Transvaal immediately forbade all ox-wagon transport across its borders 
with Rhodesia and Bechuanaland Protectorate, ordering stock to be withdrawn three 
miles from the Limpopo River'8 . 
By the end of March, however, the disease had already crossed the Molopo River into 
former British Bechuanaland, reaching Mafeking early in April. Delegates from all 
South Afiican states hurriedly convened in the town for "a fiiendly di~cussion as to the 
best means to adopt to prevent the spread of the disease". 19 The interstate confci-ence, the 
14Ibid., Robinson to Chamberlain, 5 Apri, 1896. 
l~Ibid., Resident Commissioner, Mafeking, 18 March 1896 
16Johannesburg Public Library, S Store 920, Letters by Arnold Theiler, Theiler to parents, 
18 May 1896. 
17Ibid., 
'8Minutes of Rinderpest Conference held at Mafeking, 16 April 1896, speech of A. Theiler, 
Transvaal delegate, 4. 
19c.p.p., G.64-'97: Report of Colonial veterinary surgeon, 1897, 9. 
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first of three, urged the delegates to recommend three methods of restricting the spread 
of the disease to their respective governments: fencing along respective borders, 
immediate destruction of all infected animals and disinfection of all persons and articles 
that contacted infected or dead cattle. 
On other issues requiring co-operation between governments, however, there was more 
bickering than consensus, robbing the conference of an early opportunity to arrest the 
further spread of the disease. The delegates also lacked mandates to bind their respective 
governments, thus -rendering the resolutions of the conference impotent?O In particular, 
lack of co-operation between the Cape and the Transvaal governments ensured that the 
disease would break out simultaneously along the western and northern borders of 
British Bechuanaland and the Transvaal. Already by early April, it had appeared in the 
Zeerust area of the boer republic. 21 
Jolted by the disaster, various authorities in South Africa sent delegates to Vryburg for a 
second "international" conference to formulate a concerted plan of action. Besides the 
-
previous delegation comprising the Cape Colony, the Transvaal, Orange Free State, 
Bechuanaland Protectorate and Natal colony, delegates now also came from Basutoland 
and German South West Africa. The conference, running for two days on 3 I August and 
I September, abandoned the "stamping-out" strategy and re-emphasiSed fencing as the 
most effective method of restricting the spread of the disease. Believing that' Africans 
carried the disease in their clothes, delegates recommended imposing stricter pass laws 
"to have the movements of the natives under complete control". They included 
subjecting African travellers to fumigation. The conference also adopted measures to 
disinfect hides and skins. Finally, it called for urgent research on a cure for the disease. 22 
2°Ibid., 10. 
21Letters by Sir Arnold Theiler, Theiler to Parents, 3 April, 1896; Minutes of Rinderpest 
Conference of 16 April, 1~6, speech of A. Theiler, 4. 
22c.p.p., G.82-'96: Minutes, 3-4 
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Soon after the Vryburg conference, the rinderpest defiantly appeared in many districts of 
the Cape Colony and Transvaal. It appeared simultaneously in the Herbert, Hay and 
Barkly West districts early in September, and arrived in Kimberley in October?3 These 
latest outbreaks confirmed that the disease was now out of control. The last resort was 
now to concentrate all efforts at the Orange River to combat its further spread. There 
were disagreements among various authorities on the value of this last ditch strategy; 24 
these were played out in the daily press,25 leading to the dissolution of the Rinderpest 
Commission, a consultative body that oversaw the fight against the spread of the 
disease.26 
Eventually, the Cape government carried out the proposal to make a last ditch line of 
defence at the Orange River. This natural barrier ran across the whole country from the 
Atlantic Ocean to the Drakensberg Mountains. At a cost of a million pounds, the Cape 
government embarked on the erection of a Qarbed wire fence 1,000 yards on the southern 
side of the River. It started from the southwest boundary of the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate and ran along the border of the Cape and Free State as far as the Basutoland 
border. From here, the fence continued along the boundary of Basutoland and the Cape 
as far as the Natal border. It then continued along the Natal and Cape border to the 
coast. Armed police cordons guarded the fence for a distance of about a thousand miles. 
They carefully regulated all communication between the infected and uninfected areas. 27 
~ 
J 
23 Assistance for the reconstruction of the trajectory of the rinderpest through the Cape 
colony comes from c.P.P., G.72a-'98: Runderpest Statistiek. Voor de Kolonie de Kaap De 
Goede Hoop, 1896-7-8. 
24c.P.P., G.64-'97: Reports, 21. 
2~Cape Times, 10 September 1896. 
26c.p.p., G.64-'97, Reports, P 21, and 25-26. 
27Agricultural Journal, S'"eptember 1897, 275. 
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This strategy did keep the disease at bay for about four months. In late March 1897, 
however, the panzootic leapt through the strictly imposed cordons, breaking through 
south of the Orange River. The sequel was that it blazed a relentless trail through the 
Cape Colony and completed its flanking movement towards the Free State and 
Basutoland. Despairing at the disease's defiance of natural and artificial restraints, the 
authorities abandoned centralised strategies and concerted action. They now left the task 
of containing the spread of the disease to the less efficient local district committees. 
From now on, it wou!d be almost impossible to predict where and when the disease 
might next appear, and from what source. Indeed its appearance in neighbouring 
Basutoland early in March occurred before the officially recognised date of its crossing 
the Orange River in late April.28 In May, it was spreading through the neighbouring 
Cape colonial districts of Aliwal North, Barkly East, Albert, Hay and Hope Town. In 
June it was raging in the southern Orange F(ee State and beginning its devastation of the 
Transkeian tenitories. 29 Natal followed in July. In August, it had reached Swaziland. 
Governments now turned their attention to the discovery of an efficacious prophylactic. 
On the eve of the outbreak of the rinderpest, the state of veterinary knowledge in South 
Africa was very poor. The Cape Colony did have a rudimentary veterinary service, 
apparently the best and only one in sub-Saharan Africa. A well-qualified veterinarian, 
~ 
Duncan Hutcheon, headed the veterinary department. He was perhaps the most ex-
J 
perienced veterinarian in Southern Africa. A member of the prestigious Royal College 
of Veterinary Surgeons after graduating from the renowned Royal (Dick) Veterinary 
College in Edinburgh in 1871/° Hutcheon had been the second Chief Veterinary 
28Lesotho National Archives (L.N.A.), Maseru, 53/1/5/8/6, rinderpest outbreak at 
Sephapo's in Mafeteng, assistant commissioner (Mafeteng), to resedent commissioner, 6 
March 1897. 
29Cape Archives (C.A.), Prime Minister's Office (p.M.O) 249, reports on the outbreak and 
progress of the rinderpest in the Transkeian Territories, September 1897. 
30For the history of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, see E. Cotchin, The Royal 
Veterinary College, London: A Bicentenary History (London, 1990); For the history of the 
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Surgeon to the government of the Cape Colony from 1880.31 The "Nestor of Veterinary 
Science,,32 in a country beset by various animal diseases, Hutcheon admitted his own 
lack of laboratory experience. He justified it by complaining that the "amount of the 
correspondence in [his] office" deprived him of the requisite time to undertake 
research.33 Although often ravaged by endemic foot and mouth disease, pleuro-pneu-
monia, anthrax, redwater and glanders, Natal only established a rudimentary veterinary 
service when the rinderpest alarm was sounded in 1896. A chief veterinary surgeon, 
Herbert Watkins-Pitchford,34 was appointed in July 18%, and the veterinary section was 
placed under an Agricultural Department that only secured cabinet status in 1897. The 
Department lacked adequate veterinary facilities. Watkins-Pitchford's outfit consisted of 
"one room, 15 x 20 (in which his clerk has also to work), a damaged microscope, a few 
dilapidated instruments, and some dozen bottles containing drugs".35 
The state of veterinary services in the Free State and Transvaal was even worse. The 
government of the Free State had no qualified veterinarian in its employ and the only 
veterinary expertise that did exist derived from local lore of farmers. The Transvaal 
Royal (Dick) Veterinary College, see The Royal (Dick) School of veterinary Studies, "A 
Brief History of the Royal (Dick) School of Veterinary Studies", 
<http://www.vet.ed.ac.ukJhistory.htp; also I. Pattison, The British Veterinary Profession: 
1785-1948 (London, 1984). 
31pJ. Posthumus, An Index of Veterinarians in South Africa, 4th edition (PieteIlllJritzburg), 
vol. 1, 101-103. 
32R.A. Alexander, 'The Onderstepoort Veterinary Research Laboratory, 1908-1958", The 
Onderstepoort Journal of Veterinary Research, 28,4, (1961), 571. 
33 c..P.P., G .1-'92. Cape of Good Hope Select Committee on the Agricultural Department. 
1892, Q. 222, 38. 
34For biographical details on Watkins-Pitchford, see Anonymous, "The Past Work of Lieut. 
Col. H. Watkins-Pitchford C.M.G., F.R.C.V.S., F.RS.E. Being Extracts from Various 
Official and Press Sources" (n.d), photocopy from the library of the Royal College of Vet-
erinary Surgeons, London; Posthumus, Index of Veterinarians, ii, 227-229. 
35Colony of Natal, Departmental Reports, Report of Commissioner of Agriculture, 1896, H 
143. 
Hl 
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government also did not employ a veterinarian though one lived in the state. He was 
Arnold Theiler, a Swiss immigrant who had arrived in the Transvaal in 1891. His career 
typifies the poor status of the veterinary profession in South Africa and Europe on the 
eve of rinderpest. Theiler had obtained a veterinary diploma at Zurich in 1889. Unable to 
secure employment in his home country, he set sail for Cape Town in 1891, armed with 
his few books, microscope and surgical instruments. Here he found no employment and 
was forced to survive by working on a large farm supervising cattle and forage. Disaster 
struck when he lost his left hand in a chaff cutter. Now disabled, he set up an 
unsuccessful practice in Pretoria where he ended up advertising a phoney cure for horse-
, 
sickness. Ambitious and determined, he succeeded in securing a job as consulting 
veterinary surgeon to the Johannesburg Sanitary Board when smallpox broke out in the 
city in 1893. This appointment lasted only five months, after which Theiler went back to 
private practice. 
Meanwhile, Theiler had been studying bacteriology privately. He had also been learning 
to speak both Dutch and the local colloquial form of Dutch - Taal. He succeeded in 
securing a government appointment by establishing cordial relations with important 
officials. When the Transvaal government learnt of the arrival of the rinderpest in 
Bulawayo, the authorities sent him to investigate. Soon afterwards, he was officially 
sworn in as State Veterinarian of the Transvaal.36 
J 
More telling was the archaic state of epidemiological knowledge in South Africa. Many, 
including those who should have known better, continued to view the disease as the 
visitation of God and a form of retribution exacted for the sins of society. 'It seemed," as 
an irate correspondent quipped, "that sanitary science [was] still enveloped in gloom as 
3~is summary of Theiler's career is based on H. C urson , '1beiler and the Rinderpest 
Epidemic of 1896-1903", Journal of the South African Veterinary Medical Association, 7 
(1936), 187-203; P.l. Du Toit & c. Jackson, "'The Life and Work of Sir Arnold Theiler, ibid., 
7 (1936), 135-186; T. Gutsche, There Was a Man: The Life and Times of Arnold Theiler 
(Cape Town, 1979); G. Theiler, Arnold Theiler 1867-1936: His Life and Times (pretoria, 
1971). 
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ever it was a generation since"n Governments in the various territories proclaimed days 
of prayer, calling upon the populace to attend sessions of humiliation and prayer to 
propitiate the wrath of the Most High.3!! 
Authorities also lacked experIence In the administration of an epidemic. In these 
circumstances, and confronted by an unknown and incurable disease, they had no 
alternative but to slaughter all infected cattle including those merely exposed to infect-
ion. 39 The other method was to create cordons to restrict cattle from moving from 
infected areas. Tile former method was universally unpopular for it achieved the 
opposite of what its originators had intended. Without adequate compensation for cattle 
thus slaughtered, it contributed to bovine mortality and encouraged the spread of disease. 
This was because cattle owners concealed outbreaks to avoid the wholesale slaughter of 
their stock. Most cattle-owners also preferred to kill their animals themselves, before 
infection. It enabled them to preserve the m~at for the meagre months ahead, rather than 
wait to have their cattle slaughtered and buried by the authorities. 
Grave errors, with serious consequences, could also occur when deciding to slaughter 
cattle suspected to be infected. This was mainly because some symptoms of the disease 
were similar to those of other bovine diseases including anthrax: and lung sickness. What 
the prophylactic measure of shooting infected cattle did achieve was to spawn many 
rinderpest titbits that were reported in local newspapers. One example tbld the story of a 
"nervous man in the capital city of the Boer Republic of the Free State who tn'ought he 
was suffering from the rinderpest and went to a doctor": 
He insisted so strongly upon his symptoms that at last the doctor gave 
him a prescription and sent him to a chemist. The dispenser asked him to 
37South Africa, xxxii, no. 423 (1896),269. 
18c.p.p., G.64-'97, Reports, 28. 
39L.N .A., BGB 1121, "Memorandum on Measures to be adopted for Suppression of the 
Disease known as Rinderpest or Zambesi Fever in Cattle", enc. In Under-Secretary for 
Agriculture, London, to the Department of Agriculture, Cape of Good Hope, 19 March 1896. 
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come into the back yard. 'CWhat for"? inquired the victim of the cattle 
plague. "Oh", replied the chemist, ''the prescription reads: "Bearer has 
the rinderpest, take him in the back yard and shoot him, that being the 
only cure".40 
Attempts to set up cordons were only temporarily effectual - soon the rinderpest was 
leaping one cordon after another. In this precarious situation, cattle-owners tried futile, 
even detrimental, immunisation methods. The only prophylactic method known in South 
Africa by 1896 was the Wetterberg or Gobbler method. It consisted of inoculating an 
animal with a mixtur~ ofbloocl, gall and the watery substance from the abdominal cavity 
of a donor. The blend was let to stand from one to three days. Afterwards woollen wads 
were dipped into it and placed under the hide of an animal. Sometimes, all cattle thus 
·treated died ten to twenty days after they were treated. In others, the animal remained 
apparently healthy, therefore eluding immunisation. 
Some dosed their cattle with raw linseed oil and deprived the already dehydrated animal 
of water. Others fed the animal with a strong solution of copper sulphate or 
permanganate of potash. This method was so popular that potassium permanganate soon 
became scarce or expensive when available. Still, others tried snake venom, placing the 
unfortunate animal, already infected with the rinderpest virus, between the devil and the 
deep blue sea. While some remaining assortments of cures were ~ainly innocuous, 
others could be deleterious. One of these included inserting a clove of garlic jhrough a 
hole made in the animal's throat. Others made their cattle drink soup from the boiled 
meat of an animal that had died of rinderpest. The result was that either the method 
proved impotent if the soup had boiled enough, thus destroying the virus at high temper-
atures, or the virus would infect a healthy animal if it survived the boiling. 
Others skinned an animal that had died of the disease. They then wrapped under the skin 
a hundred kilograms of salt and heated it under low temperature for twenty-four hours. 
4()Ibid., xxxvii, 1898, 164. 
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After recovering the salt, they fed it to a healthy animal, covering its nostrils with a cloth 
moistened in carbolic acid. The most popular prophylactic among the boer farmers was 
the bile cure. They made a mixture consisting of the liquid from an infected animal's 
stomach, its bile, and scrapings from its duodenum. They then injected this mixture into 
the arumal. The injection consisted of making an incision in the tail of a healthy animal, 
inserting woollen buds soaked in this mixture.4 ! 
The Cape colonial government did not hesitate to draw upon Afiican medical and 
diagnostic expertise. When the threat to the colony became obvious, the government 
devised a scheme to send a delegation of African doctors to where the disease was 
raging in Bechuanaland. The purported intention was to give the best African medical 
experts an opportunity to test their remedies and apprise them directly of the ravages of 
the disease. 42 
Other Africans tried novel prophylactics. Convinced that the rinderpest was "the white 
man's Nongqause" (a reference to African suspicion of European motives in the earlier 
cattle-killing disaster of 1856-7), the Gcaleka in the Transkeian territories drove their 
cattle to the coast, there to immerse them in sea water and sea scum. This emanated from 
a curious perception of the principle of Similia Similibus Curatur (similar cures another 
similar). They believed that the scum (Umlungu) of the seas would expunge the toxin 
that they suspected the Umlungu (white man or scum of the sea) had introdllced into 
their cattle. 43 
41Yarious methods of inoculation discussed here were gleaned from numerous reports 
appearing in the various newspapers of the period, see list of newspapers in Bibliography; most 
helpful was The Agricultural Journal of the Cape of Good HQPe, especially vol. xii, 1897, from 
no. I, January, onwards. 
42c.p.p., G.78-'97: Rinderpest: Report ofYisit of Native Representatives to Bechuanaland, 
1897; G.42-'98, report of the chief magistrate for 1897, 75. 
43Ibid., report for Willowvale, 88-89. 
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The upshot of all these "cures" was a staggering death toll. By the end of 1896, all 
methods tried to stop the spread of the disease had failed. Various South Afiican 
governments now scrambled for a cure. In the typical discord that characterised inter-
state relations during this period, governments eschewed co-ordinating research efforts. 
The Transvaal and Natal governments did initially co-operate, though the initiative soon 
failed. In September 1896 their respective chief veterinary surgeons, Theiler and 
Watkins-Pitchford, commenced experimenting on the immunising potential of serum 
blood extracted from "salted" cattle, or cattle which had recovered from the rinderpest 
disease They, however, received meagre support from their governments. It consisted of 
, 
a small grant of £550 and a miserable outfit of a corrugated iron shed, some tents and a 
mule wagon. 44 
Just when the joint research seemed to promise some success, the Transvaal government 
recalled Theiler and his staff early in 1891, leaving Watkins-Pitchford stranded. The 
fragile co-operation between Theiler and Watkins-Pitchford did not last long either. In a 
bout of professional jealousy, they soon began attacking each other. Their quarrel seems 
to have arisen from a wrangle over proprietary rights to the million-rouble prize that the 
Russian government offered to the first person to invent a cure for the rinderpest. A 
dispute also ensued over patent rights to their prophylactic and therapy.45 
~ 
The Free State government, in turn, simply ignored the Natal government's r~uest to 
J 
co-operate in the research to perfect the immunisation method.46 Dr. Alexander 
Eddington, head of the Colonial Bacteriological Institute in Grahamstown, 47 had also 
44Letters of Sir Arnold Theiler, Theiler to Emma, 21 February 1897. 
4sH. Watkins-Pitchford, "Report on Rinderpest Investigations in the Transvaal", Veterinar-
ian, 70 (1897), 530-35. 
46Colony of Natal, Departmental Reports, 1897: Annual Report of Commissioner of 
Agriculture, 1897, H. 161 
47For biographical details on Eddington, see, Anon, "Alexander Eddington", Journal of the 
Medical Association of South Africa, 2 (1928). 
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established an independent research station at Taung's railway station m the Cape 
Colony. By December 1896, he had announced that he had discovered the bacillus of 
rinderpest. 
While local research continued, the Transvaal and Cape governments solicited external 
talent. The Transvaal government imported two French scientists, Drs. Jean Danysz and 
Jules Bordet, from the renowned Pasteur Institute in Paris. It alsO recalled Theiler from 
his joint project with Watkins-Pitchford and placed him under the supervision of the 
French scientists.4~ The Cape government, in turn, turned to Britain for assistance. The 
, 
Royal Society proposed sending an "eminently qualified English pathologist" to South 
Africa to study the disease at an estimated cost of twenty-one thousand pounds. The 
Cape government, however, rejected the proposed plan, while the government of Natal 
could contribute only £500 towards the cost, thus aborting the scheme.49 Eventually, the 
Colonial Office contracted the services of professor Robert Koch, the famous Gennan 
bacteriologist who had discovered the cholera vibrio in 1883. Born in 1843, Koch was 
perhaps the world's greatest bacteriologist in the nineteenth century.so 
The French scientists arrived at the end of January 1897. Barely two weeks later they 
had announced that they had discovered a prophylactic against the rinderpest. It 
consisted of inoculating healthy cattle with the blood of "salted" cattle. This 
\ 
immunisation method was based on the principle of serotherapeuti~ according to which 
I 
injecting an animal with blood extracted from a "salted" donor would protect the 
recipient against infection. Theiler and Watkins-Pitchford had already discovered the 
principle during their joint project the previous year. Theiler had also been working with 
48Letters of Sir Arnold Theiler, Emma Theiler to parents, 31 January 1897. 
49Library of the Royal Society, Burlington House, London, Royal Society, Council Minutes, 
vol. 7, meeting of October 29 October 1896, minute 25, 317; On the contributions of the 
Royal Society to the development of science in the nineteenth century, see M. Hall, All 
Scientists Now: The Royal Society in the 19th Century (Cambridge, 1984). 
5°C.E. Dolman, Dictionary of Scientific Biography (New York, 1973), vol. vii, 420-435. 
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these French scientists from their arrival. Therefore, they must have merely confirmed 
Theiler and Watkins-Pitchford's discovery, as Theiler was to rage after its 
announcement. 51 
Professor Koch, in his tum, arrived early in December 1896. He immediately established 
his research station in Kimberley. His main mission was two-fold: to identify the 
rinderpest microbe and to discover a method of immunisation. The experiments to 
identify the active agent of the organism infecting animals followed the now famous 
Koch Postulates: isolate the suspected agent from an infected victim~ grow the agent in 
pure culture~ inject a healthy host and show that the organism produces the classical 
clinical disease~ isolate the same organism from the new victim. 
1.5: Professor Koch with staff at his Kimberley experimental station 
(Courtesy of the Onderstepoort Veterinary Library) 
51Letters of Sir Arnorld Theiler, Theiler to parents, 7 October 1897. 
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The most careful and advanced microscopic and bacteriological methods of examining 
the blood and tissues of infected animals, however, failed entirely to identify the 
microbe. Koch could at least rule out the likelihood of it being some bacteria or parasite. 
This discovery suggested that the active agent of the disease could be a more fragile 
microorganism that could be permanently destroyed through exposure or putrefaction. 
Further experiment did confirm that drying or putrefying material infested with the 
rinderpest poison destroyed the active agent. Thus nonnaI commercial traffic in animal 
produce, especially hides and skins, could recommence, on condition of drying the 
material. Pastures 'could soon be re-grazed and anxiety over the future risk of buried 
carcasses could be eased. 
Koch's experiments also confirmed that a rise in temperature occurred well before an 
infected animal manifested symptoms that rendered it a disease carrier. Thus once a 
diagnosis could be made before the animal Could spread the disease, the propagation of 
the disease could at least be restricted. This discovery also enabled researchers to 
monitor the successive stages of the development of the infection. 
A mood of cautious optimism, however, awaited Koch's announcement of an effective 
prophylactic. Suddenly, in a coup de theatre, he announced that he had discovered two 
~. 
treatments, the serum and bile treatments. The serum treatment invqlved injecting a 
healthy animal with the watery portion of blood (serum) extracted from a/"salted" 
animal or an animal that had recovered.from rinderpest infection. This treatment proved 
to offer only temporary immunity. Serum, however, seemed to acquire a more lasting 
immunising effect when mixed with blood contaminated with the rinderpest virus. Its 
added advantage was that one required only 20 ccm of the mixture to immunise one 
animal, making a litre sufficient to immunise fifty head of cattle. 
The bile treatment involved injecting a healthy animal with bile extracted from one that 
had died ofrinderpest. Its~advantages outweighed those of the serum treatment. With the 
serum treatment, the donor had to be alive after recovering from the infection; -with the 
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bile treatment, every dying animal became the saviour of those still alive. Only 10 ccm 
of bile was sufficient to immunise a head, a litre thus doubling the number of animals 
that an equal volume of serum could immunise. It was also easy to decide whether the 
immunity had taken effect, for an animal thus successfully injected with bile developed a 
hard swelling the size of a man's fist. 52 
Thus when the rinderpest crossed the Orange River late in March 1897, two potentially 
effective prophylactics existed: Watkins-Theiler-(Danysz-Bordet)"salted" serum and 
, 
Koch's bile treatments. Convincing cattle owners of the efficacy of these treatments was 
difficult, however. Each had various disadvantages. 
With the "salted" serum treatment, determining the condition of the donor at the time of 
extracting blood was difficult. Sometimes, it conveyed the disease to an otherwise 
healthy animal. In others, it infected a healthy animal with another bovine disease if the 
blood was obtained from a donor suffering from a disease other than the rinderpest. The 
blood might become septic before it was injected, thus leading to blood poisoning. It 
--
might also be putrid due to decomposing fibrin matter in it. Moreover "salted" animals 
were rare and far between amid a sweeping murrain. When first introduced, the method 
was mistakenly thought to be a preventive, and was thus used on healthy cattle, or those 
assumed to be. Consequently, when the treated cattle died, it was un~lear whether the 
treated animals died of lack of immunity or from the prophylactic.53 J 
The bile treatment had been announced prematurely, before it was tested under various 
conditions. Its assumed efficacy was based on ideal laboratory conditions and was 
~2c.p.p., G.70-'97, Reports by Professor R Koch Upon His Investigation into Rinderpest at 
Kimberley, 1897; "Dr. Koch's Reports on Experiments Conducted at Kimberley for 
~iscovery of a Cure for Rinderpest", Agricultural Journal, 14 January 1897 & 18 February 
1897. 
53 Agricultural Journal, .xii, I (January 1898); Report on The International Rinderpest 
Congress Held at Pretoria from 2nd to 13 August, 1897 (South African Republic, Pretoria, 
1898). 
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severely tested under imperfect epizootic conditions. It later turned out that the method 
conferred only a doubtful and transient immunity. 
Inoculation was also a knotty problem within the context of late nineteenth century 
Southern Africa. In this racially divided society, the rinderpest epizootic immediately 
assumed a racial identification as blacks and whites counter-blamed each other for 
spreading the disease. The International Rinderpest Conference held at Vryburg in 
August 1896 resolved thus: 
The natives undoubtedly carry the infection in their clothes from place to 
place and the conference strongly recommends that in all infected or 
proclaimed areas a strict pass law should be enforced, so as to have the 
movement of the natives under complete control and that no native 
should be allowed to leave an infected area without being properly 
cleansed and disinfected, or be allowed to carry anything with him that is 
liable to convey the infection. 54 
The case against Africans was based on a variety of curious and resourcesful theories. 
They ranged from suspected malicious and sinister designs, through their perceived 
natural unhygienic conditions, to their ignorance of scientific principles of 
epidemiology. 55 Africans, in tum, also blamed their European counterparts for bringing 
and spreading the epizootic. Behind the various explanations of the origins of the 
rinderpest lurks a shared belief by Africans generally in Southern Africa that the colonial 
administration and whites generally, were in some way responsible. Many I Africans 
supposed that the purported intention .was to reduce Africans to poverty, thus forcing 
them to work for white men. "A bitter feeling sprung up against the "Um1ungu" (white 
man)" reported the magistrate of the Transkeian district ofWilIowvale, "who, in order to 
reduce them to poverty with the view of enslaving them to the western province farmers 
~4G.82-'96, Rinderpest Conference, 8 
55Ibid., Speeches of T.J. Krogh (under-secretary of the South African Republic), 7, D. du 
Plessis (member of the South African Republic Rinderpest Commission), 16, A. Theiler 
(chief veterinary surgeon;-Transvaal), 17, D. Hutcheon (chief veterianary surgeon, Cape 
Colony), 14; also Agricultural Journal of the Cape of Good Hope, ix, 14 May 1896, 254. 
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and depriving them of their country, had struck at the root of their life by destroying their 
idolised cattle". 56 
The anti-rinderpest strategies of colonial administrations and white officials seemed to 
confirm these suspicions. Slaughtering infected cattle, including those suspected to be 
infected, convinced many bewildered Africans that the measure was merely an excuse 
for depriving them of their wealth. This seemed apparent because in their long encounter 
with Africans, Europeans had professed a superior knowledge of science and medicine, 
-
including their ability to cure and control diseases. Why, now, instead of helping to cure 
what seemed like a common disease, were the Europeans kilJing African-owned cattle? 
"They tell me you are a doctor", quipped one MoTswana chief defiantly in conversation 
with a white veterinarian who was advising the slaughter of his people's infected cattle, 
''but can you do nothing but kiIl,,?57 The fact that the very people that cattle-owners 
suspected of introducing the plague did the shooting intensified suspicions. 
Just as inoculation in England was viewed as a vehicle for the transmission of syphilis in 
the 1880s,58 it was similarly suspected in South Africa in the 1890s. It brought further 
suspicions of deliberate poisoning. Popular confidence in the newly discovered 
prophylactic was low. This was thanks to the initial disasters with inoculation, especially 
Eddington's virulent blood treatment. Widespread suspicion of the int~ntions of colonial 
officials who spearheaded the inoculation campaign also existed. J 
Many Afiicans were thus averse to inoculation. The magistrate of the Transkeian district 
of WiIIowvale reported a typical example. Afiicans there believed that "inoculation was 
~6G.42-'98, report for Willowvale, 1898,88. 
57Quoted in H Saker and 1. Aldridge, "The Origins of the Langeberg Rebellion", Journal of 
African History, xii (1971), 164. 
580. and R. Porter, "The Politics of Prevention: Anti-vaccinationism and Public Health in 
Nineteenth Century England", Medieval History, 32 (1988), 231-52. 
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merely a device for its [the rinderpest's] more rapid propagation".59 Even the former 
allies of the colonial administration, the Mfengu, were apprehensive. Colonial officials 
reported that the Mfengu suspected that their cattle were being treated with bad bile, 
whereas European cattle were being inoculated with good bile. The purported intention 
was to save European-owned cattle to sell them later at enhanced prices to Africans once 
their cattle were all dead.60 The magistrate of Kentani dramatically revealed the anti-
inoculation rumour current among the Mfengu: 
The government being jealous of the rising strength of the Fingo had 
decided to introduce rinderpest and then, under the plea of helping the 
people, to inoculate. The first inoculation was to be done well with good 
bile in order t~ encourage the mass to agree to inoculation and then, 
when they had all agreed, the cattle were to be poisoned and in this way, 
the government was to weaken the native tribes by reducing them to an 
abject state of poverty, making it necessary for them to work for the 
white man at the low price of6d. a day.61 
This response contributed to the massive t611 of the disease. From across the Zambesi 
River the disease swept south like a hurricane, leaving nothing but bleaching skeletons to 
mark its track. Contemporaries graphically painted the same picture of its impact, as 
those who had witnessed its carnage in its early trajectory north' of the river had done 
earlier. "Never before the memory of man, or by the voice of tradition, have the cattle 
died in such vast numbers", Frederick Lugard, the arch British imperialist, had remarked 
after travelling through Masailand to Uganda in 1890, "never before h¥S the wild game 
suffered. Nearly all the buffalo and eland are gone".62 He was to describe the same 
impression when he witnessed the carnage in the Bechuanaland Protectorate in May 
1896: 
~9G.42-'98, report of resident magistrate of Willowvale, 1898, 88. 
6OIbid., report of resident magistrate of Nqamakwe, 1898.76. 
6IC.A., C.M.T.3/I06, report of resident magistrate of Kentani, 22 September 1897. 
62F. Lugard" The Rise of-Our East African Empire, i, (London, 1896),514. 
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The results of the rinderpest are here terribly in evidence. Near viJ1ages, 
literally hundreds and thousands of dead carcasses lie about; they are 
found under almost every bush, and the stench is indescribable.63 
We gain a similar impression of almost wholesale devastation as we follow the murrain 
down south. Contemporaries who witnessed the carnage described it graphically. 
Marching northwards with the Matabeleland Relief Force early in 1896, F. Sykes 
described the depressing scene: 
Again wagons were met with - derelicts of the veld - laden with timber, 
furniture, and -cases of all kinds of merchandise, drawn up in the bush just 
off the road and left to look after themselves. All the trek oxen had 
succumbed to the plague and the transport riders had no alternative left 
them but to abandon their 10ads.64 
Major Frederick Russell Burnham, chief scout under Lord Roberts, travelled along the 
same route and confirmed this picture: 
Whole spans of big, strong Dutch oxen dropped dead in the yokes, and 
their precious loads were left to be looted by hostiles(sic). More than 
8,000 animals died in three weeks along our only line of supply, the road 
to rail head at Mafeking ... 65 
Given the absence of any known cure, and the fact that in such circumstances the disease 
ran its course until it killed off every host, the impressions of contemporary observers are 
tolerably admissible. In the Bechuanaland Protectorate, they paint II picture of utter 
devastation. In the BamaNgwato territory, it created havoc. Chief Khama, "satd to have 
owned three or four hundred head of trained trek oxen", failed to "save a sufficient 
number of them to make up one span". As early as April 1896, missionaries in the 
BamaNgwato capital, Palapye, doubted whether "one member of our church has a span 
of trek oxen left". They also suspected that "neither Khama nor Sekgoma possesses a 
63 Agricultural Journal, ix, 5 August, 1896, 16. 
64F.W. Sykes, With Plumer in Matabeleland (Baal, 1972), 71-72. 
65F.R. Burnham, Scouting on Two Continents (London, 1928),242. 
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single trek OX".66 By late 1896, they reported that only two or three head of cattle 
remained alive in every hundred that had existed at the beginning of the year.67 
The panzootic struck the cattle of the BaKwena under ChiefSebele equally hard. In mid-
May, many still hoped that they would save their cattle in the cattle-posts in the desert. 
By June, however, their last hope had vanished. The disease had spread to the desert 
posts. At the end of July 1896, only seventy cattle had been spared from the ten thousand 
held by Chief Sebele.68 At one mission of the London Missionary Society the entire vil-
-
lage could muster onl)l eleven head of cattle. The 5,000 villagers ofKolobeng were left 
with only thirty cattle, and forty at Gaborone.69 
The same severity accompanied the panzootic when it struck the BaTswana in former 
British Bechuanaland, recently annexed to the Cape Colony. It almost annihilated the 
entire herds of the Barolong under chief Montshiwa. 7o At the beginning of 1897, the 
~. 
civil commissioner of native reserves in the division ofMafeking reported that 
This time last year the natives were without doubt wealthy, their riches 
consisting chiefly in large and many droves of cattle; today they are 
almost reduced to poverty, possessing an occasional salted ox here and 
there. 71 
, 
66School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, London ¥issionary 
Society Archives (L.M.S), In-letters, Box 53, Rev. W.e. Willoughby to R W. Thompson, 
Foreign Secretary of the L.M.S. in London, 21 April 11896~ Annual report of assistant 
commissioner, Palapye, 1897, in Colonial Annual Reports, The Bechuanaland Prctectorate, 
1897, 13. 
67L.M.S., In-letters, B.53, Wookeyto Thompson, 20 June 1896. 
68Ibid., H. Williams to Thompson, 15 May, and 5 June] 896. 
69Christian Express, xxvi, 316, 1 October 1896. 
7°S.M. Molema, Montshiwa, 1815-1896: Barolong Chief and Patriot (Cape Town, 1966) 
7IB.B.N.A: G.19-'97: report for Mafeking, 72. 
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In Taung, of the estimated 12,000 cattle before the arrival of the rinderpest, a mere 500 
remained after the devastation of the disease.72 
The murrain repeated this pattern of devastation as it advanced south. Reports of civil 
commissioners and inspectors of "native" locations in those areas through which the 
disease passed in 1896 paint a chilling picture. Here government policy to slaughter 
infected cattle, including those suspected to be infected, and substantially increased the 
already high losses from the rinderpest. 
~ 
Every success claimed by the inspectors of locations for "stamping out" the disease most 
probably implied that there was hardly a head of cattle left. Strict regulation of the 
movement of cattle also added to the toU, as cattle died of starvation and thirst. These 
regulations enforced the kraaling of cattle at night, and prohibited watering cattle in the 
rivers. As many of these areas had experienced successive seasons of drought, almost the 
only place where some grass could be found was on the riverbanks. In Barldy West, for 
example, Afiicans lost almost all their herds through both the strict regulations and the 
disease. In the Machorogan location, "all the cattle [had] been swept off either by the 
rifle or the disease".73 The table below shows the number of cattle thus destroyed in the 
Cape Colony by the end of 1896: 74 
DISTRICT NUMBER SHOT 
MAFEKING 
VRYBURG 
BARKLYWEST 12,000 
HAY 129 
KIMBERLEY 3,022 
HERBERT 60 
72lbid., report for Taung, 77. 
73lbid., report for Barkly West, 9. 
NUMBER DEAD 
FROM DISEASE 
800 
200 
2,149 
TOTAL .. 158,360 
74Agricultural Journal, x, iv, February 1897,223. 
" --' 
TOTAL 
80,000 
6O,&x> 
12,800 
129 
3,222 
2,209 
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Despite the disease appearing in the Cape territories after preventive measures had been 
discovered, the death toll remained high. An estimate for the Cape Colony puts the 
general loss at 35 per cent. However, it specifically excluded mortality among African 
cattle scattered over European farms, on locations and crown lands throughout the 
colony. It also excluded mortality statistics for herds in the extensive African reserves of 
the Transkeian territories.75 Reports of civil commissioners and inspectors of "native" 
locations in the various divisions of the Cape Colony proper corroborate the estimate of 
more than 95 per cent mortality rates. This was undoubtedly a massive calamity76 
Estimates of mortality rates from the Transkeian territories paint a picture of massive 
devastation. Faced with hostile and suspicious black communities, and apprehensive of a 
"native" uprising, the colonial government eschewed the policy of shooting infected 
cattle. This however, contributed to the sweep of the disease and its massive mortality. 
Even a magistrate of a friendly district i~bited predominantly by the Mfengu warned 
that "should the disease once enter the territories, allowing it to take its course will be 
best".77 In newly annexed Pondoland, the resident magistrate resolutely warned: "should 
the disease once enter Pondoland, all attempts to check it within that country will be 
absolutely useless and will only lead to a great waste of money and probably to the 
stirring up of a great deal of ill-feeling".78 The result was runaway mortality, ranging 
from 50 to 95 per cent. 79 
J 
75C.P.P .• G.72A-'98: Cape of Good Hope. RundeIpest Statistiek; also A. Mabin & B. 
Conradie (eds.), The Confidence of the Whole Country: Standard Bank REpOrts on Economic 
Conditions in Southern Africa. 1865-1902 (Johannesburg, 1987) 447. 
76G.19-'97 and G.42-'98, 1897 and 1898, annual reports. 
nC.A., C.M.T. 3/59, resident magistrate, Butterworth, 28 May 1896. 
78Ibid. 3/53, resident magistrate, Bizana, to chief magistrate of the Transkeian.territories, 16 
September 1896. 
79For various district reports, see GA2-'98 annual reports for 1898, 75-140.; also C.A., 
P.M.O 249, rinderpest reports and C.A., C.M.T. 3, reports of resident magistrates. 
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Griqualand East, for its turn, took early and tight precautions to isolate the territory. The 
Cape government built a fence all along the border with Basutoland, placing guards 
along its entire length. It also divided the territory into two sections, sealing both with 
fencing. When the pest broke out in mid-June, however, it spread in its characteristic 
sweep, with mortality estimates between 70 and 90 per cent. 80 Here, too, initial 
inoculation experiments with virulent blood proved disastrous and increased the 
reluctance of cattle-owners to inoculate their herds. 81 
Corroborative evidence of the massive mortality comes from Natal and Zululand. The 
colony had inaugurated perhaps the most efficient anti-rinderpest campaign in the entire 
country. By the end of May 1897, the government had completed isolating the colony 
from the Free State and the Transvaal by a double fence. On the Basutoland border, the 
government destroyed and blocked all passes in the Drakensberg and fenced off what 
loopholes existed. 
It had also divided the colony into two parts with a fence. The cordon started from the 
junction of the Buffalo and Tugela Rivers and ended in the Drakensberg mountains. 
Moreover, the government divided the colony itself into smaller enclosures through 
internal fencing. The only gap in the programme was the southern border with the Cape 
Colony. The Cape government had commenced fencing this border, bht had abandoned 
the effort when the disease appeared in the colony in March 1897. Neverth'eless, the 
boundary had been closed for stock traffic early April with guards stationed along it to 
prevent traffic with the Cape colony. 
Between mid-July and the end of the month, however, the disease sneaked around Natal, 
springing up simultaneously over two-thirds of the territory in an inexplicably haphazard 
8°G.42_'98, 121. 
SIC.A., P.M.O. 249, "Inquiry re: Inoculation Qumbu District", chief magistrate, Kokstad, to 
secretary to the prime minister, Cape Town, 15 October 189T 
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pattern. 82 Mortality was staggering. Some districts lost almost their entire herds; among 
these were Krantzkop, New Hanover, Umlazi, Lower Tugela, Ixopo and Klip River.83 
All other reports from magistrates for 1897 and 1898 consistently refer to heavy losses 
among "native" cattle. Colonial magistrates estimated the mortality among Africans in 
the districts of Msinga and of the Mvoti at 98 and 90 per cent respectively.84 In all other 
districts they specifically observed that losses for Africans were much higher than for 
Europeans, due, again, to the reluctance of Africans to have their herds inoculated. A 
missionary working at the Ipolela mission, for example, reported that the kraals he 
passed on a trip to-the mission "looked desolate, not a beast to be seen".85 As late as 
1906, the number of African-owned cattle in Natal and Zulu land had not yet reached the 
level they had been before the rinderpest. Whereas they were estimated to number 
494,402 in 1896, and the disease had left 75,842 head alive in 1898, they had recovered 
to 343,159 in 1904.86 
Estimates of cattle losses in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State are difficult to 
secure. In both Boer republics Africans were scattered on reserves, or squatted on white 
farms, thus making it difficult to estimate their losses compared with those of whites. In 
the Free State, for example, the daily newspaper reported almost exclusively on the fate 
of white farmers, utterly ignoring that of Afiicans. 87 Most Afiicans living in the boer 
3lCoiony of Natal, Departmental Reports, HI59-HI60. 
~ 
83Ibid., annual reports for districts of Kranzkop, New Hanover, Umlazi, Lower Tugela, 
Ixopo and Klip River, B19, B22, B31, B37, B42, B86; impression confirmed I-m Natal 
Agricultural Journal, I, 2, 1898. 
84Ibid., annual reports for the districts of Umsinga and Umvoti, p B24 and B26. 
8~Library of the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (U.S.P.G.), London, 
Reports from Missionaries in the fields, E Mss., report of Rev. B. Markham, mission of 
Ipolela, Natal, 30 June 1897, vol. B. 
8~atal Departmental Reports, Annual report of the Department of Agriculture, 1902, 12-
15; Natal Census, 931; see also S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-08 Disturbances in 
Natal (Oxford, 1970), 185. 
87See e.g. the editorial of.J:he Friend, 'The State of the Country", 20 July 1897. 
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republics no longer had effective traditional authority and administration. Consequently, 
they now depended entirely on the favour of white settler governments to salvage their 
cattle. They received little assistance. Instead, they were left to draw what comfort they 
could from mounting government regulations enacted to control them and their 
movement. 
The stark phrases of contemporary observers convey the deep sense of hopelessness and 
depression that settled on the pastoral communities throughout, as the murrain unleashed 
unprecedented devastation in its tracks. 88 The destruction of a pillar of the rural economy 
had major repercussions on rural life. It resembled the 1929 Great Wall Street Crash as 
the only storable wealth of the people perished so suddenly. 
In the Bechuanaland Protectorate, observers offered an absolute figure of 800,000 dead 
cattle among the BaNgwaketse alone. This was a loss approximating two-and-a half 
~. 
million pounds at the average price of £3 per head. 89 Of the total £2,241,437 lost by the 
entire Cape Colony proper, the predominantly Afiican districts lost £945,005 in dead 
cattle, or just over 42 per cent of the total loss. Capital losses ranged from £10,700 in the 
district of Uitenhage to approximately £250,000 in the most devastated district, King 
Williamstown. The next two districts that lost the most were Herschel and Glen Grey, 
almost entirely occupied by Africans. 90 
No aggregate mortality statistics exist for the Transkeian Districts. Estimates ofmortaiity 
for the richest district in the territories; however, were made. In Nqamakwe, where the 
disease first broke out early in June 1897, 70,000 head of cattle were dead six months 
later, representing a capital loss of £21 0,000, at £3 per head, in one district alone. 
88For East Africa, see Lugard, The Rise of our East African Empire, 525-6; O. Bauman, 
Durch Massailand Zur Neilquelle (Berlin, 1894), quoted in Kjekshus, Ecology Control, 129 
89F. Coillard, On the Threshold, p 626-7, also Christian Express, xxvii, 328. I October 
1896 .. 
9Oc.p.p., G.72-'98, Rinderpest Statistics. 
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Aggregate estimates, however, mask the extent of individual losses. Individuals were 
totally ruined. Khama's personal losses were said to have soared to 750,000 head, 
representing a capital loss of two-and-a-quarter million pound.91 Among the BaRolong 
of Montshiwa, men who were formerly wealthy were "left with only a sack of hides, the 
luckiest being left with but a handful of cattle". Chief Montshiwa, said to have been the 
largest cattle owner among the BaRolong, died a beggar in 1896.92 
In Pondoland, many men who were wealthy before the outbreak of the disease found 
themselves with "next to nothing left".93 From Tembuland a missionary reported that a 
local headman who had possessed 300 head of cattle some few weeks earlier "had not 
ten" left. He observed that his fate was ''typical of many".94 Chief Zibi of the aMaHlubi 
in Mount Fletcher also lost his entire herd.9.5 While contemporary observers identified 
some wealthy owners, they ignored those lower down the scale. These, however, would 
have suffered the most, as they lost even the few herds they possessed. In East 
Griqualand Archdeacon Chamberlain remarked that "some poor people have lost 
everything".96 
The decimation of cattle precipitated a food crisis, for the rinderpest amved amid an 
unrelenting cycle of other climatic and ecological disasters. The main villains were 
droughts that recurred and annual visitations of locusts. 1896 was esp~ially calamitous 
all round. Early in the year the general manager of the Standard Bank waf/ already 
91 Annual Reports by the assistant cotntnissioner, Palapye, Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1896-
7,13. 
92Molema, Montshiwa, 197. 
93c.M.T. 3/53, report for Bizana, 1897. 
~Mission Chronicle of the Scottish Episcopal Church, no. v, January 1898, report from St. 
Alban's by Rev. S.J. Wallis, 147. 
9~G.42-'98, report for Mt. Fletcher, 125. 
96 Archdeacon Chamberla~, in Mission Chronicle, I, vi, ApriL1898. 
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reporting on "a severe and protracted drought [which had] prevailed, affecting 
Namaqualand, portions of the Transvaal, the Free State, and nearly the whole of the 
Cape Colony".97 It was also the year of the locust "over almost the entire country".98 
The drought, described as "the worst known for a generation",99 unleashed more havoc. 
The drought of 1897, the year the rinderpest consolidated its hold on the entire region, 
was reckoned to be even worse than that of 1896 in many parts of the country. If the 
report from the division of Wodehouse is anything to go by, only 15.11 inches of rain 
fell in 1897. This_ was less than 13 inches than that for 1896. It compared "very 
unfavorably with the r~infall during any of the previous ten years. ,,100 
Thus everywhere other climatic and pestilential disasters preceded and followed the 
rinderpest. They compounded the effects of the pest, or claimed the deviI's due from any 
who might have escaped the ravages of the panzootic. Drought, when accompanying 
the rinderpest, both withered growing crops and made it difficult to tum over the soil 
when draft oxen were scarce. By drying up the pastures, it killed small stock to which 
farmers turned after their cattle were dead. Stock also died of hunger owing to anti-
.. 
rinderpest regulations. These kept all stock away from water sources, almost the only 
places at which any grass was to be found during a drought. Locusts, in turn, devoured 
the few crops planted with so mllch difficulty without draft animals. 
This combined onslaught of drought, locusts and rinderpest precipitated a famine in 
some areas and dire shortages of food in others. lOl Communities, like the BaTswana, 
97Mabin and Conradie, The Confidence, 390; also the unanimous annual reports of colonial 
officials for 1896, in G.5-'96, 
98G.5_'96., 390, 396 
99ibid., 431 
IOOG.42-'98. report for Wodehouse, 55. 
IOlfor reports of near starvation in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, see C.-8141. Correspon-
dence, reports from Geberone and Palapye, April, 1896, in resident commissioner, Mafeking 
to high commissioner, 30 April, 1896, 505 I; L.M.S., in-letters, B.55, H.WilIiams to 
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which would normally have migrated to cattle posts during a drought, found that the 
decimation of their cattle ruled this option out. Those which harvested fair crops in the 
year following the outbreak of the rinderpest faced a new problem - they could not store 
their surpluses in storage pits in their cattle kraals as the stored grain soon rotted because 
there were no stampeding cattle to seal storage pits. 
Moreover, the peasants immediately felt the loss of cattle when they had to commence 
replanting their fields in the 1897-ploughing season. The absence of draft oxen meant 
that people would have, to limit acreage, as they had to resort to the hoe. The two years 
following the rinderpest did not come with any promise of relief The same pattern of 
drought, locusts, and poor harvests recurred throughout the region. In the years following 
the rinderpest, therefore, there was a serious scarcity of food. Peasants could only 
purchase food by selling their surviving herds to traders at enhanced prices. Those who 
had lost all their herds, and thus had no security to obtain credit from local traders, had to 
survive on edible weeds and the locustS. 102 ' 
Dislocation of the transport system compounded the prevailing subsistence crisis. The 
death of oxen directly destroyed the mainstay of the transport system, with a catastrophic 
impact on the transport sector. Although the railways were beginning to take over long 
distance transport by the tum of the century,103 the ox-wagon continued to be the main 
form of land transport until the motor vehicle edged it out after the first World War. 
Without branch lines, ox-wagons provided the only transport linking Joutlying 
Thompson, 27 June, 1898; For the wide-spread starvation among the Southern Tswana in the 
former Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland, recently transferred to the Cape government, 
see, G.42-'98, summary of reports from British Bechuanaland, 5; Ibid. G.31-99, 1899, reports 
for Vryburg, 59, 61, 63, Taung, 65, 67, Mafeking, 69; For serious shortages in the Cape and 
the Transkeian territories, see Ibid., G.5-'96, 6. 
102G.42.98 and G.31-'99; also running commentary in successive numbers of Agricultural 
Journal, xii, 1898; see also successive numbers of Natal Agricultural Journal, 1898 and 1899. 
1030. Tennant, 'The Railway System of South Africa", Paper delivered to the Royal 
Colonial Institute, 2 November 1897, Report of Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute 
(London, 1898),3-30. 
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agricultural areas and industries. 104 The ox-wagon was critical to the entire South 
Afiican economy, as it was essential for transporting essential goods from the coast. lOS 
The rinderpest ruined white and African transport riders. They either abandoned their 
wagons, which remained '10 remind them of their altered conditions",I06 or sold them at 
greatly reduced prices. Whereas a wagon cost £80 at the coast at the beginning of 1896, 
its price had plummeted to £2.3s by May. Otherwise, you could just take an abandoned 
one, "and trust to luck not to meet the former owner later on". 107 
As the ox-wagon transport system collapsed, traders and transport-riding enterprises 
could only rely on "salted cattle" that had recovered from infection. Their value, 
however, soared from an average of £3 to £60, totaling close to more than a thousand 
pounds per span. 108 Others resorted to mules for tractive power. The price of these 
animals, however, also escalated from the normal price of 151- to the inflated rates of 
£15-20 per head. 109 Transport costs, therefore, rose dramatically. In January 1896, the 
cost of transporting goods on the South to North road was 14/- per cwt. In July of the 
same year, it had rocketed to £6 per cwt. 110 In southern Rhodesia., some of those affected 
by the tum of their fortunes complained that whereas the cost of transport at the 
beginning of 1896 was 11 to 20/-, it had risen to £10 early in 1897.111 
I04G.H. Pirie, "Slaughter by Steam: Railway Subjugation of Ox. wagon Transport in the 
Eastern Cape and Transkei, 1886-1910, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 
26, 2 (1993), 3 19-343. 
'05Mabin and Conradie, The Confidence, 423. 
I06G.42-'98, report for Barkly West, 15-16 
107S.S.p. Hyatt, The Old Transport Road (Baal, 1969), 13. 
'08Idem; cf. Agricultural Journal, xi, 6,16 September 1897, 274. 
I09Sykes, With Plumer, 64. 
110 Agricultural Journal, xi, 6, 16 September 1897, 274. 
IIIMabin and Conradie, ~e Confidence, 418. 
J 
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Prices of goods, including food, rose correspondingly: "J see little prospect of any 
serious decline in prices for a long time", wrote 1.e. Molteno to his son, "especially in 
view of the enormous destruction of cattle on account of rinderpest".1I2 Slaughter cattle 
themselves rose in value, obtainable for between £9 and £15 in Johannesburg by October 
1897. 113 The pattern of the dramatic escalation of prices in the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate might serve as an example of what was occurring elsewhere. In March 
1896, the price of mealies went up to 50/- per 200-lb. bag, to 100/- by April, and to 170/-
by October. The price of mealie flour rose to 200/- per 200-lb. bag in August 1896 and 
to 400/- by Octobef. 114, 
Every industry was affected. As the meat industry, especially in the mushrooming urban 
and industrial centres, turned to depend on other stock, especially slaughter sheep and 
fowls, these animals became scarcer and scarcer, with a consequent escalation in 
price. I IS Even the wool industry would not~escape the ripple effects of the devastating 
cattle disease. With cattle dead, the demand for mutton put a high premium on slaughter 
sheep. To reap the advantages of the high prices paid for these animals, farmers rushed 
to cross thoroughbred merino ewes with woolless slaughter rams. Nine to ten months 
later, they could sell the progeny at the enhanced price of upwards of 20/- each. 116 The 
price of fowls rocketed from 1 s. 6d to 8s.6d "over night". 117 
112y' Solomon (ed.), Selections from the Correspondence of Percy AJport Molte60. 1892-
1914 (Cape Town, 1981), 1.e. Molten to Percy Molteno, 8 June, 1896,31. 
1l3Star, 7 October 1897, 6. 
114L.M.S., in-letters, Willoughby to Thompson, 30 March, 21 April 1896;. Wookey to 
Thompson, 24 August, 18 September 1896~ Lloyd to Thompson, 15 September 1896; 
Willoughby to Thompson, 12 October, 1896; Wookey to Thompson, 14 October 1896; 
Willoughby to Thompson, 8 January 1897. 
115e.g. Frieng, 21 October 1898. 
116Mabin and Conradie, The Confidence, 43. 
117Cape Times, 24 Septe;ber 1896. 
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Many poorer people took to subsisting on irregular foods. These included dried meat 
from infected cattle, edible grasses, roots, even non-foods. I IS The northern Transvaal 
suffered the most. Here, the poor wandered around digging and chopping at roots, 
gathering ants, caterpillars, vermin, even old hides, and eating them. Women were 
picking up the grains of maize that fell from the mouths of post mules, while mothers 
were selling their young daughters, even themselves, for food. Others drowned their 
children, or abandoned them to die, because they had nothing to feed them. Many 
deserted their villages in search of food. I 19 Two-thirds of chief Motjatje's people were 
reported to have died of starvation and other related diseases. 120 
Be·sides its economic and social ramifications, the rinderpest also revealed contemporary 
political strains and pointed to their causes. It generated intense suspicions, insidious 
rumours and red herrings everywhere. F<;>remost among these was the ubiquitous 
suspicion that the rinderpest was the deliberate poisoning of African cattle by the whites. 
The purported intention was to reduce Africans to poverty, thus forcing them to work for 
white men. Contemporary pronouncements and activities of labour agents seemed to 
confirm this suspicion. Recurring complaints about the perennially acute shortage of 
African labour at the major labour centres peaked in the 1890s. Indeed, the dramatic 
words of an observer in 1873 held true now more than they did then: "labourers here, 
labourers there, labourers everywhere, and not a man to work.,,]21. 
I 
1I8L.M.S., Box 55, Rev. J.T. Brown (K~ruman) to L.M.S., 1898; also L.M.S., Box 53, Rev. 
Willoughby to L.M.S., 12 October 1896; also G.31-'99, report from Kuruman, 63. 
119Standard and Diggers' News, 15 February 1897; The Christian Expres~ xxvii, 323, 1 
May 1897, 71; P. Rossel, "Valdezia La Famine", Bulletin de la Mission Romande, 11, 127, 
1896,98-99. 
12°Beuster, "Die Hungersnot in Nordtransvaal", Die Evangelischen Missionen, 3, 1997, 
118-9.; Kahl, "Die Fieberepidemic in Transvaal", Ibid., 237-39; P. Rosset, "Valdezia la 
Famine", Bulletin de la Mission Suisse Romande, 11, 127, 1896, 98-99; H. Berthoud 
Kuebgne abd E. Creux, "La Destresse au Transvaal", Ibid., 11, 132, 1897, 230-34; E. Creux, 
"La Detresse au Transvaal!:; Ibid., 11, 131, 1897, 304-5. 
- 12lFrieng., 13 February 1873, quoted in Kimble, "Labour MiWation in Basutoland", 121. 
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The rinderpest crisis was to be a rare occasion during this period when various sections 
of divided white South Africa came together. Many predicted that the rinderpest would 
drive Africans to labour centres, thus solving, at one stroke, the perennial labour 
shortage. Colonial officials and many employers were quick to see this advantage, as 
various reports indicated: 
Never would a scheme such as opening up railways come at a more 
opportune time, for I feel, in their present state of mind, if something by 
which they could enrich themselves were to present it to them, it would 
be a great boom. .. 
-
The loss of their [Mpondo] cattle from rinderpest may bring about a 
change and force them out of their locations to seek employment. I hope 
it will do so. 
These circumstances need not necessarily be regarded as an unmixed 
evil. It will probably have the effect of compelling hundreds of able-
bodied young men .... to go out and earn an honest livelihood by hard 
work. 
It is hoped that the losses sustained by the natives will ultimately awaken 
the men to the necessity there exists for developing habits of industry. 
The ravages of the rinderpest although reducing the natives to poverty 
have not been without beneficial results, and the native has now learnt 
humility to those to whom he is subordinate, and also the lesson that by 
work only can he live, and having learnt to work he is now a happy and 
contented man instead of the discontented indolent, lazy, and besotted 
being he was when the numerous cattle he possessed provided\his every 
want. J 
The sole counterbalancing goQ<! is that the rinderpest will com~l the 
natives to work on the railway, which will become a famine relief 22 
Missionaries throughout the field voiced similar sentiments. "God never made a lazier 
set than the Bechuana", proclaimed Rev. Willoughby of the LMS in the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate, "and if this hard year will compel some of them to work, it will be 
122G. 42-98, report from Elliotdale, 96, Umsikaba, Ill, Griqualand East, 122, Willowvale, 
82, Agricultural Journal of the Cape of Good Hope, ix., 1896, respectively; also Natal 
Departmental Reports, 1897, B22. 
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good".123 Later, he would strongly object to his Society's relief scheme for the 
BaTswana, especially the "indiscriminate" distribution of the food. Humanitarianism, he 
argued, would militate against the timely lesson that God had dispatched the rinderpest 
to administer. "The able-bodied should work or starve", he admonished. 124 
Other missionaries made similar predictions. The secretary-general of the LMS 
welcomed the rinderpest among the BaTswana for it would "drive the natives into the 
labour market". 125 Elsewhere, in the Transkeian and Ciskeian territories, the missionaries 
unanimously saw the nnderpest as the "iII wind which after all brings some goOO".126 
They went so far as to regard even the hapless Africans in the Transvaal as potential 
labourers. This was because the sheer need for survival amid the rinderpest devastation 
would compel them to seek employment. 127 
Agitation to reduce the wages of mine w2rkers and to increase their working hours 
mounted on the eve of the rinderpest. The time appeared propitious, considering the 
widespread drought of the year, the devastation of crops by locusts, and the raging 
rinderpest epizootic. Urging the immediate reduction of wages, the manager of the 
Ferreira Gold Mining Company and president of the Mine Managers' Association, J.R.. 
Johns, cheered: "At the present moment, natives-have-to-work-lrecause 1hey-cannot 
obtain food otherwise, and therefore I think we have a splendid opportunity to bring this 
change into operation". 128 
123L.M.S., in-letters, Box 53, WiUoughbyto Cousins, 29 June 1896. 
124Ibid., Willoughby to Cousins, 9 June 1897. 
mAfrican Review, ix, 19 Dec. 1896,555. 
126 U.S.P.G., E.Mss, Rev. Charles Teberer, Keiskamahoek, 31 Dec. 1898. 
127 Christian Express, xxvii, 323, 1 May 1897, 71. 
128 Star, 1 July, 1896. 
~ 
J 
42 
Africans were to confinn their fears and suspicions when the mining management acted 
upon this rhetoric. In September 1896, with the rinderpest ravaging through the country, 
they reduced drastically the wages by 30 per cent while also lengthening working 
hourS. 129 They also deployed an unprecedented army of recruiters and touts in the 
countryside to gather the expected fiuits of the rinderpest, desperate migrants. 130 
These suspicions generated an explosive atmosphere. Colonial officials and whites from 
various occupation~ reported a universal anti-colonial and anti-white phobia. From the 
Transkeian territories an the magistrates reported that Africans were seeking revenge and 
recompense for their enonnous cattle losses. "The maintenance of peace hung of a hair", 
reported the magistrate of the normally tranquil Nqamakwe district of Transkei. "One 
injudicious act on my part", he continued, "one brawl, a quarrel between two rival 
factions, might have kindled the flame ofa terrible war". 131 
The theme of the "restless native" is, of course, elusive for the historian of this volatile 
period. A thin line always divided the actual existence of covert rebellious action and its 
reflection in the paranoiac minds of those who believed its existence. These European 
fears and suspicions however only helped to fuel distrust and a disturbed state of mind 
among Africans. Ever receptive to conspiracy theories, many colonial officials and white 
people embraced these rumours of "restive natives", took precautionkry measures or 
made the necessary preparations for war. So similar were these responses thAt a few 
random selections should represent all .. 
119Report of the Chamber of Mines, South African Mining Journal, 7 November. 1896. 
130 A. Jeeves, "Control of Migratory Labour on the South African Gold Mines in the Age of 
Kruger and Milner", Journal of Southern African Studies, 2 (1975), 3-29; Jeeves, "Over-
reach: TIle South African Gold Mines and the Struggle for the Labour of Zambesia, 1890-
1920", Canadian Journal of~African Studies, 17 (1983), 391-412. 
13JG.42_'98, report for Nqamakwe, 76 
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No sooner had the disease appeared in the Bechuanaland Protectorate than the Colonial 
Office became "anxious about state of affairs [there] in consequence of the rinderpest, 
&c.". The staff of the Colonial Office went further to probe if something could not be 
done to "strengthen our position there by sending from Cape Town British troops or by 
other means",132 Further south, in the former Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland, 
Cape forces precipitated a rebellion of the Southern Tswana. The immediate spur to the 
rebellion was BaTswana disaffection with the government shooting their infected herds, 
including those s~spected to be infected. IJ3 The ensuing rebellion scared the staff of the 
Colonial Office who felt that it was "causing restlessness among the BaK wena in neigh-
bouring Bechuanaland Protectorate" whose herds the rinderpest was decimating. They 
also suspected that Chief Sebele of the BaKwena, '\vho is always ready to cany on 
intrigue against the government", was in league with the rebels. 134 
The rumours of a looming African rebellion so alarmed the magistrate of the Nqamakwe 
district of the Transkei that he ordered a store of rifles and ammunition after sending his 
family to safety. I35 In East Griqualand the unrelenting rumours of a looming rebellion 
by Africans who exploited the rinderpest crisis to express old grievances led to the arrest 
of a suspected agitator, Andreas Le Fleur, and his committal to trial for sedition. 136 
From the Natal border district of lxopo, there were persistent reportA of an imminent 
African risirIg. There now came a eri de coeur for troop reinforcements. The Cape 
government responded by sending in a hundred and fifty Cape Mounted Rifles to join 
the force of one hundred men already stationed at the Griqualand East capital, 
132C.-8141, Correspondence, Chamberlain to Robinson, 14 April 1896, 22. 
LBSaker and Aldridge, "The Origins of the Langeberg Rebellion". 
J34C.O. 179/200, xiv, minute by Penny to Lord Selbome, 2 October 1897. 
136G.42_98, report for Griqualand East, 1898, 119. 
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Kokstad. 137 The Colonial Office in London was anxIOUS over the "serious news". 
Officials kept their fingers crossed that the Natal administration. would.leamfrom. the 
blunders of the Cape government that had precipitated the Langeberg rebellion. 138 By 
then, however, Natal authorities had completed anning white residents living in African 
districts in anticipation of an African rebellion. 139 Volatile Zululand was aflame with 
rumours of "restlessness". This fluid atmosphere, amid alanning rumours of an 
imminent Zulu uprising, persuaded colonial officials to postpone the decision to allow 
the exiled Zulu King Dinuzulu to return from exile. They felt that the presence of this 
veteran anti-col9nial ftgure would provide the necessary inspiration for the rumoured 
imminent uprising. 140 
Only Swaziland seems to have been spared the wild rumours of a disease suspected to be 
the white man's weapon to destroy the wealth of Africans. 141 This added credence to the 
view of imperial officials that it was the Transvaal boers who had poisoned the minds of 
Africans. The former, it was believed, were responsible for the rumour that "Mr. Rhodes 
had introduced the rinderpest as a policy to Matabeleland, the Transvaal, Orange Free 
State and Basutoland". "The same propaganda could not be spread in Swaziland," the 
ftrm disciple of this theory, Godfrey Lagden, opined, "as the new political masters in 
Swaziland were the Transvaal Boers themselves". 142 
, 
137Ibid., minute by Just, 20 July, in encl, from governor of Natal to secretary of ~ for the 
colonies, 19 July, 1897; E.A. Mackay, "Reminiscences of the Cape Mounted Rifles: 1896-
98", Territorial News, 8, 15 and 22 Octob~r, 1959. 
me. 0., 1791200, viv, minute by Penny to Lord Selborne, 2 October 1897. 
139Standard and Diggers' News, 15 December 1896. 
J40e.O. 427/25, governor to secretary of state, 9 October 1896, enclosing conference minute 
no. 58, minute to governor, 7 October 1896. 
141Colonial Office Confidential Print, e.0. 8791515 on the rindetpest in South Africa has 
very little to say about the disease in swaziland. 
142Rhodes House, MSS. ~fr. S. 210 (1), Lagden Papers, Lagden to Rosmead, 16 January 
1897. 
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Nevertheless, this territory was not isolated from the general scare of an African uprising 
sweeping through the entire region during the rinderpest devastation. Suspicion was rife 
during the whole rinderpest period. 143 Typically, the Transvaal government, which 
jointly ruled Swaziland with Britain, took advantage of the rinderpest disaster to enforce 
the payment of a new onerous hut-tax. 
Rumours of active Swazi preparations for an uprising against the newly introduced tax 
were rife. Sensing looming trouble, the British consul in Swaziland postponed his leave 
"in view of the unsett,lement among the natives that is likely to be produced by the 
rinderpest". 144 Reports were astir that the Swazi were smuggling arms via Mozambique. 
Th~ relocation of the Swazi king's residence on a hill fortress seemed ominous. In 
anticipation, boers living in the eastern districts of the TrarIsvaal, were reported to be 
amassing guns and ammunition. 145 
This prevalent social restlessness, insidious rumours, suspicions and the political 
undertones accompanying the rinderpest extended even to "placid" Basutoland. On the 
eve of the outbreak of the. disease, relations between the BaSotho and the imperial 
administration seemed most tranquil. So reassuring were they that the Colonial Office 
was confident that the BaSotho would be spared the political alarms the disease 
generated among their neighbours. l46 Yet behind this facade, tension and restlessness 
\ 
J 
143F. Mashasha, "The Road to Colonialism: Concessions and the Collapse of Swazi Inde-
pendence: 1875-1926", unpublished Ph.D thesis, Oxford University (1977). 
144c. O. 417/221, Chamberlain to Millner, 25 September 1897. 
'4SSodlean Library, Oxford, Milner MSS 4, vol 11, Sir Alfred Milner Papers, Green to 
Milner (private and secret), 13 August, 1891; ibid., Sir Walter Heiy-Hutchinson to Milner, 14 
August, 1897; Milner MSS 6 (a), Milner to Green, 6 August, 1897. 
146c.O., 41711 86, Minute by Meade (undated), on Rosmead to Chamberlain, 30 October 
1896. 
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gathered. The ominous news of the approaching catastrophe, including colonial efforts to 
keep the panzootic at bay, brought these underlying tensions to the surface. 
J 
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CHAPTER 2 
BASUTOLAND AND TIIE BASOTHO ON THE EVE OF THE RINDERPEST 
BasutoIand lay in the south-east comer of the South African High Veld. It was 
enclosed on all sides by territories under European settler governments. Separating it 
from the boer republic of the Free State on its northern and western border was the 
Caledon River and a treaty line. On its eastern border, separated in part by the 
Drakensberg escarpment, lay the European settler colony of Natal and the Griqualand 
East section of the Cape Colony. The Orange River and its tributaries marked the 
remainder of its boundary with the Cape in the South. 
2.1: Basutoland (Lesotho) in relation to surrounding territories 
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The land lies generally 4,000 and 11,000 feet above sea level. It comprises three 
distinctive regions: the western lowlands, the intermediate foothills and the easte~ 
mountains. On the western side of the Caledon River relief is low, rising eastwards 
from 4,000 - 6,000 feet where it merges into the more high-lying region. The foothills 
stretch eastwards, rising to high altitudes into the mountain region. Both lowlands and 
foothills possess a topographical formation characterised by flat ground intercepted at 
many points by hills most of which form extensive plateaux. The upper reaches of the 
mountain region, rising to an altitude of 11,000 feet, possess steep topography, and 
thin soil depth. Plains and valleys, however, also intercept the mountains, enabling 
cultivation to occur. 
2.2: Relief Map of Lesotho 
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The best agricultural and pastoral land is found in the lowlands, followed by the 
foothills. There one finds fertile soils, abundant water fed by many running springs 
and rivers, snow melt, high rainfall, and lush pastures. The pattern of rainfall - its 
amount, effectiveness, length, how it falls, its degree of certainty varied throughout 
the nineteenth century.! Its amount, however, was adequate in normal years to sustain 
the expanding agro-pastoral economy. The highest amount, more than 70 per cent, 
normally comes when BaSotho funners need it most, during the growing season 
between October and March. Slow evaporation and snow-melt compensate for low 
precipitation in years of scanty rains. 
On the eve of the rinderpest, the country was inhabited predominantly by Sotho-
speaking people. They, with some incorporated Nguni clusters, were then, as now, 
known as the BaSotho. This BaSotho nation state dated from the demographic, 
political and social turmoil of the period usually called the Difaqane. The latter 
process has perplexed historians, stirring an historiographical debate. The details of 
the controversy need not detain us here.2 For our purposes it is enough to recognise 
that the process seems to have been a result of a conjuncture of forces. They included 
IR.C. Germond (assembled and translated), Chronicles of Basutoland: A Running 
Commentary on the Events of the Years 1830-1902 by the French Protestavt Missionaries in 
Southern Africa (Morija, 1967), 580; also E. Eldredge, "Drought, Famine and Disease in 
Nineteenth-Century Lesotho", African Economic History, no. 16 (1987), 61-93, mcpecially 
67. 
2F or the debate on the Difagane, see report of, and commentaries on, a colloquium on "The 
Mfecane Aftermath" Towards a new Paradigm", University of Witwatersrand, 6-9 September 
1991, in South African Historical Journal, 25 (1991), 154-176; A selection of the papers 
presented at the colloquium has been published in C. Hamilton (cd), The Mfecane Aftermath: 
Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History (Johannesburg and Pietermaritzburg, 
1995); For earlier stirrings against the accepted paradigm, see, J. Cobbing, "The Mfecane as 
Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo", Journal of African History, 29, 3 (1988), 
487-519; J. Richner, "The Withering Away of the Difaqane: or a Change of Paradigm", B.A. 
(Hons.) dissertation, Rhodes University, 1988; J. Wright and J. Cobbing, "The Mfecane: 
Beginning the Inquest", Paper presented to the African Studies Institute, University of 
Witwatersrand, 1988 
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demographic pressure, climatic changes and the desire of local leaders to control 
lucrative emerging trade opportunities. J 
All these seem to have required the greater consolidation of former separate small-
scale chiefdoms. It also encouraged centralisation of power for greater control over 
resources. The need to improve offensive or defensive capacity seems to have also 
featured prominently in this process. The result was that the former smaller clan-
based political units of the region gave way to larger kingdoms. Locally based clans 
were incorporated into these more complex concentrations. The BaSotho state was 
one of these experiments at political centralisation. 4 
By a combination of fate, military prowess and grit, the BaSotho survived these 
disruptions territorially intact. They also were fortunate to inherit in their founding 
father, King Moshoeshoe, the leadership of a brilliant military strategist, a shrewd 
politician, an astute diplomat, a great Statesman and a potential national-builder. 
Under his leadership, the various Sotho-speaking communities that had survived the 
Difaqane were to fuse with non-Sotho refugees from these disturbances into a 
cohesive nation. 
3por the main theories on the causes of the "Difaqane", see 1. Guy, "Ecological Factors in 
the Rise of Shaka and the Zulu Kingdom", in S. Marks and A. Atmore (~), Economy and 
Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa (London, 1980), 102-147; 1. Guy, "Analrsing Pre-
Capitalist societies in Southern Africa", Journal of Southern African Studies. 14, 1 (1987), 
18-37; M. Hall, "Archaeology and Modes of Production in Pre-Colonial Southern Africa", 
Ibid., 14, 1 (1987), 1-17; J. Orner-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteentb-Century 
Revolution in Bantu Africa (Evanston, 1969); A. Smith, "The Trade of DeJagoa Bay as a 
Factor in Nguni Politics", in L. Thompson (ed.), African Societies in Southern Africa 
(London, 1969), 171-189. 
'*The literature on BaSotho traditions of origin and migrations and the formation ofBaSotho 
state is too extensive to list here. See the bibliography, especially, Ashton (1967); Burman 
(1982); CasaIis (1861, 1889); Dornan (1909); Eldredge (1993); Ellenberger and Macgregor 
(1969); Germond (1967); Gill (1993); Hall (1987); Inskeep (1978); Kimble (1978); Lagden 
(1909); Laydevant (1952); Legassick (1969), 86-125; Lye and Murray (1980); Machobane 
(1990); MacGregor (1976); Mitchell (1992), 3-34; Orpen (1857); Sanders (1975); Sheddick 
(1953); Thompson (1975); Tylden (1950). 
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On the eve of the rinderpest, the size of Basutoland was only a fraction of its original 
extent. Afrikaner farmers now occupied the entire territory to the west of the Caledon 
River. These were descendants of boers who had trekked northwards from the Cape 
Colony in the 1830s. They had arrived on the outskirts of the mushrooming BaSotho 
state in their bid to escape from British influence in the Cape. A series of BaSotho-
Boer wars in the 1850s and 60s, combined with a vacillating British colonial policy 
over the region and the sheer incompetence of some British colonial officials, 
deprived the BaSotho of this extensive territory. Known as the "Conquered 
Territory", it covered ~bout 3,000 sq. miles of the most fertile arable land and the 
richest wheat-growing area in the entire South Africa 
Wearied by war, and with his people in dire straits as the boers redoubled their efforts 
to destroy his budding state, King Moshoeshoe eventually succeeded after repeated 
requests over many years in obtaining British protection. The Crown eventually took 
over the BaSotho as British subjects and proclaimed their country a protectorate on 12 
March 1868. Britain, however, had annexed Basutoland reluctantly, against the 
Colonial Office's aversion to further colonial expansion. Consequently, in 1871 
Basutoland was placed under the administration of the Cape colony, to which Britain 
granted responsible government a year later, in 1872. 
Under the Cape administration, 1871-1881, the BaSotho made a refuarkable 
comeback despite their truncated territory and their miserable plight. The extension of 
Cape colonial rule to the country enabled the BaSOtllO to participate directly in the 
unfolding economic expansion of the region. They exploited the opportunities offered 
by the burgeoning Cape mercantile capitalist economy. Later, they gained from the 
economic boom unleashed by the mineral discoveries. Contemporaries and later 
historians have marvelled at the BaSotho's enhanced agricultural production in the 
1870s. They have also commented on how the BaSotho exploited the opportunities 
offered by the insatiable-demand for labour in the mushrooming labour industries in 
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this period. By the mid 1870s, Basutoland had legitimately earned itself the twin 
reputation of being the "granary of South Africa" and the main supplier oflabour.5 
Despite the prosperity and apparent tranquillity of the decade of Cape colonial rule, 
tensions resulting from economic, political and social restructuring were aIreaay 
mounting by the end of the 1870s. They exploded in the BaSotho rebellion of 1880-
1.6 Consequently, the British Crown reluctantly re-annexed the country in 1884 when 
Cape colonial rule proved no longer tenable. 
Careful to avoid the mistake of the Cape government in imposing direct colonial rule, 
and limited by fmancial and personnel restraints, the imperial government 
experimented with a parallel administration of the country. For day-to-day 
administration, it relied on the existing hierarchy of chieftainship, contenting itself 
with maintaining internal order and secur~ the country's borders.7 Consequently, it 
maintained a skeletal staff. On the eve of the rinderpest, this consisted of the resident 
commissioner who reported directly to the high commissioner in Cape Town, seven 
5See especially the running commentary by Germond, Chronicles, 462-471; E. Eldredge, A 
South African Kingdom: The Pursuit of Security in Nineteenth-Century Lesotho (Cambridge, 
1993); J. Kimble, "Towards an Understanding of the Political Economy of Lesotho: The 
Origins of Commodity Production and Migrant Labour, 1830-c1885", Unpublished M.A. 
thesis, National University of Lesotho, 1978. 
J 
~or the Cape government's rule of Basutoland and the BaSotho rebellion against it, see, R. 
Ajulu, "The Gun-War in Lesotho: Aspects of Capitalist Penetration and Class Formation", 
paper delivered at the Mohlomi Seminars, Department of History, National University of 
Lesotho, 1980; E. Bradlow, "The Cape Government's Rule of Basutoland, 1871-1883", 
Archives Year Book for South African History, xxxi, 2, 1968, 119-217; Burman, Chiefdom 
Politics; 1.M. Mohapeloa, Government by Proxy: Ten Years of Cape Colony in Lesotho 
(Morija, 1971). 
7For the thrifty hand of the exchequer and its influence on colonial policy and imperial 
administration, see, B. Blakeway, The Colonial Office. 1868-1892 (Durham, 1972); A. 
Burton, "Treasury Control and Colonial Policy in the Late Nineteenth-Century", Public 
Administration, 44 (1966), 169-71; For a more detailed survey of the status of British 
imperial rule of BasutolaQd, see R.M. Cassidy, "Britain and Basutoland: A Study of Men and 
Policies from the Gun War to the Anglo-Boer War", unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of 
California, Los Angeles, 1967. -
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district commissioners, a government secretary, an accountant and a police officer 
commanding a BaSotho police force numbering 259 men. 
Besides the skeletal staff, imperial officials in Basutoland faced the rinderpest crisis 
with hardly any fmancial resources.8 The Colonial Office strictly insisted that they 
balance expenditure against revenue. The BaSotho provided the latter through annual 
hut-tax remittances. To balance the budget, the Cape government contributed an 
annual sum of£20,000 in place of customs duties.9 
In charge of this administration on the eve of the rinderpest was Sir Godfrey Lagden. 
Impetuous, demanding, neurotic and highly tactless,IO Lagden, however, was an 
efficient and conscientious administrator. His experience and skill in managing 
turbulent Basutoland clearly impressed his contemporaries in ''native administration". 
In mid-1900, amid the raging South Afri6al1 War, his superior, the fastidious high 
commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, appointed him to the difficult position of Transvaal 
Commissioner for Native Affairs. Milner, whose choice of efficient civil servants is 
legend, so trusted Lagden's .. abilities that he subsequently appointed him chairperson 
of the all-important 1903-05 South African Native Affairs Commission. II 
Moreover, Lagden inherited from his predecessor, Sir Marshal Clarke, a securely es-
~ 
tablished edifice that he could not undo. Clarke, was imbued with unique 9ualities. 
8Cassidy, "Britain and Basutoland". 
9c.O. 48/510, original draft by Sir Hercules Robinson, attached to correspond~ce between 
Derby and law officers, 2 January 1884; For a more detailed survey of the status of British 
imperial rule of Basutoland, see R.M. Cassidy, uBritain and Basutoland: A Study of Men and 
Policies from the Gun War to the Anglo-Boer War", unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of 
California, Los Angeles, 1967. 
IOSee e.g. L.N.A., S7/3112, Lerotholi to Lagden, 31 October 1897; Rhodes House, Lagden 
Papers, Mss. Afr. S. 213, 5/2" "Memorandum on Draft Despatch", 6. 
IlRhodes House, Milner Papers, FK 1194, Milner to Selbof.!1e, 14 April 1904, 262::64. 
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Relentlessly patient, sage, firm, just and tactfu~ 12 he succeeded in eventually winning 
the tacit trust and confidence of many BaSotho chiefs and people, including the most 
recalcitrant or dissident chiefs. \3 Correspondence between BaSotho chiefs and his 
successor, Godfrey Lagden, abounds with abundant encomiums for Clarke, urging 
Lagden to follow in his footsteps. 
Clarke's policy in Basutoland was so successful that the Colonial Office selected him 
as the best man to -"Basutolandize" the troubled Zululand administration in 1894.14 
, 
"The principle I hold", he stated, outlining the policy he had carried out in Basutoland 
and would pursue in his new post, 
is that natives are the best judges in their domestic affairs, that the 
chiefs are the natural representatives of the natives, and that in place of 
abusing the chiefs as is rather the fashion in Natal it is better both for 
us and for the Zulus to make use of them and ifpossible gain their trust 
and confidence. 15 
Clarke securely established the strategy of "masterly inactivity" as the most effective 
to manage BaSotho affairs. 16 It turned necessity into virtue. Without a visible force to 
strengthen their authority, imperial officials depended entirely on their patience, while 
12J. Widdicombe, Fourteen Years in Basutoland: A Sketch of Afriqan Mission Life 
(London, 1891), C.O. 417/11, minute by Fairfield, 1 September on Robinson to Stanhope, 10 
August 1886. . J 
BOn Clarke, see J. Widdicombe, Fourteen Years, 242; Sir Henry Rider Haggard's 
dedication to Clarke, Swallow: A Tale of the Great Trek (London, 1899), v; C.0.4171l1, 
Minutes by Fairfield and Herbert, 1 and 2 September respectively, on Robinson to Stanhope, 
10 August, 1886. 
14C.0. 417/94, minute by Fairfield, undated, on annual report for Basutoland, 1892-93; see 
also R. Edgecombe, "Sir Marshall Clarke and the Abortive Attempt to 'Basutolandise' 
Zulu land, 1893-7", Journal of Natal and Zulu History, 1 (1978), 43-53. 
15Rhodes House, Lagden Papers, Clarke to Lagden, 3 March 1894. 
I~.g., C.O. 417/13, Clarke to Letsie, 13 December 1886, in Robinson to secretary of state 
for colonies, 26 January 1887, and Clarke's successor, ten years later, Lagden Papers, Lagden 
,Diaries, entry for 24 January 1897. -
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using their tact and personal relationships with the BaSotho chiefs to resolve crises. 
The success of this strategy ensured that in BasutoIand, unlike elsewhere in the 
region, the imperial administration eschewed the use of military force to maintain 
public order. As thy architect of the strategy stated when advising his more impetuous 
successor, 
... The employment of force in Basutoland will modify all preceding 
conditions and offer a fresh problem for solution. There seems to me a 
danger that a section of the European popUlation in South Africa will, 
in consequence of the collapse of the Matabele, believe that in maxims 
and machine gnns are to be found the solution of the native question 
and all its difficulties. 17 
Although the staff of the Colonial Office in London allowed Lagden flexibility, they 
judged his strategy by what had now become colonial policy par excellence: "a 
government by moral force." His experiences in the Basutoland administration were 
to teach him a lesson on the best qualities for a colonial administrator. One of "the 
essentials to ultimate success in governing an alien people", he argued in 1899, was: 
"select men as governors who are distinguished rather for public spirit, tact, vigour 
and sound common sense than for genius". 18 
His counterpart in the joint administration was paramount chief Lero\holi, a grand son 
of King Moshoeshoe. He succeeded as the paramount chief at the ripe age ofJifty-five 
in 1892. While he waited his turn 8:S his father, Letsie, lingered on in his dotage, 
Lerotholi had effectively assumed the reigns of government. His administrative 
abilities and vigour were unquestionable. Both BaSotho and colonial sources agree in 
acclaiming him as an extraordinarily capable administrator. When he died in 1905, the 
colonial press consistently presented him as a model of the best of ''native'' chiefs. 
"The death of Lerotholi", the Standard eulogised him, ''removes a native governor of 
'7Ibid., Clarke to Lagden, 20 July 1894. 
18G. Lagden, "Colonial Administration for the United States", in The Independent Ii, 2656, 
26 October 1899,2861, in Lagden Papers. 
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state-manlike mind; one of the few to whom power meant more than the opportunity 
for self-indulgence.,,19 
Relations between Lagden and Lerotholi were endemically tant bien que mru, at best. 
They were to be tested severely by the rinderpest crisis. Lagden acutely distrusted the 
paramount chief, accusing him of persistent deceit.20 For his part, Lerotholi was 
shrewd and wily. He was also resolute, strenuously rebuffing imperial functionaries 
when he considered them unduly encroaching on his authority and prerogatives. Long 
before Africans asserted their dignity and demanded that their white compatriots 
respect them as human beings, Lerotholi had already driven home that message: ''1 
say are we black people, are we people or are we animals, what are we? Or what are 
we looked upon as being?". He once confronted the highest imperial officer in the 
country: 
Chief although we are black we too are people, we are like all God's 
creatures, the only fault with us is this black colour we have it is it 
which is killing us that we are looked upon like animals ... .! am 
speaking about this disrespect with which you are always disrespecting 
me, as If! am nobody - whereas Chief you know although I am black I 
am far older than you are in years. You are only greater than I am in 
chieftainship. And, I say chief that all the Resident Commissioners and 
the magistrates none of them has ever treated me as you are treating 
me, grown up people speak to each other respectively but you when 
you talk to these black people you talk to us as if you are tal~ing to a 
little child. 2 1 ,I 
Lerotholi was so determined to preserve his own authority and what was left of the 
BaSotho autonomy that when he died in 1905, speculation within the colonial and 
settler community predicted the demise of an autonomous Basutoland. Imperial and 
19Standard, 3 August 1905; see also Western Daily Mercury, II September 1905. 
~.g. Rhodes House, Lagden Papers, private letter by Lagden to Milner, 26 December 
1897. 
21L.N.A., S7/3112, Lerotholi to Lagden, 31 October 1897. 
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colonial newspapers intimated that his death was a good opportunity to substitute the 
authority of the resident commissioner for that ofthe paramount chief.22 
Nor were relations between the paramount chief and his subordinate chiefs cordial, 
straining requisite co-operation during the rinderpest crisis. Ahhough the quagmire of 
dynastic conflict that beset the BaSotho polity at the end of the century originated 
from pre-colonial times, it had worsened in the years before the outbreak of the 
rinderpest.23 The BaSotho rebellion against the Cape colonial administration in 1880 
, 
reflected and exacerbated these tensions. The issue of disarmament, which was the 
immediate cause of the rebellion, sharply pitted one chiefly faction against another, 
dividing the entire nation into factions. 24 
When the anti-colonial war formally ended, bitterness and resentment between the 
factions in the war persisted. The course of the war shifted from its original cause, 
becoming a destructive fratricidal war to settle old scores. Those who surrendered 
their arms and fought under the colonial banner were abandoned by their colonial 
mentors. They now bore the odium of treachery as those who had prosecuted the anti-
colonial war determined that they should suffer more severe penance for their sins. 
"Rebel" chiefs allegedly deprived many "loyal" chiefs of their territorial jurisdiction. 
I 
22See, e.g., Standard, 4 September 1905 . 
23F or more detailed discussion of dynastic conflicts in Basutoland, see I. Hammet, "Koena 
Chieftainship Seniority in Basutoland", Africa, xxxv, 3 (1965); Hammet, Chieftainship and 
Legitimacy: An Anthropological Study of Executive Law in Lesotho (London, 1975); L.B.J. 
Machobane, Government and Change in Lesotho. 1800-1966: A Study of Political' Institutions 
(London, 1990); T. Mothibe, "Chieftaincy and Legitimation in Pre-colonial Lesotho", Paper 
presented to the Southern Africa Joint History Seminar, National University of Lesotho, 1-3 
August 1988; T. Quinlan, 'Marena a Lesotho': Chiefs, Politics, and Culture in Lesotho", 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1995; L. Thompson, Survival in Two 
Worlds: Moshoeshoe of Lesotho, 1786-1870 (Oxford, 1975); R. Weisfelder, "The Basotho 
Monarchy", in R. Lemarchand (ed.), African Kingdoms in Perspective (London, 1977), 160-
189. 
24Burman, Chiefdom Politics. 
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They also expropriated the lands and property of the subjects and followers of the 
"loyal" chiefs. So embittered did relations become that they occasioned significant 
population movements within and out of the country, changing the political map of 
the region.25 
In its turn, Pax Britannica exacerbated these tensions after the country's protectorate 
status was restored in 1884. In attempting to reestablish the stability and order 
shattered by the 'Gun-War' and the ensuing civil strife, the imperial administration 
, 
sought to revive the waning central authority of the paramount chief and to restore the 
traditional hierarchy of chieftainship. This policy, however, fuelled the intense 
jealousies of other chiefly lineages.26 Indeed, the strategy of the imperial 
administration was precisely to maintain a dynamic equilibrium between the warring 
factions. It enabled the administration to Jocalise potential anti-colonial activity by 
frustrating any common purpose. This strategy was also self-debilitating. It 
paradoxically attempted to sustain a hierarchical structure by centralising the 
authority of the paramountcy while simultaneously weakening it in the districts. The 
--
imperial administration further consolidated localism by extending the Cape colonial 
administration's policy of dividing the country into near autonomous districts. 
, 
Paramount authority also suffered severe erosion during the feeble administration of 
J 
King Moshoeshoe's successor. At a critical moment in their history when the BaSotho 
needed robust and assertive leadership, Letsie was never a strong ruler. At an already 
advanced age of sixty when he took over the paramountcy of the deeply divided 
polity in 1870, he lingered on for twenty years. By the time of his death in 1891, 
25C. 3708, report of interview between the premier and the secretary for native affairs and 
certain Basotho chiefs, councillors and headmen, 14 March, 1883; A. 24-83, petition of loyal 
chiefs, encl. In secretary for native affairs to acting governor's agent, 3 December 1881; Blue 
Books, 1882, opinion of acting governor's agent, 107 ff., Ibid., G.8-83, 258; On the 
complicated settlement of Matatiele, see G. Bardsley, "Politics and Land in Matatiele, 1844-
1900: A Report from the Archives", Social Dynamics, 8, 2 (1982),47-82. 
26Weisfelder, "The Basotho Monarchy". 
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Letsie had long since lapsed into a state of decrepitude and senility. 27. His half 
brother, Sophonia, likened him to "an old bullock that cannot work any more and, 
therefore, is no longer fit for publicaffairs".28 
And so, the feeble government and senile administration that characterised the last 
years of Letsie's reign emboldened other chiefly factions, including his own brothers 
and sons, to encroach on the authority and prerogatives of the paramount. His 
younger brother, Molapo and the latter's sons, Jonathan and Joe4 lorded it over the 
northern districts oLLeribe and Butha-Buthe, while his second brother, Masupba, 
~ 
resolutely resisted the paramount chiefs interference in the affairs of his district of 
Berea. 
The accession of his more vigorous heir and successor, Lerotholi, signalled a more 
stable administration and potent paramount~y. Lerotholi was determined to revamp 
the waning authority of the paramount. However, the vigour with which he pursued 
this aim, and the high-handed methods he often used, embittered opponents who 
already resented his vindictive energy, hot temper and incessant ambition. Lerotholi 
--
came out vigorously against the erosion of the authority of the paramount, while his 
brothers and uncles declared no less emphatically for district rights. 
And so, throughout the 1890s the head that wore the crown wore it unJasily, and none 
more uneasily than Lerotholi. Molapo's so~ Jonathan, in the north, hiS' uncle, 
Masupha, and his brother, Maama; especially, flouted his authority in their 
jurisdictio~ and encouraged their supporters to follow suit.29 No sooner had he 
27Ibid., G.93-'84, 84; A. 24-81, A. 24-81, governor's agent to colonial secretary, 2 August 
1881. 
28 G.17-'78, pitso of I November 1877, speech of Sophonia Moshoeshoe, 21. 
29por example, ibid., S3/S/2/1, MaKhoakhoa Affairs. 
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ascended the throne than he had to confront the intransigent ambitions of his own 
brothers who immediately contested their father's estate.30 
Into this already volatile scenario emerged a new stratum, the young and upcoming 
chiefs. This emergent generation of chiefs wanted land, status and territorial 
jurisdiction, and fretted under the restraint of their seniors and that of the imperial ad-
ministration. Despite restraints imposed by patriarchal and gerontocratic pretensions, 
inter-generational tensions always hovered below the surface. Moreover, these young 
, 
chiefs had not been involved in the earlier bitter confrontations with the boers and had 
no interest in the new colonial dispensation. Consequently, these "war-hawks" were 
perhaps weary of listening to fireside tales of the glorious past days of BaSotho 
fighting prowess. Now they were eager for an opportunity to engage in conflict and 
to recover the old and vanished independen~. 
These inter-chiefly and inter-generational disputes were debilitating, at best, during 
normal times. They often catapulted protagonists into violent conflict, at worst. 
During the rinderpest crisis they would flare up more prominently. In a crisis that 
called for maximum harmony, the tensions they engendered would strain the 
cooperation needed to contain the course and effects of the epidemic. 
, 
J 
Relations between the state - indigenous and colonial- and the ordinary peasants, the 
voiceless and hidden BaSotho of the" countryside, on the eve of the rinderpest are 
more difficult to unravel. 31 This is partly because we hardly hear the voices of 
ordinary people in the available historical sources. When we begin to eavesdrop on 
30e.g., ibid., S3/5/5/4 and S3/5/5/6, Lerotholi-Maama Dispute. 
31For the existing historical literature tracing the chequered relations between chiefs and 
their subjects from the democratic tendencies of prcxolonial BaSotho society to the 
transformations unleashed ~y successive administrations which introduced, and sustained, the 
subsequent pattern of a repressive indigenous state, see B1.!fll18n, Chiefdom Politics; Ma-
chobane, Government and Change; Rugege, "The Chieftaincy and Society". 
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their "early voices of protest" from the first decade of the twentieth-century, they 
come predominantly from civil society movements representing the interests of the 
emerging literati and the petit bourgeoisie.32 
The BaSotho state had emerged and coalesced as a defensive strategem against 
invasive forces. First, the budding state had to defend itself against African 
neighbours during the turbulence of the "Difaqane". Then it had to stem the tide of 
encroachment upon its territory and sovereignty by the expansionist boer trekkers. 
Later the beleaguered state had to hold its own against the intrusive forces of 
~ > 
successive administrations. 
Against this background of relentless insecurity,33 reciprocal cooperation between 
leaders and their followers gained maximum priority and became the state's main 
prop. The need for leaders to be able and willing to support their followers in times of 
crisis, rule them through consensus and negotiation, and dispense generosity, became 
so essential that it begot the BaSotho epithet that a ruler or any leader is "a chief by 
the people". 34 
By the eve of the rinderpest, however, these relations had become distorted and 
eroded. Decades of missionary endeavour to separate individuals, from existing 
J 
32R.F. Weisfelder, "Early Voices of Protest in Basutoland: The Progressive Association and 
Lekhotla la Bafo", African Studies Review, xvii, 2 (1974); also R. Edgar, Prophets With 
Honour: A Documentary History of LekhotIa la Bafo (Johannesburg, 1983). 
330ne of the striking contributions of E.A. Eldredge's A South African Kingdom: The 
Pursuit of Security in Nineteenth-Century Lesotho is the manner in which it forces us to 
reckon with this endemic insecurity of BaSotho, a point which is the core of analysis in this 
most recent comprehensive publication on the history of nineteenth-century Basutoland. 
34Yirtually all existing histories of early Basutoland attest this feature of the chieftaincy 
institution. For a more detailed and focused study, see Mothibe, "Chieftaincy and 
Legitimation". 
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patterns of social relations undoubtedly played a role. 35 The influence became even 
more potent when boosted by colonial legislation in the decade of Cape colonial 
rule.36 More effective, however, was the commercialization of BaSotho production 
and consumption, especially the introduction and consolidation of new forms of 
property and new avenues of acquiring it.37 The transformation of productive activity 
to commodity production required the dissolution of prior productive relations such as 
communal relations between BaSotho peasants, but especially of traditional relations 
between rural producers and their chiefs.38 
During the early period of the consolidation of the BaSotho state, cattle provided the 
critical means for sustaining these reciprocal relationships, as we shall see. Cattle 
were valued for their use-value; they perpetuated the lineage and enabled leaders to 
attract and sustain a following. Cash, ho~ever, was valued for its accumulative 
power. It promoted individualism, weakening the lineage and enfeebling reciprocal 
ties. It also weakened the authority of the chiefs. 
The policies of successive administrations also contributed toward transfonning the 
relationship between chiefs and their followers. The Cape colonial government 
unleashed an avalanche of legislation aimed at weakening the power of chiefs by 
weaning their fo llowers away from prior reciprocal relationships. whne we are yet 
unable to measure precisely the impact of these legislative initiatives, they did 
35For a more balanced analysis of the role of European missionaries in this regard, see 
Eldredge, A South African Kingdom, 93-95, 147-150. 
36por collusion between European missionaries and Cape colonial officials, see Burman, 
Burmnn, Chiefdom Politics. 
37 For details on these processes, see Eldredge, A South African Kingdom; Kimble, 
"Towards an Understanding of the Political Economy of Lesotho". 
38For a general analysis 1)f this process, see H. Friedman, "Household Production and the 
National Economy: Concepts for the Analysis of Agrarian Eormations", Journal of Peasant 
Studies, 7 (1980), 158-84. 
T 
I 
f 
63 
undoubtedly alienate the chiefs from their followers. Despite the astonishing support 
both factions of chiefs received from their followers in the 1880-81 rebellion, the 
tensions unleashed by the policies of the Cape colonial government hardened each 
faction's resolve. They also left an enduring legacy of animosity. 
When the country returned to the less intrusive colonialism of imperial rule in 1884, 
the cardinal chiefs regained their former control of the productive process and the 
social relations associated with it. Wittingly or not, the policies of the imperial 
government helped to tyrannise the chiefiancy, and distorted the principle of "chief by 
the people". Expediency forced the imperial government to collude with the cardinal 
chiefs, for the administration of the country and the maintenance of social and public 
order depended entirely on them. A reciprocal relationship thus developed in which 
the chiefs depended for their power and status on the imperial government, while the 
latter administered the country through the chiefs. 
Paying the cardinal chiefs part of the annual tax collected enabled them to shift their 
reciprocal obligations towards their followers on to colonial functionaries. The 
imperial government also gave the cardinal chiefs carte blanche power over land 
allocation. This practice introduced a pernicious element in the relationship between 
chiefs and their followers. The colonial appropriation of land during and after the 
BaSotho-Boer wars had rendered land a scarce, and therefol!e contentious, 
commodity. Subsequent internal changes, including a significant increase in popula-
tion, rapid extension of acreage and ~nsuing strain on available land increased the 
value of land, thereby enhancing the power of those who controlled its allocation. As 
chiefs strove to gain access to this key basis of chiefly authority, competition among 
chiefs for land and followers proliferated. 
The preservation, albeit in a truncated form, of the traditional pitso offers a useful 
vantage point from which to glimpse the interaction between the chiefs and their 
followers on the eve of the rinderpest crisis. Chiefs and their subjects could at least 
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interact, albeit increasingly in strained tones, at these annual public gatherings. On the 
eve of the rinderpest, however, criticism of the chieftaincy was becoming more acrid. 
These large annual national gatherings had normally maintained an air of decorum 
imposing a tone of sobriety on the participants. As the century ended, however, the 
mood was becoming increasingly hostile, debates acrimonious. A crescendo of 
complaints was rising. These were directed at the parasitic bureaucracy and at the 
extractive tendencies of chiefs. "I have never known a nation with a hundred chiefs", 
a disconcerted commoner charged at the 1889 pitso at which commoners and lesser 
, 
chiefs assailed the exactions of the cardinal chiefs: 
Men run from one chief to another. The chiefs are in number with the 
stars. The people are troubled about their gardens, their cattle and their 
goats a bone is thrown to the dogs and they are always quarreling.39 
At the 1894 pitso, a rabid opponent of the chiefly institution wrily observed that "we 
are now unable to walk about as at every step you hear 'be careful, you are trampling 
on a chief. ,,40 
On the eve of the rinderpest, therefore, little formal consultative structure existed for 
the chiefs and their subjects to plan their anti-rinderpest campaign. The available 
sources do not take the historian into the countryside to view the scope and quality of 
cooperative interactions at the local level. Nationally, however, ,the entire anti-
rinderpest campaign would be spearheaded by distrusted imperial officials. J 
Nor did the imperial administration concern itself much with the lot of civil society. 
This is hardly surprising. The emergence of the concept of a democratic order in 
western Europe coincided, as Mamdani has cogently observed, with the advent of the 
notion of civil society. To the European mind, civil society meant "civilized" society. 
And so, European colonial officials brought up in the notion of civil society as 
3'1:bid., S1113, speech of-Thomas Setlaka, pitso of24 October 1889. 
~bid., speech ofT. Sethlaka, pitso of 11 October 1894. 
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"civilized" society could hardly have included the fortunes of people they regarded 
uncivilized on their agenda.41 Moreover, the imperial administration's dilemma of 
relying on the chiefs for administering the country undermined what interests it did 
have to include ordinary subjects in decision making.42 
The BaSotho social fabric, always a key factor in a society's response to an epidemic, 
had also been undermined by decades of economic, political and social restructuring. 
This was expecially the case with precolonial methods of controlling outbreaks of 
epidemics. Although the pre-colonial ecological balance was undoubtedly fragile, its 
> 
maintenance had been negatively affected by certain processes. These included the 
impact of social and economic convulsions, the effects of over half a century of 
European missionary influence and the political. social and economic transfonnation 
brought by the harsh decade of ruthless Cape colonial rule. Others included the impact 
of the rapid incorporation of the economy and way of life into the capitalist social 
formation, demographic expansion of both people and animals, the subtle, but 
effective, undermining of local authority and social cohesion by the imperial 
administration.43 
A combination of these forces had gradually weakened precolonial ideological and 
institutional strategies that helped to manage resources and regulatr<i practices that 
enabled people to cope with a risky environment. These practices depended )1pon the 
functioning of established institutional arrangements aimed at managing the 
utilisation of resources and incorporating these into a well-ordered system Pastures, 
41For a lucid and convincing discussion of the origins of this notion, and its application on 
the colonial landscape, see M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the 
Legacy of Late Colonialism (Kampala, Cape Town. Londong, 1996), 13-21. 
42For the role played by the colonial state in maintaining the repressive chiefly institution, 
see Machobane, Government and Change; Quinlan, "Marena a Lesotho"; Rugege, "The 
chieftaincy and Society". 
43Eldredge, "Drought, F~mine and Disease". 
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for example, had been controlle~ transhumance regulated, and the productive cycle 
managed. The existence of a recognised political elite, backed by a coherent body of 
ideological mechanisms, ensured the active cohesion of the community, regulated 
productive activity, and managed resources through a negotiated and consensual style. 
These institutions and mechanisms, however, had undergone profound, if ambivalent, 
transformation through the last third of the century. 
Decades of transformation of the chiefly institution, initially by missionary ideology, 
followed by the Cape colonial administration's efforts to weaken it, and its 
restructuring by the- imperial administration, eroded the power and influence of the 
political elite. This undermined its cohesive and regulating force. ''Everyone calls 
himself a chief but we do not see their good acts",44 quipped a speaker at a pitso in 
the 1890s. At every pitso in the 1890s, commoners and lesser members of the gentry 
were urging the cardinal chiefs to take care of their people, reminding them ofthe real 
basis of their power as "chiefs by the people". Even when they did intervene in the 
management of productive activity, chiefs did so with the coercive and self-indulgent 
autocracy that now distinguished the institution of chiefship. 
Specific strategies to cope with ecological and pestilential trauma had also been 
undermined. A risky environment, exacerbated by pestilential disasters throughout the 
century had forced the BaSotho to develop a range of adaptive m~ and response 
strategies to mitigate the effects of ecological and pestilential disasters. The adaptive 
measures included famine insurance ,strategies, and the whole web of economic, 
political and social relations developed to cope with critical food shortages. When a 
food shortage did threaten, they could deploy a range of responses. These included 
activating creative and alternative production strategies, consuming ahernative foods 
that relieved famine, breaking up the domestic unit, invoking reciprocal and patronal 
44L.N.A., SI1I3, speech of Mphoto, pitso of II November 1890. 
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relationships, taking up wage labour, and migrating.45 During the drastic shortages of 
the "Difagane" upheavals, the plight of some BaSotho was so severe that they were 
said to have resorted to relieving hunger through cannibalism. 
Economic and concomitant social dislocations through the second half of the century 
had progressively enfeebled these famine insurance mechanisms. They thus 
accentuated the effects of environmental trauma Territorial losses in the 1850s and 
1860s, made irrevc;rsible by the final territorial circumscription of Basutoland by 
colonially imposed boUndaries, weakened established famine insurance mechanisms. 
Without enough land, planned overproduction in a good year to insure insufficient 
harvest in a bad season became more difficult to effect. The strategy of microspatial 
45Some of these strategies are discussed in some detail by Eldredge, "Drought, Famine and 
Disease in Nineteenth-Century Lesotho", 74-83; many have been found to be common for 
many peasant communities across space and time, see, among others, A. B. Appleby. Famine 
in Tudor and Stuart England (Stanford, 1978); J. Bourriau (ed.), Understanding Catastrophe 
(Cambridge, 1992); T.W. Gallant, P. Garnsey and G. Woolf: "Patronage and the Rural Poor in 
the Roman World", in A. Wallace--Hadrill (ed.), Patronage in Ancient Society (London, 
1989); P. Garnsey, Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk 
and Crisis (Cambridge, 1988); P. Halstead and J. O'Shea (eds.), Cultural Responses to 
Uncertainty (Cambridge, 1988); U. Putnaik, "Food Availability and Famine: A Longer 
View", Journal of Peasant Studies, 19, i (1991), 1-25; P. Nolan, "The Causation and 
Prevention of Famine: A Critique", Ibid., 21, 1 (1993), 1-28; R.I. Rotberg and T.K. Rabb 
(eds), Hunger and History: The Impact of Changing Food Production ,nd Consumption 
Patterns on Society (Cambridge, 1983); for similiar studies on African famines, see, among 
others, M. de Braijn and H. Van Dijk, "Drought and Coping Strategies in Fulbe Socitt}' in the 
Hayre, Central Mali: A Historical Perspective", Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines. xxxiv, 1-3 
(1994), 85-108; LA.F. Clark, "Environmental Decline and Ecological Response in the Upper 
Senegal Valley, West Africa, from the late Nineteenth-Century to World War I", Journal of 
African History, 36, 2 (1995), 197-218; J. Giblin, "Famine and Social Change during the 
Transition to Colonial Rule in Northern Tanzania, 1880-1896", African Economic History, xx 
(1986),84-104; M.H. Grantz (ed), Drought and Hunger in Africa (Cambridge, 1987); K. Hill, 
"Demographic Responses to Food Shortages in the Sahel", Population and Development 
Review, special supplement (1989), IS, 168-192; D.H. Johnson and D.A. Anderson (eds.), 
The Ecology of Survival: Case Studies from Northeast African History (London, 1988); G. 
Maddox, "Mtunya: Famine in Central Tanzania, 1917-20", Journal of African History, 32, 2 
(1990), 181-97; D.O. Treanter, "Strategies for Coping with Food Consumption Shortages in 
the Mandara Mountain Region of North Cameroon", Social Science and Medicine, xvi 
(1982), 211-27; A.W. de !Vaal, Famine that Kills: Darfur 1984-5 (London, 1987); P. Webb 
and J. Von Braun, Famine and Food Security in Ethiopia: Lessons for Africa (New York, 
1994). -
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fragmentation of land-holdings became virtually impossible to activate for ordinary 
households. It was contingent on acquiring land in different microenvironments, thus 
reducing the risk of wiping out the entire household's crops or animals in the wake of 
localized ecological trauma. 
Diminishing availability of land resulting from dispossession was exacerbated by the 
commercialization of BaSotho production and a significant demographic expansion of 
humans and animals within a circumscribed territory. In a sense, land had always 
been scarce in the country even before the closing of the frontier in the 1850s and 60s. 
The latter, however, drastically accentuated the shortage. Hence, although the 
remaining arable land proved to be exceedingly productive, its overall scarcity soon 
became evident. 
=-
The agricultural boom of the 18705 and 18805 both caused and resulted from a 
significant increase in acreage. Assisted by rapid accumulation of the ox-drawn 
plough, this process soon exhausted opportunities for further dispersal. 46 From the 
--
onset of imperial rule in 1884, imperial officials consistently reported the increasing 
scarcity of additional land for cultivation, pasturage and settlement. "The whole face 
of the country up to the mountain slopes is a vast com field", observed the resident 
commissioner in 1886, "and numbers are now actually ploughing in tl:te mountains".47 
A significant demographic expansion compounded this process. The BaSotho 
population increased by 71 per cent -from 1875 to 1891, and by 14 per cent from 
1891 to 1895.48 More significant for the unfolding process of progressive pressure on 
the land was the age structure of this demographic expansion. Despite the absence of 
systematic studies on population patterns and trends in this period, both quantitative 
~.N.A., SIll, 1891 census returns for Basutoland. 
47L.N.A., S3/25/1I3, annual reports, report for the year ending 30 June 1886. 
48H.G. 1875, Census of the Cape of Good Hope, 1875, 17; L.N.A., SIll, census returns for 
Basutoland, 1891. .. 
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and qualitative data suggest an even distribution of adults and younger members in 
the population.49 The key factors seem to have been high birth rates resulting from an 
increased food supply,50 and adult immigration.51 The result was an immediate and 
relentless pressure on the circumscribed land. 
Rapid stock increases accompanied the equally significant increase in human 
population. This aggravated the vicious cycle of rural marginalization. From 1875 to 
1891 the bovine population increased at the rate of forty-seven per cent. In less than 
twenty years in the-same period, the number of horses had increased by fifty-six per 
~ 
cent. Sheep and goats were not counted in the 1891 census, but it is almost certain that 
their rearing had greatly expanded as revealed by the rise in the volume of wool and 
mohair exports. 52 
The integration of intensive sheep and goat ~!earing into the already strained pattern of 
land use disturbed agro-pastoral equilibrium, for sheep and goat rearing could only be 
successful through an extensive use of land. Sheep and goats also wrought havoc on 
4~.N.A., SIll, 1891 census returns for Basutoland. 
~or the link between high birth rates and increased food supply resUlting from the 
intensification of agriculture, see H. Barry & L. Paxton, "Infancy and Early Childhood: Cross 
Cultural Codes 2", Ethnology, 10 (1971), 466-508; J. Hajna~ "European Mdmage Patterns in 
Perspective", in D.V. Glass & D.E. Eversley, Population in History (London, 1965),101-43; 
J. Kasada, "Economic Structure and fertility: A Comparative Analysis", Demography, 8 
(1971), 307-318; T. Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (London, repro 1970); 
R. Schofield, "The Impact of Scarcity and Plenty on Population Change in England, 1541-
1871", in Rotberg & Rabb (eds.), Hunger and History:. 67-94; R. Sipes, population Growth. 
Society and Culture (New Haven, 1980); E. Wrigley & R. Schofield, The Population History 
of England. 1451-1871: A Reconstruction (Cambridge, 1981), 15-154. 
SJFor contemporary observations on waves of immigrants during this period, see L.N.A., 
SlIl, 1891 census returns for Basutoland; G.21-75, 15, 17; G.17-78, 7, G.l3-80, 19, 28; 
L.N .A., S3/25/1I2, S3/25/1/3, S3/25/1/4, annual reports, 1884-5, 1885-6, 1886-7; 
Widdicombe, Fourteen Years, 40-41. 
S2H.G. 1875, Census of the Cape of Good Hope, 17; L.N.A., census returns for Basutoland, 
1891. 
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the natural fauna. As over-grazing depleted the palatable and nutritious grasses, bush 
and weed invaded the veld. Contemporary observers confirmed the intense 
competition between commercial agriculture and pastoral pursuits. 53 
Shortage of land resulted in relentless pressure on its productive capacity, further 
rendering it difficult to maintain surpluses to ward off famine during years of harvest 
failure. It also disrupted the pattern of settlement, which had been shaped by the 
prospects of ecological trauma. Shortage of suitable land for agricultural and 
residential purposes_ led to a significant increase in the size of homesteads, 
encumbering established coping mechanisms during food shortages. As settlements 
spread randomly across the landscape, it became increasingly difficult to maintain the 
old pattern of settlements that was established on the logic of minimising the effects 
of ecological trauma. 
Structural incorporation of BaSotho's production into an erratic market economy 
further increased vulnerability to environmental trauma. It also worsened the effects 
of bad seasons. By the 1890s, the BaSotho's economy was firmly absorbed into the 
market economy.54 BaSotho-producers produced what the market required, and when 
it required it. Yet, that market was extremely variable, influenced by a set of factors 
outside the control of BaSotho producers. 
The "boom of the early 1870s" ended with "a time of trial and difficulty" thrGugh the 
half-decade, 1875-1880. The next five years, 1881-1885 witnessed "a wave of 
extraordinary depression", to be followed by "a cycle of prosperous years" between 
1885-1889. These five years of "excessive speculation" unleashed by the gold 
discoveries led to a collapse, with "solid prosperity" returning only in 1892. The last 
S3E.g., L.N.A., S3/25/J/3, annual report for 1886, report for Berea. 
S4Kimble, "Towards an Understanding of the Political Economy of Lesotho"; Eldredge, A 
South African Kingdom, 147-181. 
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five years of the century, 1895-1899 were decidedly an era of economic and 
ecological crises throughout, exacerbated by political turmoil and general unrest 
which finally exploded in the conflagration of the South African War in October 
1899,55 
The BaSotho economy, however, suffered more than it benefited from the regional 
prosperity of 1885-1889, and 1892-95. For example, the opening of gold diggings in 
the Witwatersrand from 1886 helped to alleviate the economic recession that had 
. 
begun to assail South Africa generally from the mid 1870s. Among others, it opened a 
new and vast market for produce. The BaSotho, however, were severely restricted 
from fully realising the benefits of these discoveries. 
The prolonged disruption in the supply of BaSotho grain during their rebellion and the 
"'-
civil war blemished the country's reputation as a secure supplier, forcing importers to 
look elsewhere. Coincidentally, secure and economical suppliers readily emerged, 
mainly from the American Midwest and Australia Thus, from the mid-1880s, the 
--
highly capitalised agriculture of the American Midwest began to alter the former 
exclusive dependence of the mining markets on local produce by supplying cheaper 
foreign grain. The extension of railway lines from Cape ports to the gold diggings 
assisted this process by reducing the cost of transporting foreign grairl. 
I 
During this period, too, a major transformation was occurring within the white rural 
community in the Free State and the Transvaal. Formerly relying on transport riding, 
pastoralism, hunting and itinerant trade, white farmers now began to resort more 
earnestly to arable farming. 56 Ironically, what nudged white Free State farmers into 
5SMabin and Conradie, The Confidence, 23-474; also C.G.W. Schumann, Structural 
Changes and Business Cycles in South Africa, 1806-1936 (London, 1958). 
56See, among others, M.L. Morris, "The Development of Capitalism in South African 
- , Agriculture: Class Struggle in the Countryside:, Economy ana Society, v., 3 (1976):292-343; 
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self-reliance was the scarcity of grain from Basutoland during the rebellion. '1t will 
now be for us to seize the 0PIX>rtunity", urged an editorial of a Free State newspaper, 
"to try and make the great part of the conquered territory the granary of at least our 
state.,,57 
The Transvaal and Free State governments began actively to encourage the 
monopolisation of production by white farmers. They achieved this by passing 
restrictive legislation unfavourable to African farmers, and by giving financial and 
professional aid to ~hite farmers. 58 To protect her market against BaSotho 
competition, the Free State imposed import tariffs on all produce coming from 
Basutoland, while the Transvaal also imposed a heavy tax on grain imported from 
anywhere else except the Free State.59 It was estimated, for example, that in 1888 
Basutoland's trade had suffered from this prohibitive tariff to the extent of almost 
£20,000 in one year alone.60 
BaSotho producers who could not afford these prohibitive tariffs were unable to 
transport their produce directly to the external markets. Wagon-hawkers, who had 
been a familiar scene in the country were seen only very rarely, only when they 
trafficked cheap brandy that had found a secure niche among the bewildered 
populace, especially the chiefs. Consequently, the volume of production declined 
owing to frustrated incentive. While in 1879 the country had exported £400,000 worth 
57Frieng, 1 January 1885; see also 3 September 1885. 
58S. Trapido, "Landlord and Tenant in a Colonial Economy, the Transvaal, 1880-1910", 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 5 (1978); T. Keegan, "The Sharecropping Economy, 
African Class Formation and the 1913 Native Land Act in the Highveld Maize Belt", in 
Marks and Rathbone (eds.), Industrialisation and Social Change, 195-211; Keegan, "The 
Share-cropping Economy on the South African Highveld in the early Twentieth Century", 
Journal of Peasant Studies, 2/3 (1983), 201-225; Keegan, Rural Transformation in 
Industrialising South Africa (Johannesburg, 1986). 
5~.N.A., S7/6, O.F.S. govt. gazette of 18 March 1887. 
~bid., annual report, June 1888. 
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of grain, in 1887 it would manage to export only £20,000 worth.61 Unable to market 
their produce externally where prices were generally higher, producers had to sell 
locally, thus exposing themselves to exploitation by unscrupulous local European 
traders. 
Commercialisation of production added an additional onus. The pre-
commercialisation productive strategy took advantage of the complementarity of the 
qualities of the sorghum and maize staples. Sorghum had superior resistance to 
drought, while maize, in hs turn, was relatively invulnerable to birds and had a shorter 
growing season. Commercialisation, however, encouraged the cultivation of the new 
commercial crop, wheat. The climatic and seasonal pattern within which the 
production of wheat took place, however, introduced a profound change in the 
productive cycle. It disturbed agro-pastoral balance while compounding the vicious 
cycle of soil exhaustion and the shrinking of'arable land. 
Specifically, the cultivation pattern of the wheat crop increased the relentless pressure 
on the land. The wheat seed-was sown in winter at the time that the transhumance 
cycle required the grazing of cattle on maize and millet stubble. Sowing the wheat 
seed immediately after the harvesting of the maize and sorghum limited winter 
grazing on stubble. Yet the temperatures in the mountain pastures plUIJ.?IDeted with the 
onset of winter, thus forcing the return of stock to the lowlands where ,grazing 
opportunities were scanty. No evidenc~ exists that stubble was cleared and turned into 
fodder prior to sowing wheat. The need for organic manuring necessitated turning 
over stubble. Besides, grass, where still available, would have withered or been 
purposely burnt to regenerate it for spring grazing. 
Claimants to a share of the harvest also increased through the last third of the century. 
This limited the BaSotho' s ability to maintain surpluses that might tide them over to 
the next harvest. Besides household claimants who increased as the size of the 
6IG.17'-78, annual report, 1878; L.N.A., S3/2S/I/S, annual r~ort, 1887. 
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homestead expanded, and the growing demands for manufactured goods, there were 
also extra-household claimants, especially the colonial state and the expanding 
parasitic indigenous state. Colonial taxation was a tax on the household's productive 
capacity. So was the payment of chiefs with part of the hut-tax. It represented the 
appropriation of the labour of the homesteads. Even though the hut-tax was paid in 
cash, the money came mainly from the sale of produce and from migrants' earnings. 
The burden of paying the hut-tax was exacerbated by the way it was collected. 
, 
Colonial officials collected it within three months immediately after the winter 
harvest. If the season had been a lean one, payment was postponed to the harvest of 
the wheat crop.62 This pattern of payment forced producers to sell their surplus, even 
part of their subsistence grain, immediately after harvest. Being when the market was 
glutted, prices were consequently deflated. Should the next harvesting season be a 
~ 
meagre one, the same producer was back to the same store to re-purchase the same 
produce he had sold at a depreciated value. Now, however, the price had inflated 
because of scarcity. It was also when the producer had no cash, and was forced to 
.. 
arrange for credit. Prices of goods, including grains, purchased on credit were usually 
higher, which worked against the peasant, and benefited the trader. Without cash, 
many people arranging for credit, placed their stock as security, or purchased grain 
with stock. 
.I 
When the BaSotho did produce a surplus, they were forced to sell it to acquire cash to 
purchase consumer goods, pay the hut-tax and invest in further production. Their 
grain, however, glutted the market, depressing prices, with producers generally 
receiving consumer goods rather than cash.63 The weakness of producers to control 
62 e.O. 451508, tax payment, 1 Jan 1892 - November 1892, encl. In L. Smythe to Earl of 
Derby, 5 May 1893 
63For the rising level of protest against this economic strangulation, see, e.g. L.N.A., S 1113, 
speech of chief Seeiso, pitso of October, 1888; ibid., speech of Rampa; ibid., speech of Setha 
Matete, pitso of 12 October 1893. - . 
75 
the fruits of their labour was further worsened when the imperial administration 
professed inability to intervene. When in 1891, for example, the chiefs ordered a total 
boycott of local trading stations, the resident commissioner lectured them on the ubi-
quitous liberal economic laws. "Such action cannot influence prices nor can 
" 
government do so", he cautioned. "We are all governed by the law of supply and 
demand". 64 
Besides these man-made tribulations, Basutoland was also hit by a cycle of ecological 
~ 
disasters in the years leading to the rinderpest. Although these disasters were a useful 
foretaste ahead of the rinderpest, and gave the BaSotho valuable experience m 
confronting the impact of the panzootic, these scourges were debilitating. A 
combination ofthem unleashed severe food shortages, sometimes famine. 
The cycle seems to have begun with the devastating drought of 1884, coinciding with 
the reestablishment of imperial rule. The drought was appalling.65 A chief in the 
southern district of Mohales'Hoek reported that hunger was among his people 
"because we had no harvest last reaping season. . .'.66 So threatening was the famine 
that the Paris headquarters ofthe French Mission mounted a Destitute Relief Fund. 67 
The almost total crop failure led to the price of grain soaring, forcing people to place 
their cattle as security for grain acquired on debt. The cattle the~lves, however, 
were in a poor state, their security value at its lowest ebb. The drought coincided with 
a devastating smallpox epidemic, necessitating quarantine regulations and restrictions 
Mlbid., speech of resident commissioner. 
6SGermond, Chronicles, 465 
~.N.A. S7/31l, Chief Molomo Mohale, to R.C., 16 November 1884. 
67Germond, Chronicles, 466. 
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on travel. This compounded the severity of the drought by hampering normal pursuits 
and restricting commerce, trade, and even migration to the labour centres.68 
The drought was partially broken in 1885, though some districts remained in its grip. 
For the southern district of Quthing, for example, 1885 was "a time of great scarcity. 
People had reaped scanty crops for several seasons and were unable to obtain money 
with which to purchase grain. The stock that they could exchange for food had 
depreciated in value.69 Those in the more favoured districts could reap a fair harvest of 
, 
wheat and sorghum. Chiefs, however, imposed a ban on the sale of cereals to prevent 
the recurrence of the severe shortages of the previous year·70 
The ploughing season of 1885 was blessed with copious rains and the harvest looked 
"promising.,,71 The harvest of 1887 was "exceptional".72 in some districts, but the 
early onset of winter frost destroyed the maturing grain in others. Southern 
Basutoland was especially affected. During the harvest month of June, it was reported 
from Quthing that many people were already buying sorghum at the enhanced price of 
10/- a 200lb bag. The following month, the price had escalated to 12/- and to 15/- by 
September.73 
The year 1888 also brought a "plentiful" crop, but the spring ra~ in 1889 came 
late. When they did come, they helped to ensure a good harvest of wheal and an 
average crop of mealies. Late ploughing and the early frost, however, drastically 
68Lesedinyana, 1 January 1884, 7, and 1 April, 1884,4; also Friend. 15 January 1885. 
69L.N.A .. , S312511/3, annual reports, 1885-6, report for Quthing. 
70Lesedinyana, 15 February 1885; also Frieng, 2 and 30 April 1885. 
7lLesedinyana, 15 November 1885 and 1 February 1886. 
72Germond, Chronicles, 469. 
73Leselinyana, 1 June, 1 July and I September 1897. 
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reduced the next harvest of the staple crop, sorghum. 74 The same pattern recurred in 
1890.75 Rains came late in the ploughing season of 1891. When the seed struggled to 
corne out, swarms of locusts, which arrived early in 1892, devoured the sprouting 
crop. They "totally destroyed" the mealie and sorghum crops, reducing people to 
"great straits". 76 
Observers throughout the country made dreary reports of people being "on the verge 
of starvation".77 A_petition from twenty-five senior chiefs of Leribe district revealed 
that "some people sleep and wake up again without eating".78 During the same month 
of November, two chiefs from the district were reporting great scarcity in their 
districts and appealing to colonial officials to intervene by importing grain and selling 
it at COSt. 79 To avert a looming famine, imperial officials did oblige, importing 
mealies. They, however, sold them at "enonnous prices".80 The famine of 1892 was so 
devastating that the colonial administrati0
4
n had to start a relief scheme, employing 
parties of men on public roads and paying them in imported mealies·81 
74e.A.R, L.N.A., S3/25/1/7, reports from districts for the year ending 31 July 1890. 
7sIbid., S3/25/l/8, reports for the year ending 31 July 1891. 
71bid., S3/25/1/1O, report for Maseru for the year ending 31 July 1893. 
J 
nlbid., T.Y. 11112, assistant commissioner, Berea, to R.e., 27 October 1892; also S7/1/2/8, 
assistant commissioner, Leribe, to R.C., I t) November 1892. 
78Ibid., S7/l/2/8, petition of chiefs of Leribe district to the chief Jonathan Molapo and 
Leribe magistrate, 2 November 1892. 
"1bid., chief Jonathan Molapo and Peete Lesaoana to assistant commissioner, Leribe, 8 and 
10 November 1892, respectively, encl. In assistant commissioner, Leribe, to R.C., 10 
November 1892. 
~.N.A., S3/25/1I10, annual reports, report for Maseru, year ending 31 July 1893. 
Sle.g. Ibid., S7/I/3/8, assistant commissioner, Mafeteng, to R.e., 29 September 1892 and 
T.Y. 11112, assistant commissioner, Berea, to R.C., 27 October 1892. 
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Owing to the famine of the 1891-2 season, the imperial administration closely 
watched the prospects of the harvest of the 1892-3 season. The resident commissioner 
requested all assistant commissioners to make weekly reports on the conditions of the 
cropS.82 They all reported bleak prospects for the upcoming harvest. From M:asen4 the 
assistant commissioner there regretted that he bad not "been able to hear of any kaffrr 
com crops which (showed) any promise at all". He predicted that the "prospects of 
harvest may be described as nil". 83 From Mafeteng came the report that the sorghum 
"in most instances did not grow". All along the valleys of Berea the sorghum crop bad 
"been almost completely destroyed". 84 
When it appeared that the blight was receding and after farmers bad re-sown their 
fields with mealies, the locusts arrived in December and January. It caught the 
late-sown mealie crop at its tender stage. In some districts, Mafeteng among them, the 
crops "were almost entirely eaten up".85 To worsen the already bleak prospects for a 
sufficient harvest, the drought set in early in the summer, while foot and mouth 
disease (Epizootic Aphta) among cattle broke out in December 1892. This panzootic 
was not very virulent and soon became endemic. It, however, necessitated strict quar-
antine, requiring regulationbf the movement of cattle and humans during a crippling 
drought86 
I 
82Ibid., circular no. 168 of 1 November 1892. 
83Ibid., S7/114/3, assistant commissioner, Maseru, to R.C., 10 November 1892 
84Ibid., S7/113/8, assistant commissioner Mafeteng, to R.C., 6 November 1892; S7/11116, 
assistant commissioner, Berea, to R.C., I December 1892. 
85rbid., S3/25/1110, annual reports" report for Mafeteng. 
86Ibid., S7/11116, assistant commissioner, Berea, to R.c., 22 November, 6 and 26 December 
1892; also, S7/1/2/8, assistant commissioner, Leribe, to R.C., 29 December 1892; S7/11219, 
assistant commissioner, L~ibe, to R.C., 19 and 21 January 1893. 
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Food shortages became so severe that people sold their livestock in exchange for 
grain, or put up their cattle as security for debt. In 1892, for example, "fat cattle were 
[being] bartered for a haifa muid of mea lie per head". Reports of assistant magistrates 
from virtually all the districts confirmed that "a bag of mealies required absolutely for 
subsistence could only be repurchased from the traders by payment of a fat ox or the 
value of it". The report for Mafeteng district revealed that 3,000 head of cattle had 
been received by traders in exchange for grain·87 
, 
The 1893-4 season was average, and by the summer of 1893 crops were promising. 
Late in the summer, however, torrential rains destroyed the ripening wheat crop and 
the young mealies and sorghum cropS.88 In the mountain districts of Quthing and Qa-
chas'nek, the early frost withered the crops of maize and sorghum. The quality of the 
wheat crop was poor due to the continuous summer rains that came during the 
harvest. 89 
The next season, 1894-1895, was prosperous. The rains were seasonable and an 
"abundant" harvest, partic~iarly the sorghum crop, was realised.90 1895-6, however, 
repeated the pattern of drought, locusts, and a poor harvest, leading to escalating 
prices of produce. In Mafeteng District, where the price of a muid of mealies was 4/6 
in the preceding season, it had escalated to 17/6 in the next.91 An av~rage rainfall was 
recorded during the growing season of 1896. An "abundant harvest" of m~ies was 
87Ibid., S3/25/1Ill, report for Maseru, Mafeteng and report of the resident commissioner, 
1893. 
88lbid., S3/25/1I11, annual reports, reports for Berea and Mafeteng, year ending 31 July 
1893. 
~bid. 
~bid., 53/25/1112, reperts from districts, year erIding 31 July 1895. 
9IIbid., S3/2511112 and S3/25/1I13, reports for Mafeteng, 1894-5 and 1895-6, respectively. 
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expected early 1897. The same pattern recurred. The crops were caught up in the 
drought of late summer and the locusts wrought their yearly destruction. 
Recurring agrarian distress, therefore, marked the closing two decades of the 
nineteenth century. This was due mainly to high levels of climatic variability, 
exacerbated by the devastation of locusts, human and animal epidemics. It resulted in 
high levels of crop yield variability. Although not new92 the climatic and pestilential 
calamities of the late nineteenth century were more devastating. They bunched 
together in runs of tw~ or three years. More importantly, they burst upon a society 
whose productive system and coping mechanisms had been undermined. 
The pastoral branch of production was itself equally besieged, making its products 
unavailable as a line of defence against starvation and fumine. Drought dried up 
pastures, weakening and sometimes killing stock. Droughts were also often 
accompanied, or immediately followed, by stock diseases which found stock already 
enfeebled. Now, in 1896, the economy, already strained to the limit by agrarian crises, 
was suddenly struck by a devastating murrain that threatened the bastion of its already 
battered economy, cattle. 
When cattle secured a critical niche in the lives and history of the Basotho is still in 
doubt. 93 As . immediate descendants from the Sotho-Tswana sulrgrouping of the 
Bantu-speaking cattle farmers of Southern Africa, however, the BaSotho were 
definitely cattle-keepers by the time they settled on the valley bisected by the Caledon 
River (mohokare) from about the 14th century AD.94 The type of cattle they brought 
with them was the Sanga, which was a cross between the hump less longhorn type and 
92Eldredge, "Drought, Famine and Disease in Nineteenth Century Lesotho". 
93M. Wilson" "The Sotho, Venda and Tsonga," in M. Wilson and L. Thompson, ed. The 
Oxford History of South Africa (Oxford, 1969), vol. 1, 162-63. 
94Ibid. 
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the humped longhorn Zebu. 95 Interbreeding, especially with European breeds, 
however, further adulterated this distinctive breed towards the nondescript 
brachyceros type that was common in Basutoland on the eve of the rinderpest. 
Basutoland was never a cattle-ranching country. Its ecology and climate favoured 
agro-pastoralism. Animals thrived in the lowlands and the foothills after the spring 
rains had generated the growth of thick carpets of grass that clothed the valleys and 
hillsides. The main grass types seem to have been the sweetveld and the sourveld, 
with the former predominant96 Although sour, stock can still eat the sourveld. Its feed 
value, however, is shorter, about four months, after which it becomes indigestible as it 
matures. The sweetveld, in its turn, retains its palatability and nutritive value through 
a longer period. However, it requires a free growing period in the summer months.97 
Its scarcity, fragility, and feed value required institutional mechanisms to regulate its 
grazing. The BaSotho achieved this through a combination of a system of reserved 
~-=. 
grazing - maboella - and animal transhumance. The former involved restricting 
grazing to designated areas while reserving others to allow the sweetveld to grow 
undisturbed. In the latter, shepherds drove their herds to the mountain region in the 
summer to exploit the grazing opportunities offered by the still palatable sourveld. It 
also enabled the sweetveld grass in the lowlands to grow. In the winter months, as 
temperatures in the mountains dropped, cattle returned to the lowlands to graze on the 
reserved sweetveld grass. Transhumance also enabled the spatial dispersal of 
productive activities during the growing season. It thus permitted crops to gtow and 
9SH. Epstein, The Origin of the Domestic Animals of Africa, vols. 1 & 2 ( New York, 
1971), especially vol. 1, 410 for distribution of the Sanga type. 
9It Melville, and G.A. Kolbe" "Missionary Tour Through the Country of the Basuutoos", 
Transactions of the Missionary Society, 52 (October 1, 1929), 221-38. 
97Cf. 1. Guy, "Ecological Factors in the Rise of Shaka and the Zulu Kingdom", 103; D.I. 
Bransby, "The Ecology of Livestock Production in Natal and Zululand", Paper Presented to 
the Workshop on Production and Reproduction in the Zulu Kingdom, Pietermaritzburg, 1977, 
2-3. 
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mature undisturbed by stock. In the winter months, after harvest, cattle returned to 
exploit the grazing potential of stubble. 
This ecology in which cattle thrived had all but changed as the century drew to a 
close. The main influences, closely related, were the processes which we have already 
surveyed - dwindling availability of land, commercialisation of BaSotho production 
and the steady demographic growth which occurred in the closing three decades of the 
century. The expansion of acreage under grain production resuhed from 
commercialisation of groduction, population growth and the need to colonise virgin 
land. This intruded into pasturage. So extensive and encroaching did cuhivation 
become by the 1890s that people were said to be "bringing ploughing too close to the 
roads".98 
As acreage expanded in the lowlands, displaced homesteads increasingly populated 
the mountain region, originally reserved for seasonal grazing. In 1891, an Anglican 
missionary, observing population trends and settlement patterns in the country over 
the previous ten years noted that "even the remote valleys of the Malutis are rapidly 
becoming populated". 99 This, however, restricted the viability of this region to relieve 
pressure on the land in the lowlands. It also replayed the same drama of increasing 
competition between humans and animals over land that was underway in the 
~ 
lowlands. 
J 
The increasing reliance on commercial agriculture and the corresponding decrease of 
pastoral production encouraged a more permanent settlement, further imposing more 
pressure on the land. Most of the land was devoted to wheat cultivation to supply the 
burgeoning urban centres in South Africa with wheaten bread. The climatic and 
seasonal pattern of wheat cultivation introduced a profound change in the BaSotho 
98L.N.A., SIlI3, speech of resident commissioner, pitso of 1893. 
99J. Widdicombe, Fourte;n Years, 40-1. 
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productive cycle, disturbing agro-pastoral equilibrium and compounding the vicious 
cycle of soil exhaustion and the shrinking of arable land. loo Wheat was planted in 
winter when the transhumance cycle required that cattle be grazed on maize and 
millet stubble. Thus, winter grazing on stubble was increasingly limited. 
Despite the increasing difficulties with maintaining agro-pastoral equilibrium, cattle 
still retained their secure niche in the economic, political, religious and social lives of 
the BaSotho on the eve of the murrain. The BaSotho settlement pattern still included a 
kraal for cattle as the ce!1tral place, firmly confIrming the crucial importance of these 
animals. Although the introduction of new crops had added variety to the BaSotho 
diet, the most basic relish consisted almost invariably of cow's milk. Soured milk 
formed the basic relish, while fresh milk was an essential food for growing babies and 
their mothers. 
"'"-
Beef was also important in the BaSotho diet. Without reliable means to preserve large 
quantities of meat, people preferred to slaughter smaller stoc~ notably sheep. Cattle 
were slaughtered mainly onritual occasions. These rituals were themselves closely 
associated with productive activity. The regularity of such occasions within a village, 
or between adjoining villages seems to have been frequent enough to satisfy the beef 
needs of the community without extensively slaughtering cattle merely for providing 
beef. 
.I 
The BaSotho consumed beef mainly during the winter when low temperatures could 
preserve it. Most festivities and rituals associated with slaughtering cattle also 
occurred in winter when the harvest was in and food was more plentiful. Beef was 
also an essential protein supplement during this season when milk was scarce. Weaker 
animals that could not survive the harsh conditions of the winter climate were 
lOOpor the requisite climatic and environmental factors for successful wheat cultivation, see 
D.B. Grigg, The Agricultural Systems of the World (Cambridge, 1974). 
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slaughtered, or died on their own. Old cows were also slaughtered and the beef of 
those that died of disease or other natural causes was eaten. Thus, a common thOUght 
was expressed in the phrase: Lebitla la khomo ke molomo, literally ''the tomb of an ox 
is in the mouth". 
Although cattle retained their value as sources of food throughout the century, their 
value as tractive animals had increased on the eve of the rinderpest. This resulted 
from the agrarian expansion already referred to. Its basis was the use of the ox-drawn 
, 
plough in cultivation. The BaSotho attached such importance to the productive 
capacity of ox-drawn ploughs that the wide diffusion of this technology further 
unleashed a cultural revolution. It transformed the traditional division of labour, 
where women dominated cultivation. The wide diffusion and use of the ox-drawn 
plough brought male labour into cultivation. This reflected the tradition of exclusive 
male domination over cattle-related activities. Correspondingly, it diminished the 
practice of polygyny as the plough assumed the economic role of that institution, the 
acquisition of human labour. Ploughs were so valued that they replaced cattle ill 
-. 
marriage transactions during times of cattle shortage. 
The tractive power of cattle also dominated the transport sector. Oxen were used as 
pack animals and mounts although ponies increasingly performed tbls function. They 
also fulfilled a crucial role of conveying produce home from the fields, and to local 
and distant markets. 
Their versatility gave cattle their prime value. Besides providing the all-important 
milk and beef, and the only source of tractive power, the same animals could also be 
used in other vital productive activities. They provided clothing, their products being 
used as raw material for other crafts and industries. The dung of cattle fertilised the 
fields and was used for plastering floors and walls. It also provided fuel. 
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Cattle, of course, also served as money. Despite extensive commercialisation and the 
introduction of a cash economy, cattle continued to act as a medium of exchange or 
security in all financial transactions, they were what the saving bank is to western 
society. Capital accumulation took the form of an expansion in cattle holding. Cattle 
stored the entire wealth of the family and the nation in movable property. "We have 
grain and cattle only", implored a senior counsellor challenging the colonial 
administration's insistence on cash payment of the hut-tax, "we do not understand 
money". 101 
Even the cash earned from migrant labour was invested in the accumulation of cattle. 
The South African historical literature on labour migrancy has paid undue attention to 
the later migration to the diamond and gold mines, thus linking labour migrancy 
exclusively to factors like the growing desire to accumulate ftrearms and ammunition, 
the introduction of a cash economy, the spread of: and general urge for, European 
manufactured goods, the effects of colonial military defeat, territorial losses and 
colonial taxation, environmental and climatic deterioration, and the decline of rural 
productive capacity. Long before the existence of labour centres for the South African 
mines, many individual BaSotho worked on white farms in the Free State and on 
public works in the Cape Colony. Here payment was generally in stock, or in cash 
which could be invested in the purchase of stock, especially cattle. 102 \ 
J 
The later labour migrancy to the mines was also influenced by the same logic. 
Originally, the main incentive seems to have been the desire of chiefs to accumulate 
fIrearms and ammunition. 103 Yet money, to invest in acquiring factors of production, 
especially cattle and ploughs, also featured prominently. Moreover, BaSotho 
IOIL.N.A., S 1113, speech of Setha Matete, pitso of 1888. 
'02Kimble, "Towards an Understanding of the Political Economy of Lesotho", 162-190. 
I03G.20_1881, colonial annual report for Quthing, 13-14; C.O. 517/355, encl. in high 
commissioner to the secretary of state for the colonies, 28 February 1902. 
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labourers did not make exclusive choices of their destinations. Those who travelled to 
the mining centres and those who worked on public works or on white farms were 
often the same men, astutely gaining different advantages from the various labour 
markets. A young man might prefer working on white farms in the Free State. He 
might then choose to go to public works or the mines. While moving to and from the 
mines, men might do stints on white farms or on public works to supplement their 
wages, or to earn stock. The example of the two sons of one Morokane is not atypical: 
In the year 1881, I sent my two sons to Kimberley for the purpose of 
procuring employment. Shortly afterwards they were returning home 
when they met with Mr. Grobler. Mr. Grobler said he wished to hire 
them to work on his farm. For three years I searched for my children 
but was unable to find them. At last I found my sons at Elands Kop, 
Bethlehem district, O. Fr. State. I asked Mr. Grobler why he had stolen 
my children. He said it did not matter now how he had possessed 
himselfofthem as he was paying them good wages. He showed me the 
cattle he intended to pay the boys with. He showed me two cows with 
calf and said they were mine for the boYS.I04 
It was, however, in their role as a means of production and reproduction of labour 
power that cattle acquired a preponderant value as an investment. They were used to 
marry wives, who provided actual productive labour and reproduced it through 
reproductive capacity. lOS Cattle created and reproduced labour and society itself. This 
104L.N.A., S7/611, Morokane vs Grobler:court of sub inspector of the Basutoland Mounted 
Police, Butha-Buthe, 8 September 1885. 
IOSFor some of the well-known works on gender, production and reproduction, see B. 
Bozzoli, "Marxism and South African Studies", Journal of Southern African Studies, 9, 2 
(1983), 139-71; Eldredge, A South African Kingdom, 101-16, 126-46; Eldredge, "Women in 
Production: The Economic Role of Women in Nineteenth Century Lesotho", ~ 16, 4 
(1991), 707-31; M. Epprecht, "Gender and History in Southern Africa: A Lesotho 
Metanarrative", Canadian Journal of African Studies, 30, 2 (1996), 183-213; J. Guy, 
"Analysing Pre-capitalist Societies in Southern Africa", Ibid., 14, I (1987), 18-37; Guy, 
"Gender Oppression in Southern Africa's Precapitalist Societies", in C. Walker (ed), Women 
and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945 (Bloomington, 1990); M. Kinsman, "Beasts of 
Burden: The Subordination of Southern Tswana Women, ca. 1800-1840", J oumal of Southern 
-. - African Studies, 10, 1 (1993), 39-54. -
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intrinsic connection between women, cattle, production and reproduction emerges 
distinctly in a remarkable interview between a group of visiting missionaries and a 
MoSotho chief in the 1880s. The chief made a fascinating statement that summed up 
the primary value of women in a labour-intensive economy: 
"Question: If a person kills another, what do you do to him? 
Answer: He is fined ten head of cattle if he killed a female, but if he 
has killed a male he pays eight head of cattle. 
Question: What is the difference? Are they not all human beings? 
Answer: A female person makes people."I06 
"It is evident that in this system, the woman represent capital", a French missionary 
observed cogently on the eve of the rinderpest, 
though immobilised, it is true, bllt nevertheless capable of bearing 
enormous interest since .... each of her daughters is the equivalent of a 
herd of cattle probably of the same value as the herd that they had 
originally given for herself. For a Mosotho, therefore, to marry is the 
best investment which he can make, and the more wives a male has, 
naturally, the better it will be lO7 
In addition to creating labour power and reproducing it, cattle also perpetuated the 
lineage - leloko. 108 A wife was married to bear healthy children tp the husband's 
lineage, and upon divorce, the children of the marriage remained with them father's 
lineage. Female children, in turn, Were similarly valued. Their potential lay in 
attracting cattle to their own lineage. Her brothers, including other male members of 
her lineage, used these cattle to marry and perpetuate the lineage. "Leloko ke ntho e 
kholo" (perpetuating the lineage is fundamental), stated chief Masupha at a pitso to 
106 L.N.A., S3171Z0 
I07Germond, Chronicles, 437. 
108For a detailed discussien of this role of cattle among African societies in Southern Africa, 
see A. Kuper, Wives for Cattle (London, 1982). 
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discuss the vexing problem of Christianised wives who returned to their maiden 
homes with their children upon the death of their husbands or divorce. ''Ha re nyale 
mosali, re nyala popelo" (We do not marry a woman, we marry her womb", aff'rrmed 
the paramount chiefs counsellor at the same pitSO. I09 
Cattle linked lineages together in an endless and enduring reciprocal relationship. 
They belonged to the lineage, and several members of the lineage contributed the 
bohali cattle. This linked members of the husband's lineage to those of his wife. 
Settlement of the full complement of bohali was seldom ever effected, rendering it 
virtually impossible to settle lineage debts thus established. I 10 
Cattle also determined economic, political and social status. There clearly was 
inequality in the level and extent of cattle acquisition and ownership across the social 
spectrum. The great chiefs remained the richest cattle owners, followed by heads of 
junior houses, chiefs of clans amalgamate<l into the BaSotho nation and village 
chiefs. I I I They used their wealth in cattle to exploit and consolidate the system of 
cattle trusteeship - mafisa. It involved the loaning of cattle to those who did not 
possess this asset. The tenant possessed usufruct of the stock.' Mafisa was a very 
effective method of investment. It ensured that the owner's cattle were territorially 
and regionally distributed. This guaranteed optimum exploitation of the best pasture. 
It spread the risk of cattle losses through disease. It provided for the ~rding and care 
.I 
l~eselinyana, 1 July 1888, speeches of ~hief Masupha and Ramabilikoe at Matsieng pitso 
of21 June 1888 .. 
I lOOn lineage debts and how they were transformed by commercialisation and colonial law 
in Zimbabwe, see R. Smith, "Money breaks Blood Ties: Chiefs' Courts and the. Transition 
from Lineage Debt to Commercial Debt in Sipolilo District", Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 24, 3 (1998), 509-526; on endless litigation over lobola debts among the BaSotho, 
see, S. Poulter, Family Law and Litigation in Basotho Society (Oxford, 1976). 
1I1For an idea of Chief Lerotholi's wealth in cattle, see, L.N.A., S3/5/5/4, Lerotholi-Maama 
Papers; For Chief Jonathan's large estate, see, P. Hadley (ed), Doctor to Basutho. Boer and 
Briton, 1877-1906: Memories of Dr. Henry Taylor (Cape Town, 1972), 42-3; also L.N.A., 
S3/5/13/6. 
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ofthe owner's cattle at no cost to himself. It also enabled the owner of the cattle thus 
loaned to attract followers and to sustain support through dispensing patronage. 
Within the homestead, cattle defmed gender and masculine identities. Their 
ownership and control determined hegemonic and subordinate genders and 
masculinities· 112 Institutions of social relation vested property rights in the hands of 
male heads of homestead. Cattle and activities associated with them were the 
exclusive preserve -of males. Females occupied the most subordinate position in the 
, 
complex network of property relations. Despite their crucial contribution to the 
production and reproduction of cattle wealth, women were strictly excluded from 
cattle ownership, and from cattle-related activities. 
There was differentiation among males. Although the unmarried men contributed 
significantly towards the requisite labouf~ for the production of cattle, that asset 
remained the property of the head of the homestead. A young man did acquire access 
to cattle mainly as gifts after initiation, but this would have been only a limited 
acquisition. There is no evidence that fathers allocated portions of their herd to their 
sons during the former's lifetime. Even after fathers had passed. their productive years, 
their sons had limited access to their herds, if at all. Only at the death of his father did 
a son gain any significant access to cattle. Yet even then, considerations of seniority 
within the patrilineage ensured that brothers, uncles and widows of the decedsed had 
prior claim to the inheritance. 
112For a classic and persuasive analysis of masculinities, including an extensive review of 
the literature, see R. W. Connell, Masculinities (Cambridge, 1994); On the construction and 
expression of masculine and gender identities specifically in Southern African, see the 
"special issue on masculinities in Southern Africa", Journal of Southern African Studies, 24, 
4 (1998), especially the introductory essay by R. Morrell, "Of Boys and Men: Masculinity 
and Gender in Southern African Studies", 605-630; On the salient caution that women in 
African societies were not subordinated as one universal gender, but that there was significant 
stratification even within this gender category, see, S. Hanretta, "Women, Marginality and the 
Zulu State: Women's Institutions and Power in the Early Nineteenth Century", Journal of 
African History, 39, 3 (1998), 389-416. . 
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Class relations relating to the production and circulation of cattle within the 
homestead were the microcosm of those operating at the level of the state. The ruling 
elite drew their authority as custodians of custom and as lawmakers because they 
dominated the entire base of the economy, especially the ownership and distribution 
of cattle. Thus, they generated laws and customs that reproduced their class and 
consolidated their dominance over the productive process and productive relations. 
These laws and customs, however, were pliable, adjusted to the changing demands of 
the time. For example,' the amount and type of admissible bohali varied across time 
and social status, and was also influenced by economic vicissitudes. In the mid 1860s, 
for example, when cattle were devastated by the lung sickness epizootic, bohali was 
negotiated through an LO.U system, as would happen after the rinderpest. It involved 
depositing stone pebbles, which would be redeemed later after successful restocking. 
The panzootic also affected the earlier cust!>m of replacing bohali cattle that died in 
the custody of the bride's kin. A defendant, sued for replacement of cattle that had 
died in the custody of the bride's kin, reminded the plaintiff of this convenience in 
'. 
1879: "in the olden times, it was our custom to replace cattle that died, but that it was 
no longer our custom as the plaintiff himself knows". II3 
Undoubtedly, these laws and customs were distorted during decades of economic 
~ 
change, missionary and colonial impact. 114 While these initiatives did challenge 
I 
BaSotho social relations, their impact was not immediate and absolute. The Cape 
colonial administration lacked effective means of enforcing its regulations amid 
113Ibid., unreferenced, evidence of Ramabilikoe and Pholwane, respectively, in Pholwane vs 
Salomone, undated, no. 75 of 1879. 
114For details of attempts by missionaries and colonial officials to restructure BaSotho 
social relations, see Cape of Good Hope, Report and Evidence of Commission on Native 
Laws and Customs of the Basutos, 1873, C.O. 48/441, regulations enclosed In Philip 
Wodehouse to Buckingham, no. 31, 2 May 1868; Bradlow, "The Cape Government's Rule of 
Basutoland", 119-217; Burman, Chiefdom Politics; Report of the South African Native 
Mfairs Commission. 1903-;, vol. iii. 
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overwhelming defiance. Colonial officials were themselves careful to avoid too 
radical changes, fearing that it might provoke violent resistance. Thus, many colonial 
regulations were often half-heartedly enforced, or people simply flouted them. 
Imperial rule from 1884 deliberately reversed the policies of the previous Cape 
colonial administration. The new imperial policy officially recognised the traditional 
political structure. To consolidate colonialism-on-the-cheap, as many studies have 
shown/IS imperial officials firmly upheld some traditional political and social 
institutions in a neuter~d form, while distorting others. Similarly, to maintain social 
order, they collaborated with elders and chiefs as happened elsewhere in similar 
colonial situations. 116 Missionaries, especially those of the French church, who had 
spearheaded most of the earlier attempts at social restructuring, lost institutional 
support for their intervention in BaSotho affairs when imperial rule was re-
established. 
115J. Banaji. "Modes of Production in a Materialist Conception of History," Capital and 
Class, 7 (1977), 1-44; for summaries of the debate on "articulation of modes-of-production", 
see A. Foster-Carter, "Can we articulate articulation?," in J. Clammer (ed.), The New 
Economic Anthropology (London, 1978), 217-231; J. Taylor, From Modernisation to Modes 
of Production: A Critique of the Sociologies of Development and Underdevelopment (New 
York, 1979); H. Wolpe, (ed.), The Articulation of Modes of Production (London, 1980); R. 
Chilcote and D. Johnson (eds.), Theories of Development: Mode 0\ Production or 
Dependency? (Beverly Hills, 1983). 
, 
1I6See among others, T. Barnes, "The Fight for Control of African Women's Mobility in 
Colonial Zimbabwe, 1900-1939", ~ 17 (1992), 586-608; M. Chanock, "Making 
Customary Law: Men, Women, and Courts in Colonial Northern Rhodesia, in M. Hay and M. 
Wright (eds), African Women and the Law: Historical Perspectives (Boston, 1982); Chanock, 
Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia (Cambridge, 
1985); L. Manicom, "Ruling Relations: Rethinking State and Gender in South African 
History", Journal of African History, 33 (1992), 441-65; K. Mann, "Women's Rights in 
Law and Practice: Marriage and Dispute Settlement in Colonial Lagos", in Hay and Wrigh, 
African Women and the Law, K. Mann, and C. Roberts (eds.) Law in Colonial Africa 
(Portsmouth, New Jersey, 1991); E. Schmidt, "Negotiated Spaces and Contested Terrain: 
Men, Women, and the Law in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1890-1939", Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 16, 4 (1990), 622-48; E. Schmidt, "Patriarchy, Capitalism and the Colonial State in 
Zimbabwe", fuw, 16 (1991), 732-56; C. Summers "Intimate Colonialism: The Imperial 
Production of Reproductionin Uganda, 1907-1925",~, 16,4 (1991),787-807. 
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Most of the challenge against established social relations came from within - from 
young men and women. They expressed the conflict thus engendered through what 
the elders, chiefs, colonial officials and missionaries echoed as deterioration of 
morality. It was expressed in the increased incidence of adultery, divorce, premarital 
pregnancy, infanticide, seduction of young women, runaway spouses, and single 
parenthood. 117 Inter-generational conflicts abounded in the closing quarter of the 
century. They were reflected in the rising pattern of labour migrancy of young men, 
and, more dramatically, in the increasing restlessness of younger chiefs. 
Cattle had a central place in the lives of the BaSotho, for whom these animals were 
objects of intense emotional attachment. Men were socialised into the activities 
surrounding cattle from a very early age. I IS They started herding calves early, soon 
graduating into cattle herders. When they returned home with the cattle, they stayed 
with their male elders at the cattle kraal and had their meals there. The cattle kraal 
was a central arena for engendering boys into men. They were responsible for 
collecting the fuel for fires at the cattle kraal. Here, boys were taught responsibility 
and hardiness, and were praised for masculine escapades like collecting fuel, running 
errands and for rising early to make the first fire. They also learnt male crafts and 
industries - weaving ropes for thatching, constructing baskets, and tanning. 
From the cattle kraal herd-boys proceeded to communal sleeping quahers designated 
J 
especially and exclusively for them, and a boy who slept at his home was shamed. 
Conversation often centred on cattle and the experience of herding. Brave action to 
protect cattle was a common topic of conversation. Boys also taught one another 
riddles, proverbs and tales often related to cattle. 
117See e.g., S. Burman, "Fighting a two-pronged attack: The Changing Legal Status of 
Women in Cape-ruled Basutoland, 1872-1884", in Walker (ed.), Women and Gender in 
Southern Africa to 1945,48-75. 
lI~ost of what follows was gleaned from an unpublished manuscript by S.L. Moremi, 
Balisana Ba Lesotho (BaSotlro Herdboys), 1944. 
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Male circumcision centred on cattle. A boy on the verge of circumcision was called 
leqai, and his socialisation was in part geared to enhancing his herding capabilities. It 
also taught him everything connected to animal husbandry. Circumcision itself began 
and ended with boys slaughtering a bull with their bare hands. During their initiation, 
the husbanding of cattle was further taught. After initiation, the boys returned to 
herding awhile, soon signifying their intention to marry and begin new homesteads. 
Here, too, cattle became the mediwn of alerting the elders to the boy's designs. A boy 
wishing to marry released the calves on their mothers at dawn, depriving his family of 
the essential mille Marriage, itself, was contracted through cattle. 
And so, cattle were central to the life of an individual. It is hardly surprising, then, 
that relations between humans and cattle were so close. Human relations with 
domestic animals, especially cattle, in nineteenth century BaSotho society were 
characteristically African. They contrasted sharply with western notions at a similar 
stage of development that cultivated a more-distanced view of domestic animals. The 
BaSotho had more intimate relations with their animals. 119 They displayed this 
attitude in several significant. ways. Cattle were not regarded as ordinary livestock, but 
assumed personality, even superhuman characteristics. A beast was, as the BaSotho 
fondly referred to it, molimo 0 nko e metsi (a God with a wet nose). 
Each animal had a special and distinctive name. Many of thesp names were 
descriptive terms, referring to colour, bearing, physical characteristics, or 
1I9See, e.g., K. Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England, 1500-
1800 (London, 1983); For literature on the "wanning-up" of human-animal relations in 
western society, see S.R. Kellert, & J.K. Berry, A Bibliography of Human/Animal Relations 
(Lanham, 1985); also the special issue on "The Role of Animals in Human Society", Journal 
of Social Issues, 49, i (1993); For a characteristically African view of domestic animals, see 
C. Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago, 1966), especially 205; For a discussion of the 
clash of differences between Western and African notions of domestic animals, and how these 
differences influenced white attitudes of Africans, see, P.O. Morgan, "Slaves and Livestock 
in Eighteenth-Century Jamaica: Vineyard Pen, 1750-51", William and Mary Quarterly, Lii, I 
(1995),47-76. 
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temperament. Others, however, were often anthropomorphic. Praise poems were 
created for cattle, inspired by the deep affection for the animals. Praise songs for 
humans, especially chiefs, used symbols and metaphors derived from cattle. 120 The 
common metaphor for the handsome features of a chiet: for example, used the 
symbolism of a female cow. For example, Chief Posholi's praise singer admires him 
as: 
Kbomo e tolotsana e ka kbaka linala, 
Khomo ea Ramotbele e kboalipana, 
E tolotsana e ka kbaka Iinala. 121 
The White-spotted black cow is like a guinea fow~ 
The white-spotted black cow of Ramothele, 
It is white-spotted the cow, 
It is like the guinea fowl of the claws. 
The special place held by cattle in the minds and hearts of the BaSotho is illustrated 
perhaps most strikingly by the people's perception of colour. Although SeSotho 
language, like most Bantu languages, struggles to distinguish intermediate shades of 
colour and colour patches" and patterns, this difficulty does. not exist when the 
BaSotho describe complicated colour combinations in cattle hides. Consequently, 
besides original words describing the basic distinction of white, brown, blac~ and 
yellow, all other words in the language describing colour combinations derive from 
those used for colours of cattle hides. 122 \ 
I 
'Z<M. Damane & P. Saunders, Lithoko: Sotho Praise Poems (Oxford, 1974); Z.O. 
Mangoaela, Lithoko tsa Marena a Basotho (praise-Poems of the Chiefs of the Basotho) 
(Morija, 1921). 
12lMangoaela, Lithoko. II. 
I22A Mabille, Sesuto-English Dictionary (Morija., 1924); Cf. for Tswana in A Sandi lands, 
Introduction to Tswana (London, 1953); For Ndebele, J. W. Brownlee, Popular Ndebele 
Descriptions relating to Cattle Colour, Patterns and Hom Shapes (Harare, ad.). 
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Thus, despite profound, albeit ambivalent transformations throughout the last half of 
the century, cattle still played a preponderant role in the lives of the BaSotho on the 
eve of the rinderpest. As the panzootic approached the country, even an exceptionally 
empathetic perception of a missionary in the country still only touched the tip of the 
iceberg. Predicting the "obvious flood of miseries and privations" awaiting the 
people, he bewailed: 
No more cattle, no more milk, 
What shall we eat? 
No more cattle, no more fuel, 
What shall we qse for making fire? 
No more cattle, no more skin clothes, 
What shall we wear? 
No more cattle no more marriages, 
How shall we marry? 
No more cattle, no more ploughing, 
What shall we eat and where shall we get money?123 
The BaSotho themselves fearfully awaited their tum. "We are Basutbo and have no 
money, we live by cattle", asserted chiefSeeiso at the 1896 pitso which discussed the 
impending catastrophe. "The loss of [our] cattle", lamented the paramount chiefs 
counsellor, "is the death blow of the Basotho nation". 124 
I 
l23H. DieterJen. "La peste bovine au sud de J' Afrique", Journal des Missions Evangeligue, 
1897, 15-16. 
124L.N.A., S1I13, pitso of 1 October 1896, speeches of chief Seeiso and Nehemiah, 
respectively. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE RINDERPEST IN BASUTOLAND 
When the news of the approaching catastrophe reached Basutolan~ a massive effort 
was set apace to keep the disease at bay. The anti-rinderpest campaign devised by 
imperial officials was, by regional standards, commendable. In August 1896, Lagden 
attended the International Rinderpest Conference at Vryburg. Here, he singled himself 
, 
out by rejecting the conference's resolution to destroy all cattle already infected and 
those suspected of being infectious. "It is not desirable that cattle should be 
slaughtered", he cautioned, "seeing that such a course has hitherto proved futile in 
other parts of South Africa". I 
Lagden carried out anti-rinderpest strategies" with admirable zeal. Soon after returning 
from the rinderpest conference, he briefed the paramount chief and his counsellors on 
suggested measures to keep the rinderpest at bay. These included severing all 
communications with infected regions and enforcing regulations. stopping all external 
traffic in animals and vehicles. He also recommended fumigating all travellers coming 
into the country and controlling traffic by proclaiming specified ports of entry. He 
printed in SeSotho general instructions for public guidance and bad them approved by 
1 
the paramount chief-in-council. Lagden further proposed to summon all district 
I 
commissioners, representatives of Christian missions, traders and the nation's 
representatives, to a conference. This would devise measures for transporting essential 
supplies should the need arise sUIIll'ilarily to close the borders. He brought forward the 
annual pitso to "call upon the nation to co-operate with us". 
Lagden also briefed government officials, missionaries and traders. The briefing 
recommended limiting traffic to principal ports while closing all extra ports of entry. 
IL.N.A., S8/2125, residentcommissioner to paramount chief, 24 November 1896. 
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It suggested guarding the entire border especially ports of entry, fumigating visitors 
entering the country, and declaring a five-mile zone along the border from which to 
exclude cattle. It also reaffirmed the policy that shooting infected cattle was 
inadvisable. This took the cue from an impassioned appeal by the resident commis-
sioner: 
It will be asked, I dare say, how we shall carry out our measures. You 
know we have no powerful police, or striking force in the country. 
BaSotho are more easily led than driven. Their intelligence admits of 
appeal to it. _ What I have been lately trying, and will continue is to 
impress upon the native mind the necessity of earnestly listening to our 
advice and strictly carrying out the measures we may determine upon. 
If we succeed, and I have hope of it, in arousing their conscience, it 
will be of more value than a thousand border guards along our 
extensive line. 2 
The resident commissioner submitted these resolutions to the national annual pitso. lilt 
is useless you depending solely upon government and being indifferent or careless 
yourselves," he urged the assembled populace: 
you may pray but God helps those who help themselves. Our energies 
will be lost unless you co-operate with us and act without hesitation. In 
preparing to combat this disease you should sink all tribal differences 
and unite with one voice and hand. We shall advise you the best 
measures to adopt. If you despise or neglect this advice and suffer in 
consequence you must blame yourselves. Your cattle are your life. We 
wish to preserve them for you. We have self-help only to rely upon. 3 
J 
A report by the missionary paper, Le~linYi!mb avowed that the pitso adopted these 
measures unanimously.4 Lagden's own official report of the pitso impressed the staff 
of the Colonial Office in London. "It [the report of the pitso] gives a vivid picture of 
the national meeting in an hour of great peril", the under-secretary for colonies 
2Lagden Papers, Mss. Afr. S. 212, Box 4, Lagden's speech at Rinderpest Conference, 
reported in Cape Times Weekly, date unknown, press cutting in Lagden Papers. 
3L.N.A., S1113, speech of Lag den, pitso of 1st October 1896. 
4Leselinyana, 5 October 1896. 
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enthused, "and of their complete confidence in, and readiness to obey, the Queen's 
government in the attempt to keep out the disease". He went on to pour encomiums on 
the imperial administration in the country: 
I do not think that in the British Empire there is a parallel to the 
government of Basutoland where we have established order and won 
the complete confidence of the native at a cost entirely borne by 
themselves.5 
The proposed measures immediately came into operation. In October 1896, the 
, 
imperial administration closed borders with the Free State, the Cape and Natal, 
leaving only selected points of entry opened under stringent conditions. It cleared 
zones in each district, and ordered the exclusion of cattle from the "free zones". It 
advised the removal of all cattle to mountain sanctuaries for isolation. By the end of 
October Lagden had completed a tour of Northern Basutoland, where he personally 
inspected the anti-rinderpest projects.6 
The key to these measures was the absence of coercion. They differed from the 
baleful seventeenth century plague regulations described by Defoe in London, or the 
harsh and coercive regulations imposed by the Romanov, Habsburg and HohenzolIem 
autocracies during the European encounter with cholera in the early 1830s.7 They 
neither bore any resemblance to the equally Spartan measures adopted by 
~ 
neighbouring governments towards Africans. The reason was the lack of a strong 
I 
military force to oversee coercive anti-epidemic measures. The imperial 
administration depended on the co-operation of the BaSotho themselves. 
SC.O., 417/186, Minute by Meade (undated), on high commissioner to secretary of state for 
colonies, 30 October 1896. 
6L.N.A., S4/1/4, Lagden's Diary, 1896, entry for 31 October and 4 November 1896; also 
S5/13, Resident commissioner to High commissioner, 30 October 1896. 
7D. Defoe, A Journal of the Plague (London, 1722); For a survey of the universal relaxation 
of these measures during the second European encounter with the cholera at mid-century, see 
Evans, "Epidemics and Revolutions." 
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BaSotho chiefs initially seemed willing to co-operate. Soon after the national 
rinderpest pitso in August, the paramount chief met with the principal chiefs at his 
headquarters in Matsieng. They proposed a joint action against the spread of the 
disease. Chiefs were to appoint vigilance committees to carry out anti-rinderpest 
precautions. They were also urged to establish teams to guard the borders and isolate 
every sick animal. They agreed to co-operate with imperial officials in keeping the 
disease at bay.8 
Various factors; however, prevented the fulfillment of these well-intentioned designs. 
The paramount chief was indisposed for much of the last quarter of 1896.9 He was 
thus unable to take personal command of the campaign. When he did engage in 
matters of state, he was taken up with dynastic disputes. These flared more 
prominently during this period of impending crisis. These dynastic feuds militated 
against a cooperative effort. The paramount chiefs commitment to carry out measures 
devised by distrusted imperial officials now exacerbated the feuds. He became 
alienated from the more conservative chiefs. Thus, when Lagden lambasted Lerotholi 
for failing to mobilise his -subordinate chiefs, 10 the latter protested his inability to 
command obedience among subordinate chiefs, claiming that ''they do not admit my 
being a chief and therefore ignore me and refuse to carry out my instructions". 
Further, he reported that his attempts to carry out the regulations proposed by the 
imperial government had earned him the odium of aping "a white nufu". His enemies 
now dubbed him "a white black". II J 
8See for example, L.N.A., S5/13, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 8 October 
1896. 
'1bid., S41I14, resident commissioner's Diaries, entry for 28 and 29 October 4. 7 and 9 
November 1896; also S5/13, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 15 December 
1896. 
lorbid., S8/2/2/4, resident commissioner to paramount chief, 23 November 1896. 
lIIbid., S7/3/12, paramount chief to resident commissioner, 24 November 1896. 
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Most of the senior chiefs, also, seem to have pinned all their hopes on the initiatives 
of imperial officials. "Whatever orders I get from government", presaged the 
paramount chief I will carry out": 
I will work hard, this fat body that you see before you will be worn thin 
by work in a single day. I am the arm that will carry out the work which 
government orders to be done. 
"We are your [resident commissioner] cattle," confirmed the next most senior chief, 
Jonathan, 
We hear about this disease. We wish to know what we must do to 
prevent it copring in. We have always been protected and taken care of. 
Some of us are stupid and some imprudent. Don't get tired on account 
of our ways. We are the government's flocks. We are caretakers of 
cattle and will carry out your orders. See for us and tell us where to 
take our cattle. 12 
Masupha, the third next senior chief, did not even attend the pitso, drawing sneering 
criticism from a speaker attending the briefing. \3 
The anti-rinderpest campaign had its merits, but also practical weaknesses. The 
measures were neither stringent enough to ensure the country's protection, nor flexible 
enough to reassure the populace of the administration's good intentions. Fearful of the 
popular discontent they had evoked, the imperial administration carried out the 
measures cautiously. The measures also depended on local community support. 
Individuals from communities that doubted the existence of the disease policed 
cordons and borders. It is unlikely, therefore, that those who saw no clear reason for 
such cordons would have been diligent to enforce them. Besides, believ!ng the 
unlikely tidings that the imperial government had suddenly taken an interest in their 
welfare was difficult for the populace. 
12Ibid., S 1113, speeches of Lerotholi and Jonathan, pitso of I October 1896. 
13Ibid., speech of Snei Moshoeshoe, pitso of I October 1896; also Leselinyana, 15 October, 
1896, speech of Snei Moshoeshoe, pitso of 1 October 1896. 
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Restricting the movement of people and stock was also difficult because the value of 
cattle lay in part in their mobility. Cattle had to move between families, villages and 
regions. They were the medium in marriage and financial transactions; and various 
social activities were associated with them. The problem was exacerbated when 
people were restless, prone to move about at the slightest suspicion of an outbreak of 
the disease. 
The rinderpest also coincided with other climatic disasters; further complicating 
efforts to restrict stock movements. The year 1896 had brought with it a universal 
drought reputed to have been the most severe in living memory. This impelled 
widespread migrations in search of pasture and water. Climatic disasters also spurred 
people to move both within and out of the country in search of food. There was also 
the massive repatriation of BaSotho labourers from various labour centres in South 
Africa. They returned home amid rumours, that their country was under threat. The 
movement of these men with their stock acquired in areas already infected, hastened 
the spread of the rinderpest. 14 Besides, the country had become irrevocably 
incorporated into the regional commercial and labour nexus, rendering it especially 
vulnerable to the movement of goods and people during epidemics. 
Furthermore, the whole length of the country was a gaping hole in the national 
defence against epidemic disease. Basutoland was especially vufuerable because 
territories where there had already been outbreaks of the disease surrounded it. A 
large part of the country's long border had no natural barriers, and there were meagre 
resources to protect it. The imperial administration had never anticipated the 
likelihood of such an emergency. 
14L.N.A., S 1113, speech of chief Seeiso, pitso of 1 October 1896; also speeches of 
Nehemiah, Philip, Setha and Pshatlella. 
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The supposedly superior European knowledge of science and medicine was not useful 
either in this crisis. The lack of epidemiological knowledge in South Africa was 
replicated, in its worst form, in Basutoland. Public facilities, for people and animals, 
did not exist. As late as in 1899, patients could be treated at one of only four medical 
centres in the country, each with an average of six beds. IS Given these meagre 
facilities for people, one can only imagine the extent of neglect of veterinary services. 
When the cattle murrain broke out, there was no trained veterinarian in the country. 
The battle agains! the disease began with one veterinarian lent by the Cape 
government. 16 
Nor was imperial assistance forthcoming. In the 1890s, Britain was the centre of 
veterinary education and knowledge with some of the best established veterinary 
schools in the world. The oldest was the Royal Veterinary College, founded in 1791. 
In 1823, the Royal (Dick) Veterinary CoU~ge was founded, and the establishment of 
the Glasgow Veterinary College followed in 1862.17. Most of the veterinarians who 
now had to cope with the rinderpest in South Africa had been trained in Britain: 
Hutcheon (Cape Colony), Gray (Rhodesia), Watkins-Pitchford,(Natal), to name only 
the most prominent. 
J 
ISc.o., 417/297, report of chief medical officer, year ending 31 December 1899, in Sloley to 
Chamberlain, 7 May, 1900. 
l~.N.A., S5/15, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 7 September 1897. 
17E. Cotchin, The Royal Veterinary College. London: A Bicentenary History (London, 
1900); I. Pattison, The British Veterinary Profession: 1785-1948 (London, 1984); Pattison, 
John MacFadyen: A Great British Veterinarian (London, 1901); For the early history of the 
Glasgow Veterinary School, see M. Moss, "The Origins of the Glasgow Veterinary School", 
University of Glasgow Veterinary Newsletter, issue 1997, at http://www.gla.uk/acad/vet/ 
news/no.5/origins,html 
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" 
Yet, the imperial government, including British institutions like the British Board of 
Agriculture and the Royal Veterinary College,18 failed to assist its South African 
colonies, including Basutoland, with veterinary expertise. This was despite the 
development of the process of ''professionalizing'' the British government that had 
started long before the 1890s. 19 It involved the increasing reliance of the civil service 
on the advice of experts. Even six years after the outbreak of the rinderpest, when 
East Coast Fever threatened South Africa, the staff of the Colonial Office was hard 
put to identifY a suitable pathologist to undertake research on the disease. They had 
not even heard ofProfe~sor John MacFadyen, a pathologist who was to be recognized 
as the first modern veterinary scientist in Britain. He had been principal of the oldest 
veterinary college in the country - the Royal Veterinary College - since 1894.20 When 
the British high commissioner in South Africa requested the Colonial Office to send 
him to South Africa to study the disease, a staffer minuted as follows: 
I think we [should] first find out something privately about this 
Professor. It is my experience that such proposals are sometimes made, 
quite wildly, on hearsay evidence. Make private inquiry at the 
Agricultural Department - about Professor MacFadyen [sic]".21 
Britain had also acquired extensive experience in confronting the same epizootic that 
now threatened its South African colonies only two decades before. Rinderpest 
devastated British cattle between 1865 and 1867, an episode ranked the most dramatic 
in British agricultural history in the nineteenth century.22 Yet the onlr advice imperial 
.I 
180n the contribution of the Royal Soc.iety to the development of science in the nineteenth-
century, see M. Hall, All Scientists Now: The Royal Society in the 19th Century (Cambridge, 
1984). 
19R. MacLeod (ed.), Government and Expertise: Specialists. Administration and 
Professionals, 1860-1919 (Cambridge, 1988). 
2Opattison, John MacFadyean. 
2IC.0., 417/344/36657. 
220rwin & Whetham, History of British Agriculture, 200-2; J.R. Fisher, "The Economic 
Effects of Cattle Disease-in Britain and its Containment, 1850-1900", Agricultural History;liv 
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officials in Basutoland received from the Board of Agriculture was to slaughter all 
infected cattle including those that had merely been exposed to infection.23 
Epidemiological knowledge among the BaSotho was not lacking. Fragmentary evi-
dence suggests that they were not ignorant of the basic principles of contagion and 
quarantine. During an unprecedented outbreak of smallpox in 1884, for example, 
BaSotho chiefs had adopted stringent measures for the isolation ofthe victims. Whole 
villages were quarantined, the disease dying out in some villages with the last 
inhabitant. 24 Another strategy was to quarantine infected or suspected victims in the 
mountain sanctuaries where they allowed the disease to run its course.25 In 1892 when 
foot and mouth disease hit the country, the cattle were quarantined in the mountains.26 
Charles Currey, under-secretary for agriculture in the Cape, observed that during an 
epidemic of horse-sickness some years before, the loss was modest. This was because 
their owners had driven the horses into the"mountains, where the water was pure and 
untainted by germs. 27 
(1980). 278-94: Fisher. "British Physicians, Medical Science and the Cattle Plague, 1865-66", 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 67 (1993); Fisher, "Not Quite a Profession: The 
Aspirations of Veterinary Surgeons in Britain in the Mid-nineteenth-century", Historical 
Research, ;xvi (1993), 284-7; Hall, "The Great Cattle Plague of 1865",259-66; M. Worboys, 
"Germ Theories of Disease and British Veterinary Medicine, 1860-1890"" Medical History, 
xxxv (1991),308-27. 
J 
23L.N.A., BGB 1121, "Memorandum on Measures to be adopted for Suppression of the 
Disease Known as Rinderpest, or Zambesi Fever in Cattle", encl. in under-secretary for 
agriculture, London, to the Department of Agriculture, Cape of Good Hope, 19 March 1896, 
in L.N.A., S3/1/5/8, high commissioner to resident commissioner, 13 January 1897. 
24U.S.p.G. Archives, 1884 B, annual report of Rev. Stenson. 
25L.N.A. S 1113, minutes of pitso of 1st October 1896, see especially speeches of Chiefs 
Seeiso, Jonathan, Nehemiah, Philip and Pshatlela. 
26ybid., S7/1/2/8, assistant commissioner, Leribe, to resident commissioner, 22 December 
1892. 
27c. Currey, in Southern 1>ost and Border, 7 November 1896. 
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During the rinderpest outbreak, the BaSotho did display knowledge of contagion and 
epidemiology. They did view the rinderpest as a contagious disease. At the rinderpest 
pitso of Octo ber 1896, speakers drew attention to this aspect. They understood that 
the disease would spread from region to region and through physical contact. They 
realised that the main vehicle for its spread would be migrants returning from the 
labour centres with infected cattle, and transport riders crossing into the country with 
infected teams. One speaker observed that the disease could "be brought by clothes 
and boots".28 
However, a new, unknown disease would test the prevailing interpretative system, 
imposing strain on what remained of traditional epidemiological expertise. Although 
people could explain why one neighbourhood after another was infected the yearning 
was for an explanation of the original source of the disease. It is hardly surprising that 
an overwhelming and inexplicable disease, like the rinderpest, taxed every one's 
explanatory faculties - both black and white, literate or illiterate. Moreover, the 
-i.. 
dramatic impact of the rinderpest created a crisis atmosphere, a sure source of 
conspiracy theories. Furthermore, in the grip of an inexplicable epidemic, a system of 
surveillance, fundamental for disease contro~ did not exist. Gaining information about 
the disease and the sources of contamination was difficult. 
Yet, against all odds, it was to the credit of the country, its authorities and people, that 
the outbreak of the disease was delayed for as long as it was. By the 'end of October 
1896, the murrain was raging in Winburg and Senekal, southwest of the saSotho 
border with the Free State. By mid-November, it had broken out in Rouxville on the 
southeast border, thus encircling Basutoland in a flanking movement.29 Soon, 
28L.N.A., SI1/3, minutes of pit so of 1st October 1896, especially speeches of Chiefs Seeiso, 
Jonathan, Nehemiah and Philip and PshatleIa. 
~.N.A., S4/1/4, resident commissioner's Diaries, entry for 26 October & 11 November 
1896. 
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afterwards, it streaked through a strictly imposed cordon, suddenly appearing in two 
villages in the northern district ofLeribe. 
Considering the elaborate campaigns that imperial officials and neighbouring states 
mounted, this first outbreak puzzled everyone. However, it was snuffed out before it 
could spread. Strict quarantine measures and the shooting of infected cattle on the 
orders of the district chief stalled the outbreak for a while. The fight against the 
disease seems to have been more effective at the local than national level. Colonial 
officials attributed this success to the district chief Jonathan. "Upon his own 
responsibility", he shot all the sick cattle and drove those still healthy into the 
quarantine area. 30 
So effective were these measures, in the short term, that the mortality of the disease 
was slight. Although the outbreak occurred on the Phuthiatsana River separating the 
two districts of Leribe and Berea, the disease did not appear in the latter district. It 
~-
testified to the efficacy of the stringent quarantine measures enforced by the chiefs of 
both districts. Only in March, the following year did the panzootic reappear in the 
country. 
This delay, and the effective strategy of stamping out the first outbreak, gave people a 
false sense of confidence and control. It resulted in relaxing precautions, and 
confirmed in the minds of the already skeptical populace that the 'entire panic had 
been a false alarm. In January 1897 the resident commissioner, at the requ~st of the 
paramount chief, reluctantly reduced the five-mile free zone along the border to 1000 
yards. 3 ! With the approach of the winter months, cattle-owners began bringing their 
cattle down from the mountain retreats. With the rinderpest raging in neighbouring 
Free State, many BaSotho wished to commence their ploughing before the disease 
should appear in the country. They violated the restrictions imposed for the removal 
3~bid.,S3/251111 4, annual reports, year ending 30 July 1897. 
31Ibid., S5/14, resident commissioner to High commissioner, 23 January 1897. 
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of cattle within the five-mile free zone along the Caledon River, and brought their 
cattle to plough their fields32 
Then the disease struck again. On 5 March 1897 the assistant commissioner for 
Mafeteng district tersely reported that a disease suspected to be rinderpest had 
appeared in a village bordering the Free State, at Sephapo's gate, in the neighbouring 
district of Mohaleshoek. By the next morning, at least sixty-five cattle were already 
dead, and all others in the village were sick.33 This dramatic and rapid mortality 
suggests that the disease had been in the area for sometime, and that cattle owners had 
- , 
concealed its presence. 
Now there was no doubt - the dreaded disease had arrived and the cattle were dying. 
The successful quarantine measures implemented during the first outbreak: instilled 
confidence for halting this latest outbreak. A massive effort was concentrated on the 
strictly quarantined area Lerotholi dispatched his most senior son, Letsienyana, to 
establish a stringent quarantine in the infected area Lagden, in turn, appointed 
Lerotholi's energetic and progressive younger brother, chief Maama, to help enforce 
quarantine regulations. Imperial officials and BaSotho chiefs immediately called for 
the closure of district borders to localise the outbreak:. Vigilance committees were 
hurriedly set up to guard both the country's borders with neighbouring states and 
district boundaries. Dipping stations were established to disinfect t~vellers between 
districts.34 I 
32FrienQ, 24 November 1896. 
33rbid., S311 /5/4, assistant commissioner, Mafeteng, to government secretary, 5 March 
1897; assistant commissioner, Mafeteng, to resident commissioner, 9 March 1897. 
34Ibid., acting government's circulars 35.97 and 38.97 to assistant commissioner, Quthing; 
circular 25.97 to assistant commissioners. 
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This outbreak sealed the fate of the rest ofBasutoland. Ten days later, the disease was 
reported spreading northwards, devastating cattle belonging to the enterprising 
BaTaung, the Mfengu of Basutoland. In panic, cattle-owners fled with their cattle, 
driving them to the mountain posts. This took the infection to the only remaining 
reliable quarantine areas. The fleeing herds also spread the disease en-route.35 
The disease advanced on the rest of the country in a flanking movement. None of the 
districts knew what had hit them, and from where. From the centres of infection, the 
disease travelled along the main road, ravaging both southwards and northwards. It hit 
the northern district of Leribe in mid-March when the panzootic broke out in one 
village. Strict quarantine measures were imposed and the disease died out by the end 
of May, having killed only close on 150 head of cattle. It appeared in another village 
in the district late in May, with Chief Jonathan ordering the slaughter of all the sick 
animals. Only in late June did the disease gain the upper hand, spreading "like wild 
fIre" throughout the district. 36 
April and May was the fatal period for all districts. Neighbouring Berea was struck in 
mid-May. Here the disease was thought to have come through two stolen cattle that 
had arrived from a village in the district of Mafeteng. It soon "ran riot" over the entire 
district, despite "spasmodic" attempts made by some of the more progressive chiefs of 
the district, among them 'Mamathe and Martinus, to halt it through quahmtine. Within 
a month, between 30 May and 30 June, close on six thousand cattle had died, imd the 
assistant commissioner for the district was speculating a mortality rate of ninety-eight 
per cent of unreported deaths.37 
3SIbid., S4/1I4, resident commissioner's diaries, entry for 29 March 1897. 
~bid., S3/115/8/11, rinderpest report for the district of Leribe, 30 June 1897; Ibid., L2/l//6. 
37Ibid., S3/115/8/3, Rinderpest report for the district of Berea, 30 June 1897; ibid., TY 
111117. 
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May was also a fateful month for the central district of Maseru. Defying well-
conceived and enforced measures to arrest its spread, the rinderpest broke out in the 
district early in May. It "spread from hut to hut with alarming rapidity".38The 
Southern districts of Basutoland - Mohaleshoek Quthing and Qachasnek - in their 
tum, had been protected from infection from East Griqualand by a fence constructed 
hurriedly. Quarantine had been imposed in Mohaleshoek and Quthing in October 
1896 and no animal transport was allowed through the sole waggon road from the 
latter district into the Cape Colony at the Tel1e Drift. In April, however, rinderpest 
was spreading through,Mohaleshoek and Quthing, probably from the initial outbreak 
at Sephaphos. Early in May 1897, another infestation came from across the border 
after the panzootic had appeared near the Orange River on the Herschel border. From 
then on, the disease raged through entire southern Basutoland.39 
By keeping the disease at bay for a while, Basutoland was able to derive the benefits 
of Koch's newly discovered immunisation remedy. The administration's plan of 
defence thus took advantage of this new prophylactic. Lagden tried to win the support 
of BaSotho chiefs for the prophylactic. He, however, cautiously avoided committing 
the imperial administration until its efficacy was no longer in doubt. 
The imperial administration established its own experimental laboratory to test the 
effectiveness of Koch's method of immunisation and to develop a vaccine. This , 
station was established near the village where the first outbreak had occurred. Two 
I 
veterinarians lent by the Cape Government, Harry Armstrong and William Robertson, 
manned it. Both were convinced disciples of the Koch remedy. On arrival at the 
quarantined camp, they met a bewildered populace. It included the paramount chief 
who accompanied them as they demonstrated a diagnosis of the disease among dead 
38Ibid., S3/1/5/8/4, Rinderpest report for the district of Maseru, 30 June 1897 
3~bid., S3/1/5/817,8,9, Rinderpest reports for the districts of Mohaleshoek, Quthing and 
Qachasnek, 30 June 1897 
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and dying cattle and the method of collecting and injecting bile. They commenced 
using Koch's method immediately. By the end of their first week in Basutoland, they 
had inoculated upwards of five hundred cattle that, though not yet exhibiting any 
symptoms, were regarded as infected.40 
Their experiments started with twelve cattle from a healthy area. They inoculated six 
of these animals with bile in a public demonstration, and kept the remaining six 
uninoculated as a control experiment. Eight days later, the period required for an 
animal to gain imm1!nity, they mixed all twelve animals with an infected herd.41 If the 
six uninoculated cattle should manifest symptoms of the disease, unlike the six 
inoculated cattle, Koch's method would have proved its effectiveness. Four days later, 
the signs were promising. Three of the six inoculated cattle remained perfectly 
healthy. Most of the cattle inoculated outside laboratory conditions also displayed 
signs of immunity, prompting the assistant commissioner for Mafeteng to recommend 
full-scale inoculation. 
However, three ofthe six inoculated cattle soon died even before being mixed with an 
infected herd. Their death sparked a rumour that the cattle had been poisoned through 
inoculation. It emerged, however, that these cattle had already been contaminated 
before their arrival at the experimentation centre. This speculation, however, did little 
to allay the suspicions of the pessimistic populace. 
General inoculation also brought problems. Koch's method of inoculation had'several 
shortcomings. It demanded zealous' care and effort. Its success depended on 
experience with the process of inoculation. With only two veterinarians to attend to a 
national herd totalling approximately 500,000, distributed through 30,343 square 
~bid., S3/1/5/8/5, report by William Robertson and Harry Armstrong, 27 March and 3 
April 1897. 
411bid., report of2 April 1897. 
; 
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kilometres of rugged countryside, successful inoculation on this large scale and under 
epidemic conditions was impossible. One had to use clear and fresh bile, which had to 
be extracted either by killing a sick donor, or immediately after its death. Killing a 
sick animal for the express purpose of extracting its bile was a knotty affair because 
cattle-owners held out hopes that some of their sick cattle might mysteriously recover. 
Doomed cattle did miraculously recover. 42 Persuading cattle-owners to sacrifice even 
one head was difficult. 
An unwitting, but necessary, paradox of Koch's method was that the salvation of a 
cattle owner was the perdition of another, for the prophylactic to save the former's 
herds came from the latter's dying animals. The rinderpest, like most disasters, 
brought out the best and the worst in people. While in some cases it encouraged 
generosity, in others it engendered individualism. It also exacerbated social 
fragmentation, and led to a tenacious desire for the preservation of self and family 
even when that resulted in cruelty to others. 4~ It was thus difficult to obtain sufficient 
doses of bile owing to the reluctance of owners of moribund cattle to donate it - their 
attitude was "let others' cattle as well as mine die. ,,44 
The bile had to be injected immediately after extraction, for preserving its immunising 
agent was difficult. Some bile could also convey the disease to an otherwise healthy 
animal, fanning the suspicion of deliberate poisoning among already sceptical cattle-
owners. The quantities of bile needed - 10ec per injection - though modest in normal 
I 
circumstances - was large under epidemic conditions. Enough of it could only be 
42Ibid., S5114, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 7 April 1897. 
43For these contradictory reactions to most plagues and other disasters, see e.g. Evans-
Pritchard, The Nuer (Oxford, 1940), 85; D.M. Schneider, "Typhoons on Yapii:, Human 
Organization, 16 (1957), 10-15; C. Laughl in, "Deprivation and Reciprocity", M!ID, 9 (1974), 
380-96; "In Time Of Plague: The History of Social Consequences of Lethal Epidemic 
Disease", special issue, Social Research, 55, 3 (1988), 337-8. 
44L.N.A. S31115/8110, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 12 June 1897. 
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acquired by killing several infected animals. Inoculation had to be accomplished 
before a neighbourhood was infected. This was an onerous task among people who 
remained doubtful ifthe prophylactic worked. 
The latest that one might inoculate a herd was within three days of the onset of the 
fIrst symptoms. This, however, was an elusive period to detennine. Immunity did not 
take effect immediately, thus exposing the animal to infection between inoculation 
and the start of immunity. The inoculated animal acquired only transient immunity, 
, 
for three to six months, after which it had to be re-inoculated. Moreover, the immense 
popularity of the prophylactic, after the initial suspicion, caused logistical problems 
around the availability and delivery of the bile. 
Tracing the onset of infection before affected cattle could infect healthy ones was 
difficult. At the end of March, for exampJe, about two thousand cattle of an ardent 
disciple of inoculation had been inoculated. At the completion of the campaign, 
however, the veterinarians discovered that among the inoculated herds were a cow 
and its calf both in the last stages of rinderpest. It also emerged that the cattle 
inoculated included his son's herds that carne to the inoculation site from some 
distance. They had mixed with the village cattle, and had returned home before the 
infection of the village herds was discovered. They had thus helped to spread the , 
disease.45 
I 
The impediment to convincing cattle-owners of the effectiveness of inoculation arose 
largely from the death of inoculated herds treated after they had already become 
infected. It also weakened their faith in the veterinarians and their prophylactic; they 
stood to bear the blame of poisoning the cattle.46 What happened at one village was 
dramatic and chilling. When the veterinarians arrived at the village to collect bile 
45Ibid., S3/1/5/8/5, report of Armstrong and Davis, 2 April 1897. 
46Ibid., report of3 April 1897. 
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from the dying cattle, they observed the villagers throwing their cattle down and 
cutting out the spot on the animals' bodies where the incision for inoculation had been 
made. Then a woman accosted the veterinarians, swearing that ''we were wizards and 
had killed the cattle and were now come to destroy the rest of the herd".47 The 
villagers had destroyed the inoculation camp and cattle-owners were fleeing with their 
herds. 
Successful inoculation, especially when administered by the same people who 
collected bile from contaminated animals, depended on maintaining clinical 
conditions. This meant using sanitary needles and syringes, submitting to rigid 
disinfection in carbo lic baths, and changing clothing. The expertise and capacity for 
inoculating on such a large scale were lacking. There was no trained staff and the 
imperial administration engaged in a massive effort to give rudimentary training to 
potential inoculators. Unprofessional procedures so bothered the authorities that the 
paramount chief had to campaign for caution: 
From the way I hear how the inoculation is being done I find that it 
differs from the way the doctors showed us. I remember an important 
word which was spoken by the doctors when they said great care was 
to be taken in inoculating; that the skin only was to be pierced and the 
needle not to reach the animal's flesh; that it is to be between the skin 
and flesh. And this to be done with the greatest care. Now I hear that 
those inoculators do not do so. They prick right into the flesh so that 
when the needle is drawn out blood gushes out. This is why I say do 
again advise those who are inoculating. 48 
Disinfection procedures did not encourage cattle-owners to submit willingly! At the 
fIrst public demonstration of the inoculation procedures, the paramount chief himself 
47Ibid., resident commissioner's diary for 7 April, 1897. 
48rbid., S3/l/S18/IO, paramount chief to resident commissioner, 11 June 1897. 
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failed to tolerate the discomfort of being subjected to a carbolic bath. To relieve the 
irritation, he and counsellors resorted to intemperance.49 
The racist undertones of the disinfection also disturbed the BaSotho. The burden of 
fumigation seemed to bear more on Africans than on their white counterparts. 
Following the Vryburg Conference, the imperial administration had adopted the 
measure of fumigating "every person white or black". Fumigators were to subject 
clothes to a dry heat of 220 degrees Fahr., washing people with water and carbolic 
soap. It soon became evident that the authorities were applying these measures only to 
the BaSotho. European travellers, unlike the BaSotho, could deposit spare suits of 
clothing at disinfecting stations. This enabled them to change into fresh clothes while 
leaving others at the stations to undergo disinfection. Further, washing their hands and 
face at disinfecting stations was deemed sufficient for Europeans, while Africans had 
to undergo a complete soaking. 
The initial immunisation experiments did~ prove disastrous. From the Mafeteng 
district, where these experiments were first conducted, the early reports caused 
anxiety. "1 fear", Lagden wrote early in April "all experiments with inoculation are 
working out unfortunately". A month later, the paramount chiet: in turn, expressed his 
apprehension - "the cattle", he warned, "are dying from inoculation".5o Similar reports 
came from other districts as the disease began to spread through May, June and JUly.51 
This failure of inoculation and the striking resemblance between ~ symptoms of 
.1 
rinderpest and those of inoculation convinced cattle owners of foul play. The 
suspicion that assistant commissioners: who supervised inoculation, were deliberately 
4'1bid., S5/14, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 29 March 1897. 
sOMss. Afr. S. 169, Lagden's Diary, entry for 3 April 1897; L.N.A., S3/1/5/1O, paramount 
chief to resident commissioner, 23 May 1897. 
SIE.g. from Quthing and Mohaleshoek, L.N.A., Q2/1113, assistant commissioner to resident 
commissioner, 30 June 1897, and S312511114, assistant commissioner to resident 
commissioner, 3 July respectively. 
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poisoning their cattle spread with the panzootic. Some came to implore the assistant 
commissioners to save at least some of their herds, believing that as they brought the 
disease, they could also take it away. 52 
Attitudes towards inoculation varied among cattle-owners. Some preferred to have 
their cattle treated, saying, "save at last some of our herds"! Others opposed 
inoculation, suspecting that it was the surest means of spreading the disease. Rumours 
associating inoculation with witchcraft were rife. For example, on reaching one 
infected village, an inoculation team found the villagers "sulky", saying, ''their cattle 
were dying from the effects of the inoculation". Allover the area, "the common 
people [were] very suspicious and [said] that their cattle [were] bewitched by 
inoculation. " 
At another village, a man confronted assistant commissioner Kennan. He showed the 
latter a sixpence piece that he claimed to have found in the stomach of his dead cow 
that had been inoculated. He accused the inoculators of placing the foreign object in 
his cow's stomach to bewitch it. So persistent was he in his accusations that he spread 
the allegation around. He wished the government, the chiefs and the populace to know 
that the reputed rinderpest was nothing but witchcraft. 53 A month later, another 
alarming story spread that a blanket pin had been found in the st0marh of a dead cow 
that had been inoculated. 54 J 
Initially, the chiefs had promised to co-operate with the imperial administration in its 
inoculation campaign. The early disasters of inoculation, however, tested their 
resolve. After appearing to give his approval for the campaign, Lerotholi failed to live 
52M. Pascal, 24 August 1897, Journal des missions, 1897,600. 
53L.N.A., S3/1I5/8/5, Kennan's diary, week ended 9 April 1897. 
~ 
54Lesedinyana, 15 May 1897. 
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up to expectation. Once the programme was under way, he neglected inoculating his 
own herds and was reluctant to order inoculation as a national policy. His reluctance 
was understandable. Amid widespread suspicion that inoculation was the deliberate 
poisoning of cattle by the imperial administration, the paramount chief had to avoid 
carrying the blame for collaborating with an administration that people suspected of 
killing his own people's herds. If he ordered inoculation on a national scale, and the 
cattle died, he would have to bear the blame for the disaster. His role as a partner in 
the parallel administration that managed the anti-rinderpest measures placed him in a 
quandary. He had to conceal his initial apprehension about the inoculation campaign. 
So he employed various subterfuges, including proposing that the country be 
partitioned into two parts, the one for disciples of immunisation, and the other for its 
opponents. This would enable the former to have their herds treated, while also 
allowing the latter to follow the dictates of their hearts.55 
Lerotholi continued to discourage the supporters of inoculation. His own chief 
councillor, Rarnabilikoe Matete, upon finding that his own ward was infected, 
petitioned the assistant commissioner to intervene: 
I am sitting here quite amazed to see the sickness around about my 
place .... I sent to the Paramount chief to ask for inoculation and I see 
that the chief is hesitating. I request you to be kind enough to speak: to 
the paramount chief to permit us to have our cattle inoculated. Perhaps 
he might listen to you and the Resident Commissioner. I see that our 
cattle will die before we could do something to save them. 56 ~ 
.I 
Many conservative chiefs, themselves equally apprehensive, employed similar 
subterfuges. In Mafeteng one headman applied to the principal chief of the district, 
through the assistant commissioner, to have his cattle treated. He, however, received 
a belated reply asserting that the principal chief was without the power to authorise 
5SL.N.A.., S3/115/1, paramount chief to resident commissioner, 22 and 25 Apri~ 1897. 
s1bid., Ramabilikoe Mateje to Assistant commissioner, Mafeteng, 26 April 1897. 
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inoculation, and that he would refer the request to the paramount chief. To evade 
similar requests, the principal chief disappeared from the district fot a lengthy period, 
until imperial officials tracked him to the village of his uncle, Chief Bereng. The latter 
was reputed to be irrevocably opposed to inoculation. 57 Chief Masupha, at Berea, 
persistently opposed inoculation, threatening those who treated their herds with 
confiscation of their stock. His sons and subordinate chiefs who preferred immunising 
their herds incurred his wrath. 58 In Leribe, Chief Joel frustrated efforts by 
missionaries to treat his people's herds by banning the inoculation campaign in his 
ward.59 
Suspicious of the ''white man's medicine", some cattle-owners attempted their own 
remedies. They drew on indigenous resources and expertise to combat the disease. 
Many attempted everything - germicides, anodynes, astringents, laxatives. Chief 
Masupha expressed this attitude best, arguing that "it isn't to say that I know how to 
treat this disease, but I am only trying". 60 
The principle behind inoculation was not, itself, foreign to the BaSotho. It was based 
on the familiar principle of sirnilia sirnilibus curatur, which the BaSotho practiced. 
Koch's method of immunisation with bile was actually the BaSotho's cure for 
snakebites. A European doctor who worked in Leribe in the 1880s admitted receiving 
his first practical lesson in this homeopathic remedy locally. He also specul~ted that 
the BaSotho ideas of inoculation could have influenced Koch's method.61 Some cut 
their cattle on their forehead and "rubbed in medicine". Others "pierced the cattle's 
57Ibid., S3/1/515, assistant commissioner's diary of week ended 30 April 1897. 
sSE.g. Ibid., TYlII7, Lepoqo to assistant commissioner, Berea, 13 July 1897. 
5'M. Christeller, Journal des Missions, 1897,351. 
~.N.A., TYlII 7, Masupha to Resident commissioner, 12 March 1897. 
6JHadley, Doctor to Basutho, 28. 
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dew laps and gave them to drink". 62 Others made their cattle drink from a medicinal 
potion, the efficacy of which is difficult to determine. Others fumigated their herds 
with a mixture of a charm potion and sulphur.63 Still others adapted medicinal cures 
used by neighbouring boer farmers, who also possessed an impressive store of 
homemade veterinary knowledge. 
Many of these remedies emanated from local curative lores in treating lung sickness 
(contagious pleuro-pneumonia), for the symptoms of rinderpest exhibited the worst 
, 
forms of this endemic bovine disease. Some of these domestic remedies may have 
worked, depending on the virulence of infection. Generally, however, they probably 
did more to ease the anxieties of perplexed cattle-owners than to cure their sick and 
dying cattle. 
The medicines used before infection were probably protective charms against 
suspected witchcraft. The cures used most probably included medicines intended to 
fight the particular symptom of sickness. While they may have temporarily relieved 
symptoms, they did not cure the disease. The rinderpest was a serious test of medical 
expertise, and unleashed an admirable scramble to experiment. 
After the initial reluctance to inoculate, attitudes soon changed. In tiple, most cattle-
owners turned wholeheartedly to inoculation as the remedy began to display jsigns of 
relative success. Reports from the main experimental centre in Mafeteng soon 
revealed the prophylactic potential of Koch's remedy. Within three months of the 
onset of the immunisation programme, only a tenth of the inoculated cattle within 
infected areas had died. Compared with the massive death toll of fifteen thousand 
reported uninoculated cattle during the same period, the prophylactic sparked a 
realistic hope of saving at least some herds.Results persuaded cattle-owners better 
62L.N.A., S3/1/5/6 , SneLMoshoeshoe to resident commissioner, 19 June 1897. 
63Leselinyana, 15 May 1897. 
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than words or coercion. Sometimes, whole herds of inoculated cattle showed sympt-
oms of permanent immunisation without a single casualty. By mid-May, the resident 
commissioner was observing that 
The striking difference in mortality between inoculated and 
uninoculated herds had made itself popularly felt, and that the 
paramount chief and many other chiefs whose cattle they do not infect 
are clamouring for inoculation.64 
Those still harbouring doubts were convinced when the success of the prophylactic 
was displayed in villages that embraced the inoculation campaign. Christian villages, 
~ 
like Morija, and mission stations took the lead in the inoculation campaign. They 
readjly listened to advice and inoculated their herds. They thus saved some of their 
stock and demonstrated the effectiveness of the prophylactic. 
Christian and other enlightened villagers living in non-Christian villages also saved 
some herds because they readily treated th~m. Many enlightened chiefs, Jonathan 
among them, also enthusiastically inoculated their herds and encouraged their subjects 
to do the same. Even within one household, initial attitudes towards inoculation might 
differ. The relative survival rate of herds belonging to one member of the household 
who treated his animals soon convinced the initially recalcitrant member. For many, 
conversion to inoculation grew proportionally to the proximity of the disease to their 
respective kraals. 
I 
Towards the end of April, the immunisation programme entered a new phase. Rather 
than the initial ordeal of convincing the public of the value of immunisation, now the 
urgency was for an accelerated programme. On an average, 300 head of cattle were 
inoculated every day, often over 500 per day. In one day, on 22 April 1897, veterinary 
surgeon Armstrong broke the existing record, inoculating 268 cattle alone "and could 
have done more ifhe had had more biIe".6s 
64L.N.A., S5114, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 18 May 1897. 
- . 65Ibid., S3/1/5/8/5, rinderpest camp diary for Mafeteng districL entry for 22 April. 
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The paramount chief, who had previously disclaimed any control over those who 
refused to treat their herds, now actively encouraged the inoculation campaign. He 
startled the resident commissioner: 
I really say that inoculation does save some, and I have inoculated a 
great number of mine here and those that are with caretakers. There 
were some caretakers who said they refuse their caretakings to be 
inoculated saying that I am killing the cattle and I fetched them by 
force and also told them that I will not return to them their 
caretaking. 66 
Even his son in_ Mafeteng district, who bad prevented his people from having their 
cattle treated changed his attitude, as the rinderpest approached his own kraals. In 
mid-May the inoculation team spent the entire week inoculating his cattle. Although 
by the end of the month he had lost thirty inoculated cattle, he "appeared pleased with 
the results of inoculation so far, as most of the cattle not inoculated in his 
neighbourhood [were] now dead".67. AnPous cattle-owners besieged inoculation 
teams. 
By mid-July, the rinderpest_ had spread to the districts of Mohaleshoek and Maseru 
and to the southernmost district of Quthing. The inhabitants of these districts 
clamoured for the preventive. In Leribe, district veterinary surgeon Armstrong had 
lost all hope for success of the immunisation programme owing to the "usual 
\ 
opposition of the native. ,,68 His letter had hardly reached the resident commissioner's 
I 
office when he followed it with another telling a different story. Inoculation in the 
district was now proceeding "in a most satisfactory manner", and cattle-owners were 
"eager" to have their cattle treated.69 
66Ibid., S3/1/5/10, paramount chief to resident commissioner, I I June 1897. 
67Ibid., S31I 15/5, diary for 15 May and 4 June 1897. 
68Ibid., Armstrong to resident commissioner, 15 July 1897. 
6'1bid., Armstrong to resident commissioner, 22 July 1897. 
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So widespread and relentless were appeals for inoculation by desperate cattle-owners 
that imperial officials had to abandon its cautious policy of inoculating only in 
infected areas. By the end of May, the government had extended the sphere of 
inoculation to those districts that had not yet been infected. In Maseru district alone, 
approximately 10,363 cattle had been inoculated by the middle of July 1897, the 
number rising to 20,000 by the end of the month.70 The programme had begun with 
the inoculation of the resident commissioner's own herd, "so that if it kills, mine 
should be the fIrst to die.,,7\ Soon after, "messengers from all sides" arrived at his 
office requesting urgent treatment of their cattle. 72 
Every available resource was mobilised to support this campaign. The police force 
was diverted to the immunisation campaign, and many BaSotho were trained in the 
, 
requisite procedures. Protestant missionaries brought immunisation to the lower 
classes. This contrasted sharply with the concerns of colonial officials who sought to 
endear themselves by concentrating on saving the herds of the chiefs. "I do not want 
-. 
to abandon these little ones for the great people", declared Rev. Dieterlen: 
As for the chiefs, they have an incarnated egoism. people are nothing, 
the chiefs are everything, their word is final. What saves the situation 
is that people still find that normal and do not dream of revolting or 
complaining. These people adore their kings. 73 ~ 
.I 
Thus, Koch's treatment seems to have' worked remarkably well in Basutoland. The 
immunisation campaign in the country solved one of the most difficult problems of 
Koch's method - the stage at which the immunisation properties of the bile were at 
7OIbid., S3/1/5/8/4, Rinderpest report for the district of Maseru, 30 June 1898 
7lMss. Afr. S. 170, Lagden's Diaries, entry for 11 May 1897. 
72Ibid. 
73Ibid., 597. 
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their most ideal. It led to the discovery that the most effective bile was that extracted 
from a donor in the last stages of sickness, or immediately after death. This earned the 
country the reputation for being the most successful experimental and demonstration 
centre for the method in the entire subcontinent. Even the Cape government, with 
greater veterinary and [mancial resources, looked to Basutoland for guidance.74 When 
the prophylactic came under public assault, those who had witnessed its success in 
Basutoland defended it: 
Neither shootmg, (ences, neutral zones nor cordons of police stay the 
progress of it [rinderpest]. In Basutoland, there are, in round numbers, 
70,000 head of cattle alive today which, but for inoculation would have 
been rotting in the sun ... The credit of saving them is due to Dr. Koch. 
Where Dr. Koch's method of bile inoculation has been faithfully, 
though often (owing to great urgency) very roughly carried out, the 
returns have been astonishing. I know of many instances where not a 
single herd has died and others where the loss has only been from six 
to 10 per cent.75 
When the rinderpest re-appeared in South Africa in 1902, the lessons learnt from 
Basutoland provided the basis for the successful inoculation campaign that brought 
the disease under control. 76 
This eventual Willingness of the BaSotho to embrace inoculation relieved the 
anxieties of imperial officials. The latter had lived in constant fear that the rinderpest 
\ 
would provoke an anti-colonial rebellion among the BaSotho. It is to the reactions and 
I 
responses of the BaSotho to the approac~g catastrophe, and as it swept through their 
herds, that this study now turns. 
74L.N. A. , S/14, high commissioner to resident commissioner, 30 August; also Resident 
commissioner's reply, Ibid., 7September 1897; D. Hutcheon, "Rinderpest", Agricultural 
Journal, xiv, no. 12, June 1899, 774. 
75 Agricultural Journal, xiii, 1897. 
71). Hutcheon, "Rinderpest, in South Africa: A Short Description of its History, General 
Characteristics and Methods of Treatment", Cape of Good Hope, Department of Agriculture, 
Cape Town, no. 8, 1902. 
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CHAPTER 4 
REACTIONS AND RESPONSES 
The outbreak. of the rinderpest in Basutoland was delayed by almost a year after it 
fIrst appeared south of the Zambezi River. This delay led to the dissemination of 
rumours, which engendered distrust and restlessness ahead of the panzootic. The 
shock waves generated by the panzootic as it approached Basutoland attracted the 
, 
BaSotho to seek news of its progress. Those with links, however tenuous, to existing 
networks of communication, kept abreast of the news of the rinderpest. They spread 
alarming reports among their brethren. 
The local press also carried grim eyewitness reports of the panzootic. The widely 
circulating missionary paper, Leseliny~ plied its readers with dire reports. It printed 
alarmist reports of BaSotho evangelists who had accompanied French missionaries to 
the Zambezi. It reported that the rinderpest formed the backdrop to the Ndebele-
Shona rebellion then underway. It also informed of the bleak famine conditions in the 
Transvaal and Bechuanaland. 
These reports generated alarm among the BaSotho ahead of the\ arrival of the 
panzootic. Like the symptoms of cholera in nineteenth-century Europe that '''set an 
indelible stamp on the responses it evoked", I those of the rinderpest instilled terror 
and perplexity in the hearts and minds of those who watched the disease devour its 
victims within days. "There has never been anything like it before," wrote Lerotholi 
after observing the rapid deaths of rinderpest-infected cattle. 2 
IF. Snowden, "Cholera in Barletta, 1910", Past and Present, no. 132 (1991), 88. 
2L.N.A., S3111519, paramount chief to resident commissioner; 25 December 1896. 
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The symptoms of the rinderpest puzzled everyone, including those with veterinary 
expertise. This rendered explanation, and therefore contro~ difficult. This new disease 
seemed to embody many diseases in one: gall sickness, diseases of the paunch, 
entrails, liver, even the brain. Its symptoms were similar to those of redwater and 
lungsickness. This inspired the Xhosa to call this strange, aU-encompassing disease, 
Zefosonke - every disease.3 
Even more alarming were widely circulating allegations that the disease was a 
zoonosis, that it was ,transmissible to humans. Thus, a MoSotho living in the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate sent a sensational description of the ravages of the 
rinderpest there to his local newspaper: 
After the death of cattle, the disease enters among human beings. Oh! 
You have never seen anything of the like before! In one day, 
approximately 100 people die in every viIlage.4 
Reports reaching Basutoland from the Transvaal averred that a terrible disease 
afflicted those who ate the meat of the dead animals and that worms came out of 
themS 
The dramatic, relentless sweep of the panzootic and its carnage horrified the BaSotho 
as they waited their turn. "Its (rinderpest) characteristic pattern", Leselinyana 
reported, "is that if you have 100 cattle in the kraal the night before,\ you wake up the 
next morning with nothing left".6 These dramatic and often exaggerated reports 
terrified many BaSotho. 
3C.M.T. 3/59, Report of a meeting of the inhabitants of the district of Butterworth, 
February 1897. 
4Leselinyana, 15 July 1897. 
5Ibid. 
~eselinyana, 15 July 1897. 
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Colonial and settler governments also alarmed the BaSotho when they began sealing 
off their borders with Basutoland and guarding them with armed police and military 
cordons. Thus by December 1896, the Cape government had completed fencing the 
entire border between Basutoland and its territory, deploying armed guards along its 
length. The Natal government followed suit, fencing off its and connecting with the 
fence erected by the Cape government from the Atlantic Ocean to the Drakensberg 
Mountains. As early as in June 1896, the government of the Free State had established 
cordons prohibiting the movement of cattle from any infected area It also enforced 
> 
stringent fumigation ofBaSotho en route from the Transvaal. 
These actions made the BaSotho suspect that a plot was astir to besiege their country. 
The anti-rinderpest measures enforced by the imperial administration, especially those 
of clearing a five-mile neutral belt frOili the border, also created suspicions. The 
BaSotho watched these measures with scepticism. Many were apprehensive. This was 
a natural response by a society bracing itself for an approaching catastrophe. It also 
revealed specific deep-seated suspicions. In the popular imagination, that Europeans 
--
were the first to know about the existence of this disease showed that they knew about 
its origin. Letsoalo Ie molato lea ikahlol~ one BaSotho proverb cautioned: "Beware 
of him who fIrst cries 'stop thief! He might be the thief'. That w~ how they knew 
when a chick had laid an egg: E kakatletsang lehe kea eona: (The chick you hear 
cackling has just lain). Besides, the few Europeans in the country owned very few 
cattle. Why did they panic so much? Why did they exert so much effort to stamp out 
the disease? They could only do it for something - "they will reclaim their 
compensation. Then war with US.,,7 
When imperial officials attempted to reassure them by telling them that boer-owned 
cattle were also dying, what could the BaSotho do but shrug their shoulders? They 
also suspected that the ~ers were targets of British vengeance, and they its unwitting 
7Journa) des Missions, 1897, 15. 
--
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victims. "This disease has been sent from England by the Queen," Dieterlen, a French 
missionary, reported hearing some BaSotho whispering, "she is angry with the Boers 
for refusing her railways. She kills their bulls to force them to accept it. A messenger 
. has been ordered to spill the rinderpest from a large bottle".8 
They also suspected that the isolation measures to close the borders and to create free 
zones were pretexts - perhaps to transfer the border area to neighbouring colonial 
governments. Were -these measure not first attempts to open their country to mineral 
exploitation? they wondered.".9 
Familiarity with transhumance and quarantine did not reassure the suspicious 
populace. The BaSotho knew about the practice of isolating cattle in mountain sanctu-
aries. Now, however, they were apprehensive. They suspected that colonial troops 
deployed in the mountains would steal their cattle. 10 Even more alarming was the 
fencing of the East Griqualand border and the deployment of armed guards along the 
frontier. These preparations seemed to the BaSotho an excuse for the Cape govern-
ment and the imperial administration to encroach into their territory. There had to be 
some mischievous plot behind the whole enterprise, the people suspected. Dieterlen 
represented popular fears in these words: "Vous nous cachez fes choses, vous bfancs. 
Vous avez des pensees de derriere fa tete. Vous voulez nous tuer." (~ou hide things 
from us, you, white people; you have some hidden ideas. You want to kill us).,P 
This mistrust of neighbouring governments and imperial officials in the country 
almost exploded in an armed rebellion. When the Cape government started fencing 
8Ibid. 
'1bid. 
l~bid. 
!lIbido 
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the Griqualand East border with Basutoland, and deploying armed cordons, the 
BaSotho were alarmed, suspecting a looming invasion of their country. These 
activities further convinced them that the alarm over the rumoured rinderpest was 
nothing more than an excuse. 12 Armed BaSotho, under the youthful charge of the 
paramount chiefs son, Makhaola, were soon gathering along the border. Initially they 
angrily watched the fencing operations. As the week progressed, however, they 
actively obstructed them, disrupted inter-governmental communications, and 
threatened Cape colonial officials supervising the work. I3 
This volatile atmosphere escalated. Armed BaSotho removed the pickets along the 
border, taunted and mocked the border guards, forcing them to retreat. The local 
colonial official in Matatiele found the situation inflammatory and feared that "the 
h 
slightest mistake would bring the BaSotho down on us. ,,14 The mood was so volatile 
that ifLagden and the paramount chiefs emi~saries had delayed in intervening, a full-
scale rebellion might have erupted. IS 
After appearing before a roving court consisting of the resident commissioner and the 
paramount chiefs counsellors, those involved in this demonstration were sentenced to 
twelve months imprisonment with hard labour. 16 Makhaola, in his turn, faced the 
graver charge of "ordering armed guards along the border and threatening the peace 
of a foreign state". He, however, claimed that he had acted on his father's instructions. 
12G.82-96, Minutes of Rinderpest Conference held at Vryburg, p.3. 
13L.N.A., S7/3/12, "Makhaola at Qachasnek", evidence of Arthur Bovil, Edward Hogge, 
John Garbutt, Henry Chaplin, Rooijan and Arthur Bovill. 
14Ibid., evidence of Edward Hogger. 
15Ibid., resident commissioner to high commissioner, 15 December 1896. 
I1bid., S5114, Regina vs Makhaola, Rakoche, Poli, Radisiu and Ntili, 16 December 1896, 
- ~ 
853, charge sheet, court of the resident commissioner held at Qachasnek, encl. in resident 
commissioner to high commissioner, 16 January 1897. 
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Ever astute, Lagden preferred to place the matter before a full court of all the principal 
chiefs at a full pitso. The pitso attended by ''the whole tribe",17 sentenced Makhaola to 
imprisonment. 
Fearing the risk of exacerbating the situatio~ Lagden thought it prudent to waive the 
sentence. Instead, he recalled Makhaola from Qachasnek to place him as a native 
police officer under his charge. This would teach him ''the essentiais','of discipline and 
order."ls When summoned, however, Makhaola, now joined by his brothers, 
Letsienyana and Griffith flouted authority. They rushed from the pitso with their 
entourage, menacingly riding away amid the prevailing pandemonium. 19 This action 
increased anxiety. The fugitives camped at Mafeteng and resisted surrender. Reports 
asserted that they were doctoring their armies in preparation for war.20 
Just the~ the Griqua leader, Andreas Le Fleur, began threatening the small and 
scattered white community around Kokstad, the capital of East Griqualand. The 
rumours surrounding his movements suggested that he was mobilising various 
African communities in the area for an armed revolt against colonial rule. More 
alarming to the imperial authorities in Basutoland were reports that he was eliciting 
\ 
the support of the young rebel chief Makhaola. Early in 1897, colonial officials in 
. J 
Basutoland were receiving startling telegrams reporting "almost total consternation in 
[Matatiele]". The cause was the nimour that ''young Chiefs Makhaola and GriffIth 
propose crossing border of East Griqualand and joining in attacks on EurOpeans".21 
17L.N.A., S4/1/4, resident commissioner's diaries, 11 January 1897. 
18S5114, encl. in resid~nt commissioner to high commissioner, 16 January 1897. 
I~id. 
w-rbid., S5114, assistant..comrnissioner to resident commissioner, 16 January 1897. 
21G. 42-'98, 116-120. 
129 
From Kokstad, the chief magistrate warned Lagden of a "scare" throughout the 
districts of Matatiele and Urnzimkhulu in Griqualand East. It arose from reports that 
Makhaola had defied the imperial government in Basutoland and returned to his 
village. From here, it was believed, he intended invading Griqualand East.22 
Simultaneously, the government secretary in Maseru in Basutoland received alarming 
news from the assistant commissioner in Qachasnek. It averred that "natives were 
rising in East Griqualand. It alSQ reported that white farmers were going into laager." 
More disturbing were the reports that BaSotho chiefs intended to cross the border to 
aid the Griqua rebels. 23~ 
The paramount chiefs second senior son, Griffith, with Makhaola, had arrived in 
Qachasnek two days before, amid rumours that they intended freeing their imprisoned 
comrades.24 Although Lagden placed "little reliance'''' on these rumours, he did 
suspect the motives of the fugitives. rearing for the safety of the assistant 
commissioner of Qachasnek, he permitted him the discretion to withdraw "if danger is 
manifest. ,,25 
Just then, newspapers began circulating reports that Lagden had despaired of his 
efforts to control the turbulent BaSotho and considered transferring the country to the 
Cape government. 26 The threat produced the desired effect. It led to Lerotholi and his 
subordinate chiefs promptly edging the young chiefs to surrender. They later appeared 
22L.N. A. , S5114, high commissioner to resident commissioner, 25 January 1897, encl. 
telegram from chief magistrate (Kokstad), undated. 
23Ibid., S71116, Griffith to govt. secr., 24 January 1897; also S5114, high commissioner to 
resident commissioner, 25 January 1897. 
24Ibid., S71116, Griffith to govt. secr., 24 January 1897; also S5/14, high commissioner to 
resident commissioner, 25 January 1897. 
25Ibid., S5114, resident co~missioner to high commissioner, 25 January 1897. 
2'bid., high commissioner to resident commissioner, 12 February 1897. 
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before a "moot" court that fined them a hundred head of cattle. Lerotholi and his 
subordinate chiefs promptly brought Letsienyana to Lagden, tmking him apologise 
for his part in the unrest.27 Later, Griffith and Makhaola tendered their apologies?8 
Various factors had combined to avert a potentially serious disturbance without a shot 
fIred. Yet, the signifIcance of this episode lies more in exposing the ambiguities of 
colonial interaction in a volatile colonial setting. The rinderpest and its associated 
discontents became_ "a test of social cohesion," as Morris has observed in similar 
~ 
responses to the nineteenth century cholera epidemic in England. "To follow [its] 
track", he continues, "is to watch the trust and co-operation between different parts of 
the- society strained to the utmost".29 The Makhaola disturbance shocked imperial o-
fficials. Basutoland appeared a haven of peace. Why this ominous disturbance? 
Lagden's foreboding was revealing. Undoubtedly, he mused, the rinderpest crisis and 
the political tension accompanying it provided the backdrop to the disturbance. ''It is 
certain", he wrote to the high commissioner, ''that the BaSotho in common with most 
_. 
other tribes, harbour ideas that the plague would be introduced by white people or 
even by govemment".30 What made the BaSotho suspect government motives was 
especially the actual construction of the fence along an ill-defined and contested 
boundary. 
I 
Nevertheless, the episode, he suspected, was not an isolated affair; he warned of a 
general undercurrent of "restlessness." The baste with which the culprits and their 
entourage had left the pitso was ominous, suggesting a conspiracy. Lerotholi's failure 
27Ibid., S7/3/13, paramount chief to resident commissioner, 12 February 1897. 
28Ibid., paramount chief to resident commissioner, 26 February 1897; Ibid., S8/2/2/6, 
resident commissioner to paramount chief, 26 February 1897. 
~orris, Cholera 1832, 17 ... 
~.N.A., S5/14, resident commissioner to high commissioner,· 16 January 1897. 
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promptly to apprehend his fugitive sons suggested complicity. A report from the 
assistant commissioner of Mafeteng, where the fugitives encamped, seemed to 
confirm this suspicion: "I am swarthily suspicious about Lerotholi and other chiefs 
and don't believe they are sincere".31 When Lerotholi tried reassuring him that he was 
attempting to negotiate the surrender of his sons "through persuasion and not force," 
Lagden rejected this assertion as "a blatant lie."J2 
Further than that, Lagden considered it safer to speculate on the wider implications of 
the affair. "Presumably," Lerotholi would follow his children if a full-scale rebellion 
had occurred. "Perhaps" the BaSotho had plotted a massive onslaught on the scattered 
European population.33 More ominous was the likelihood of the disturbance signalling 
a revolt against imperial rule, a theory to which Lagden and others inclined. The 
character of the drarnatis personae in the disturbance appeared to support this theory. 
"The characteristics of the people resident in the mountain", Lagden observed, 
vary considerably from those of the people living in lower altitudes 
who are brought into more continual contact with Europeans, 
government officers and civilisation. They inherit in the first place the 
wild traditions of all mountain people who feel a certain sense of 
security on account of their inaccessible position and are 
correspondingly inamenable to order and control Many of them are 
moreover refugees of tribes that have been broken by war in previous 
years and sought exemption from the trammels of government in the 
forbidding recesses of the Drakensberg. It is with such seetions of 
people I am now dealing.34 J 
The youthful composition of the "rebels" added further weight to the evidence of an 
anti-colonial conspiracy. Throughout the region during this period, young men were 
31Ibid., assistant commissioner (Mafeteng) to resident commissioner, 18 January 1897. 
32Ibid., S7/13/13, paramount chief to resident commissioner, 17 January 1897; S4/1/4, 
resident commissioner's diary, 19 January 1897. 
33Ibid., S5/14, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 16 January 1897. 
34Ibid., S5/l3, high commissioner to resident commissioner,J5 December 1896. 
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in the vanguard of anti-colonial agitation. Le Fleur in Griqualand East, for example, 
was twenty-nine years old and most of his comrades-at-arms were young men. In 
British Bechuanaland, ''the younger men pressed for rebelIion".35 w.e. Scully, the 
magistrate of the Nqamakwe district of the Transke~ perceived a similar pattern there. 
In his view, one had to divide the community into categories in a bid to comprehend 
the entire rebellious spirit so prevalent among the once placid Mfengu: the old men, 
the men of middle age and the young men. To reveal their feelings towards colonial 
rule, it would be fQund that "the first class was loyal, the second more or less loyal 
with a tendency towards more disloyalty, and the third absolutely disloyal".36 
Observing for Basutoland, Lagden identified a similar pattern and suggested the 
reason: 
These younger men became impatient of restraint and, having all the 
brutal instincts of the race in their blood, thought to win back for the 
tribe barbarous habits and the attractive rapine and oppression per-
taining to chieftainship of bygone dayS.37 
Lagden's reflections, however, betrayed a conventional pattern of thought, which was 
typical of his generation of colonial officials, including other Europeans. Typically, 
they were quick to fmd the prevailing restlessness among Africans in the "barbarian" 
mind steeped in ignorance, superstition and emotionalism. Always baffled by African 
expression of discontent, they often seized on supposed innate ~can personality 
traits to explain social unrest.38 I 
35Saker and Aldridge, "The Origins", 316. 
36C.M.T., 3/145, confidential report by magistrate ofNqamakwe, 1 December 1897. 
37L.N.A., S5/14, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 16 January 1897. 
38For such explanations see T.O. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia. 1896-7 (London, 
1967); Ranger, "From Humanism to the Science of Man: Colonialism in Africa and the 
Understanding of Alien Societies", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 26 (1976), 
120 , for the Shona-Ndebele rebellion; Saker and Aldridge, "The Origins", 299, for the 
Southern Tswana rebellion; C.M.T. 3/106, report of resident magistrate of Kentani, 22 
September 1897 and Ibid.,~3/59, confidential report by magistrate ofNqamakwe, 1 December 
1897. . . 
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Thus, Lagden argued that the BaSotho acted from "passions [which] become aroused 
without any reason apparent to civilized people". It was "hardly necessary to say that 
these people are profound masters of the art of deception": 
Communications couched in plausible and polite language have 
generally to be read conversely. The true workings of a native's mind 
can only be guessed at.39 
He also condemned the BaSotho for their lack of gratitude, accusing them of "biting 
the nurturing and protecting hand of' their benefactors. ''It is hard, after all our 
efforts", he complameq despondently, ''to be turned on in such a way, but the word 
gratitude is unknown to natives - there is no corresponding word in their language".40 
Europeans around him echoed the same sentiments. ''Never'', agonised a French 
missionary long resident in the country, 
have I better perceived what lies in the spirit of the Black, the inability 
to believe in the disinterested devotion, and of unlimited capacity to 
believe in things very absurd and- in perverse intentions. These ill 
sentiments reveal the spirit of the Mosotho, his ignorance, his 
stupidity, his pride and his ingratitude.41 
« 
The ''unfounded'' rumours accompanying the rinderpest were, in Lagden's mind, 
behind the disturbance. Especially, he thought, the boers had started the rumour that 
the ubiquitous Cecil Rhodes had spread the rinderpest "as a policy to [sic] 
Matabe Ie land, the TransvaaL Orange Free State and Basutoland.''' Such rumours, 
"however childish," he argued, "once rooted, take a firm hold upod native 
imagination." An entry in his private diary might throw further light on this pattern of 
thought: 
There is a nasty spirit amongst the Basotho bred by Lerotholi and his 
sons, which bespeaks their savage nature and shows how characteristic 
3'L.N.A., S5114, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 16 January 1897. 
~bid. 
41Joumal des Missions, 1897, 18. 
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of the kaffir it is to have outbursts of fury without any apparent rea-
son.42 
In the early part of the disturbance Lagden was nervous: "Considerable scare going 
on ... People under arms for some unknown reason", he wrote in his private diary on 18 
December 1896. Subsequent entries reveal his anxiety: 
January 1 1897: Reflex of excitement in country ... 
January 4: Thete is a nasty spirit among the Basotho ... No complaints 
have been made - I think it simply that the whole native mind of South 
Africa is unhinged. 
January 18: Alarming reports current and considerable uneasiness. 
January 24: The time is very anxious. The Basotho seem alive with 
suspicion and liable to rise on any sl!,dden impulse.43 
There is no substantial evidence that the BaSotho were conspiring for an anti-colonial 
rebellion. Most of the alarm among colonial officials and neighbouring white settlers 
existed in the minds of those who typicaUy feared "native restlessness"; Lagden's 
fears were exaggerated. He would have soon recognised that most of the would-be-
rebels had been caught up in the affair almost by accident - that they now found 
themselves in a blind alley, with little prospect of making it a national rismg. Panic, 
romour-mongering, scapegoating, and· insecurity are normal reactions at a time of 
crisis. In times of social stress especially in the throes of a devastating epidemic, 
conspiracy explanations have found fertile ground, regardless of culture, race or 
historical epoch. 
42Mss. S. 169, Lagden Di~ies, 4 January 1897. 
43Ibid. 
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In the fourteenth century, for example, Christians blamed the bubonic plague on the 
Jews, and on the Arabs in Spain. In London, the government prohibited lepers from 
entering the city because of the popular belief then current that they were the 
originators and carriers of the plague.44 In the minds of fifteenth and sixteenth-century 
Europeans syphilis originated in the New World. Even when it became endemic in 
Europe, each country named it after another: called the ''French'' disease by the 
Germans, the "Italian" by the French, the "Polish" or the "Neapolitan" disease by 
others, depending on their nationality. In the New World itself, it was blamed on the 
Indians.45 In the eighte.enth-century when it spread all over the globe, the Japanese 
called it the disease of the Portuguese, the Persians attributed it to the Turks, while the 
Poles called it the disease of the Russians. 
Panic, insidious rumours and conspiracy theories abounded in revolutionary France. 
The causes of these fears, their character, dOwn to the social classes who entertained 
them, have provided rich material for Georges Lefebvre's The Great Fear of 1789.46 
The cholera epidemics on both sides of the Atlantic during the 1830s and 1840s 
generated wild rumours as people cast about in search of scapegoats.47 The famous 
French historian, Louis Chevalier, one of the first to fathom the powerful historical 
function of rum our, captures well the psychology of stress: 
In a word, in this troubled Europe of the first half of the nineteenth 
century, not only was the cholera everywhere considered~ by the 
popular classes as an aspect of social inequality, but in the mostj 
retarded countries or groups, it was denounced as a criminal enterprise 
of the authorities and the privileged.48 
44Cloudley-Thompson, Insects and History; Ziegler, The Black Death. 
45Dennie, A History of Syphilis; Rosebury, Microbes and Morals. 
46G. Lefebvre, G., The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France (princeton, 
1973). 
47McGrew, Russia and the Cholera; Rosenberg, "Cholera"; Sussman, "Carriers of Cholera"; 
Ziegler, "Germany: The Flagellants and the Persecution oftbe Jews", 65-79. 
48Chevalier, Le Cholera, xv-xvi. 
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In our century examples abound from the Protocols and the Elders of Zion after the 
First World War, through Stalinism and McCarthyis~ to the conspiracy theories of 
the extreme right and left today. Here we might also note that despite the 
sophisticated scientific knowledge underlying concepts of disease and infection in the 
late twentieth century, the most prominent modern epidemic, AIDS, has generated a 
thriving set of conspiracy theories. Africans and Russians have blamed . it on 
Americans, the latter on Haitians, American protest groups on the c.I.A., right-wing 
religious groups on immoral behaviour and God's Wrath, heterosexuals on 
homosexuals, to Jllention only a few.49 Nor has the most recent outbreak of cattle 
, 
disease, of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or "Mad Cow Disease" in Great 
Britain been without its own set of conspiracy theories.5o 
The state, especially, has often been targeted as a scapegoat in times of plague. It has 
borne the odium of criticism both for being responsible for spreading disease and for 
'''-
perceived failure in its efforts to contain or eradicate it. From the Black Death in early 
modern Europe, through the cholera epidemics in the nineteenth century, to the "Mad 
Cow Disease" of our times, fierce criticism of the state has been a common ingredient 
in popular responses to p~es. 51 
4'13. Chirimunte & R. Chirimunte, Aids, Africa and Racism (London, 1988); J. Cribb, The 
White Death: On the Origins of AIDS (Sydney, 1995); P. Farmer, "Ai~ and Accusation: 
Haiti, Haitians and the Geography of Blame", in D.A. Feldman (ed.), Culture and Aids (New 
York, 1990), 67-91; E. Fee & D.M. Fox (eds.), Aids: The Burden of History (Berkeley, 
1988); J. Fenton, "The Disease of All Diseases", New York Review of Books, 1 December 
1994, 48; L. Garnett, The Coming Plague (London, 1993); J. Seale, "Aids Virus Infection: A 
Social View of its Origins", Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, lxxix (1986), 494-5; 
R. Swanson, "Plagues, History and Aids", American Scholar, 57 (1988), 183-200. 
SOJ.R. Fisher, "Cattle Plagues Past and Present: The Mystery of Mad Cow Disease", Journal 
of Contemporary History, 33, 2 (1998), 215-228. 
51See, among others, C.M. Cipola, Fighting the Plague in Seventeenth Century Italy 
(Madison, 1981); R. Evans, Death in Hamburg: Society and Politics in the Cholera Years. 
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Given the universality of such responses, the tendency among Africans in Southern 
Afric~ generally, and especially the BaSotho, to cast about in search of scapegoats for 
the rinderpest and to act on these suspicions cannot be seen as peculiar to them. Even 
when people blamed epidemic disease on God's Will or the Lord's Wrath, they still 
looked for the behaviour among them, or others, which was to blame for divine judge-
ment and retribution. Indeed, blaming has its own rationale - it is a way of making a 
mysterious epidemic disease comprehensible to render it controllable. 52 
Of course, a thin line always divides blaming from agitation because blaming is also a 
means for defining boundaries as disease is often associated with "the dangerous 
other".53 Blaming, therefore, is "an identification of the enemy and an implicit call for 
his destruction". History is replete with examples where disease, and the blaming for 
it, has justified persecutions and destruction. Some notable examples might suffice. 
The Black Death in the fourteenth-century infused a poisonous suspicion leading to 
widespread persecution of lepers, Jews and Moslems. Christians blamed Jews for 
spreading the pestilence, and for plotting with Moslems to destroy Christendom. So 
--
was the great outbreak of "witch hunting" during the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies. During these times, tens of thousands of women were set alight for their 
supposed responsibility in causing illness through their black magic. 54 
Some fears accompanying the rinderpest reflected the prevalent political and social 
strains. Some were the culmination of. the general sense of unease, which had been 
520. Nelkin and S.L. Gilman, "Placing Blame for Devastating Disease", Social Research, 55 
(1988), 361-78. 
53 A. Brandt, No Magic Bullet, 2nd edition (New York, 1987); K. Burke, A Rhetoric of 
Motive (Berkeley, 1969); M. Douglas, Purity and Danger (London, 1979); G. Lakoff and M. 
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1978). 
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simmering in the years leading up to the outbreak of the panzootic. The year 1895 had 
ended with the Jameson Raid. Although the Raid was a white-on-white affair, it had 
implications for the BaSotho. Boer burghers in the neighbouring Free State, and some 
of their brethren in the Transvaal, used it to subvert BaSotho allegiance to the 
imperial government.55 They spread exaggerated imputations of imperial 
government's complicity in the Raid, and attempted to mobilise the BaSotho and 
other African peoples in the region for a common anti-imperial resistance. 
Simultaneously, their newspapers printed alarming "reports as to [BaSotho'sJ warlike 
attitude, intentions and possible confederations". 56 
The Raid and the military movements around it in turn alarmed many BaSotho. The 
commandeering of forces in the Transvaal, and more particularly the arming of the 
Free State burghers in aid of their Transvaal brethren, alerted the BaSotho to the 
prospects of a war on their borders. The Raid also occasioned a mass exodus of 
BaSotho working in the Transvaal. They returned home in panic ahead of what they 
viewed as a looming war between the English and the boers. Upon their arrival, they 
spread reports of an immine~t war between the two protagonists.57 
More alarming were the widespread rumours that the Free State boers were readying 
themselves for a ftnal showdown with the BaSotho. The menacing 'movements of 
armed boer burghers in the Free State seemed to verify these fears. Moreovet, those 
boers who tried to avoid joining the campaign in support of the Transvaal employed 
the excuse that they could not leave their homes. The reason, they alleged, was the 
rumour that the BaSotho planned to attack their farms in their absence. In early 
55 L.N.A., S3125/1I13, annual reports, 30 July 1896. 
~bid., S3/25/1I13, annual !eports, 30 July 1896. 
57Ibid. 
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January 1897, reports in the newspapers bewailed the "friction that exists between the 
BaSotho and the Free State burghers".58 
The dust had no sooner settled in the aftermath of the Raid than the alarming news of 
the advancing rinderpest crisis arrived early in 1896. The press put out sensational 
reports, leading to the exodus ofBaSotho workers from South African labour centres. 
The chiefs had recalled them to help in watching over their threatened herds. Others 
simply wished to join their families before the borders were closed as an anti-
rinderpest precaution: Another mass exodus occurred in October 1896. It resulted 
from the miners' revolt against the reduction of wages and the lengthening of working 
hours.59 
All these movements generated intense suspicion in the white community, fanned by 
sensational journalism. The press intetpreted them as preparation for war. 
"Forewarned forearmed" was the typical reaction in an alarming report of the Daily 
Express late in 1896: 
For some time pan of the Basotho have been leaving the Rand by 
every goods's train almost in hundreds. Now the boys that have been 
working in the district [I-Ieilbron] on local roads have left in a hurry in 
some cases leaving their wages behind. And all that leaks out is that 
they have been called home to prepare for a great move to coeunence 
at Christmas. One rumour has it that they are going to sweep clean the 
Free State while the Zulu do the same for Natal 60 J 
Free State burghers believed these rumours amid a sensational call to arms by the 
local press. "The proposal to call the Free State people to arms to defend themselves 
58Star, 8 January 1897 
5'1-.N.A., S717118, H.E. Mabille to acting government secretary, 28 October 1896. 
Woaily Express, 18 December 1896. 
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against their worst enemy that ever threatened our national existence", a typical report 
speculated, ''will fmd a ready echo in every Free State heart.'.61 
Suspicion and imaginings within colonial and settler communities also implicated the 
BaSotho in the prevailing restlessness of their African neighbours. Earlier, in the 
1860s, colonial officials and many white settlers had suspected BaSotho complicity in 
the Xhosa cattle killing and in intrigues with Kreli and other Xhosa chiefs.62 
Similarly, during the spate of African rebellions in the early 1880s, the BaSotho 
> 
featured prominently in the colonial mind as the main instigators. For example, the 
1880-81 Transkeian rebellion was directly linked to similar activities then underway 
in Basutoland. A powerful rumour was astir, believed by colonial officials, that the 
BaSotho paramount chief had dispatched messengers throughout the entire region 
urging all Africans to join in the rebellion. "Disarmament was a question affecting all 
the tribes in South Africa", the message was alleged to say, "and if they stood aloof 
while the Basotho were being disarmed, their turn would follow". 63 
--
On the eve of the new crisis, the colonial press represented the BaSotho as the only 
undefeated ''tribe'', and therefore as dangerous. "Thousands and thousands have gone 
out from their country year after year to work at the mines and have brought back 
money and fighting materials", a Cape colonial newspaper warn~ 
they are hardy, know your language, ideas, and the subjects which are J 
engaging public attention. Being observant they will be calculating; in 
case of new trouble with them, they will be therefore more dangerous, 
as a nation, than previously.64 
61Ibid., 8 September 1896. 
62See e.g., C.O. 48/377, enc!. In Grey to Labouchere, 13 October 1856; B.P.P., vol. XI, 
1857-8, Grey to Labouchere, 25 March 1857. 
63C. Brownlee, Reminiscence ofKaffir Life and History (Lovedale, 1916), 194; see also his 
The Transkeian Native Territories: Historical Records (Lovedale, 1923). 
64Cape Times, 17 July 1895. 
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The Cape government also suspected BaSotho complicity when the Southern Tswana 
in Langeberg rebelled in 1896.65 Simultaneously, it implicated them in a suspected 
attempt by chief Mhlonhlo, to rekindle the rebellion he had led in 1880 in the 
Transkeian district of Qumbu.66 This veteran Mpondomise rebel was in exile in 
Basutoland, hiding in the mountains there. In 1894, the Cape had finally annexed the 
territory of the Mpondo, faithful allies of the BaSotho. Immediately, rumours 
circulated in the public press linking the BaSotho to a plot by the Mpondo to resist the 
colonial hamess.67 The perceived link between their resistance and supposed collusion 
of the BaSotho resurfaced on the eve of the rinderpest.68 Fuelling this speculation was 
, 
a visit by a relative of the Mpondo chief Sigcau to Basutoland early in 1896.69 
Suspicious circumstances also seemed to link the BaSotho to the Griqua rebellion led 
by Andreas Le Fleur on the south-eastern border in East Griqualand. Evidence at the 
trial of the rebels did suggest that the lead7rs of the rebellion attempted to canvass 
some BaSotho chiefs, including the paramount chief. 70 Even the Shona-Ndebele 
65L.N.A., S7/3/13, Patrick Lenkwane to resident commissioner (B.asutoland), 6 January 
1897. 
66Ibid., S5/14, affidavits of Lerotholi's counsellors, J. Sehole & L. Matete, enclosure in 
resident commissioner to high commissioner, 8 April 1897; also resident commissioner to 
paramount chief, 29 March 1897, enclosure in same; Paramount chief to resident 
commissioner, 28 March 1897, enclosure in resident commissioner to high ¢ommissioner, 8 
April, 1897; Ibid., S5113, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 3 April 18~6; also 
S4/114, resident commissioner's diaries, entry for 4 April, 1896; ibid., S5/14, resident 
commissioner to high commissioner, 8 April 1897, with enclosures .. 
67Ibid., S5/12, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 20 September 1894, enclosing 
Lerotholi's letter denying involvement. 
68 Ibid., S5/13, high commissioner to resident commissioner, 28 April 1896, encl. copy 
from Secretary to the prime minister (Cape Colony) to the prime minister (Cape Colony) 
enclosing telegram from special commissioner, East Pondoland. 
6~bid., S5/13, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 3 April, 1896 
7<The Kokstad Advertiser, 25 February 1896, evidence of Stoffel Bezuidenhout," 
preliminary examination of the Griquas and Natives arrested in connection with the Le Fleur 
outbreak", Kokstad; 25 February 1898, evidence of Lepula. 
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rebellion of 1896 caused a ripple in Basutoland. When BaSotho chiefs declined to 
mobilise their men to fonn a "native levy" being conscripted to help subdue the 
uprising, the impe;ial administration suspected their complicity in the rebellion. 71 
White fears peaked on the eve of the rinderpest. Sensationalist journalism. to which 
many BaSotho had ready access, heightened this paranoia. It helped to fuel panic and 
to confirm suspicions by disseminating the false expectation of an impending all-out 
African rebellion. Typically, the press singled out the BaSotho as the villains. This 
white alarmism on the eve of the rinderpest was not new, nor did it end with the 
rinderpest crisis. As a r.ecent study has revealed, it has been a common and enduring 
feature of black-white relations, recurring especially during criseS.72 
This combination of circumstances was bound to spur restlessness. All these 
disturbing events alarmed the BaSotho. Predictions made in the public press further 
fuelled their fears. One appearing in the editorial of the Free State paper, Daily 
Express, early 1897, was among the most disquieting "Tribal Ru1e's Last Stand", was 
its ominous headline. "What has thus far kept the large body ofBasutos on the side of 
the British government," it proclaimed, 
is neither love nor loyalty, but the prevailing consciousness that being 
the last nation of any consequence in South Afri~ they are now sitting 
on a veritable powder magazine, and stand in imminent danger of 
being blown up the moment a light is set to the fuse. 73 
J 
71L.N.A., S7/113, resident commissioner's circular no. 83, 1896, to assistant commissioners, 
5 April 1896; paramount chief to resident commissioner, 2 May 1896; J.P. Kennan, 
"Memorandum for the information of G.Y. Lagden", 21 April 1896; Ibid., S4/114, resident 
commissioner's diaries, entry for 24 April 1896; Ibid., S7/31l2, paramount chief to resident 
commissioner, 2 May 1896. 
7lJ. Krikler, "Social Neurosis and Hysterical Pre-Cognition in South Africa: A Case Study 
and Reflections", Journal of Social History, (Spring, 1995),491-520. 
n"Tribal Rule's Last Stand", Editorial, The Daily Express, 22 January 1897. 
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BaSotho fears did have a basis, although suspicions linking them directly to the 
rinderpest were unwarranted. Fears over the fencing of their borders and the creation 
of free zones along their frontier had more deep-seated roots. Conflicts over 
boundaries had embittered relations between the BaSotho and Free State boers for six 
decades. The rumours about fencing the borders and clearing a free zone on the 
frontier heightened popular insecurity. They convinced the BaSotho that this Was 
another attempt to grab what was left of their land. Even the ally of the imperial 
administration, Chief Jonathan, was apprehensive. "What has surprised us here at 
Leribe", he protested, "it's said that the country will be divided into two and it is to be 
a five-mile line from the Caledon. This we do not understand".74 The strongest 
opposition to the proposed measure came from the recalcitrant ChiefMasupha: 
I have heard what you said about this new line which we do not 
know.... I say you are to tell these chiefs that I and the nation are 
dissatisfied with this zone because it has consumed space in BasutoI-
and .... I and all ofus say that the Caledon is sufficient .... I say that it is 
sufficient that the line should be the Caledon river which is the usual 
line. Again, know that BasutoIand is very small, even this line of the 
Caledon is near to our doors. Even the Caledon line we were not sat-
isfied with but it was_said that we were to blame. 75 
Intractable problems with fencing the border inevitably arose. The greater length of 
the border had been surveyed in 1869 but had never been clearly defmed. Except 
1 
where a river identified it, beacons marked the rest of the boundary. These, in time, 
J 
had become inconspicuous and indistinguishable. Fencing the Griqualand East border, 
especially, touched a particularly raw nerve. It reminded the BaSotho that the fencing 
of the nearby Pondoland border had heralded the annexation of that territory two 
years before. Besides, this was a contested border, which was not clearly delineated. 
"The beacons were difficult to find", conceded a report to survey the border in 1896; 
74L.N.A., S3/1/SI7, Jonathan to resident commissioner, IS October 1896. 
75Ibid., S3/IISI7, Masupha to resident commissioner, 12 October 1896. 
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"they had in some cases been pulled down and at other points there [were] as many as 
three in a line at right angles to the fence". 76 
Faced with this difficulty, both the imperial administration in Basutoland and the 
Cape government negotiated a compromise. It would allow the anti-rinderpest fence 
to "take the line of the actual boundary in so far as possible". Otherwise, it would 
have to "converge into the Cape Colony or Basutoland as the physical features of the 
country may demand".77 Soon, however, imperial officials in Basutoland themselves 
began complaining that at several points there were "considerable encroachments on 
Basutoland territory, where the fence instead of going round the heads of valleys, 
strikes across them from point to point". 78 Officially, the fence was to "be regarded as 
a temporary rinderpest fence only, without prejudice to the desire of either 
government to readjust it.,,79 It, however, became the pennanent boundary. 
Neither were the rumours reading military intentions into official actions altogether a 
product of the BaSotho imagination. The deployment of Cape colonial military guards 
on the BaSotho border and the military metaphors applied to the iinderpest in both the 
contemporary press and popular discourse confirmed BaSotho suspicion that a plot 
had been hatched to invade their country. Words like "attack," "invasion," and 
"devastation" echoed ominously in reports on the panzootic. The coIllllXtion between 
epidemics and conquest is well attested in history. The Aztec and Inca empites, for 
example, owed their demise to military: defeat followed by "invasions" of smallpox, 
76Ibid., S311/517, report of Sub-Inspector Cartwright of the Basutoland Police on the Barldy-
Basutoland Fence, encl., in assistant commissioner, Quthing, to resident commissioner, 24 
April, 1897 
nlbid., S3/7 /3/1, resident commissioner to assistant commissioner, Quthing, 14 December 
1896. 
78Ibid., resident commissioner to Assistant commissioner Quthing, 24 April 1897. 
~bid., resident commissioner to assistant commissioner, Quthing, 4 December 1896-
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measles and other diseases that Europeans transmitted.8o A similar pattern emerged in 
Southern Africa, with the rinderpest epidemic coming hard on the heels of the most 
decisive and military phase of colonial expansion. 
BaSotho fears that the anti-rinderpest measure of clearing free zones along their 
border also reflected real concerns. They had watched the dispossession of 
neighbouring African communities to make way for mining operations. They, 
therefore, were detennined to resist mineral prospecting in their country. Their 
suspicions were especially ignited as the scramble for mining concessions peaked on 
the eve of the rinderpe~t. The years 1895 and 1896 witnessed a frenzied prospecting 
scramble in the country, rendering the coincidence with the rinderpest uncanny. Count 
de Ferreres, representing a conglomerate of European financiers, submitted to the 
suspicious paramount chief a proposition to prospect for minerals. 81 One Captain de 
Burgh made the most alarming allegations in a bid to obtain sole prospecting rights: 
The Cape government is trying to get: the British government to hand 
your country over to them in the same way as they have recently 
acquired Bechuanaland. If they succeed in this (and they are bringing 
and will continue to bring very great influence to bear), the Cape 
Colony will throwth.~ whole ofBasutoland open to the whites of South 
Africa as has been done with Mashona and Matabele lands, and what 
will become of you and your people? In answer to this, you may say 
you will fight. If you do so, what chance have you? You will face 
armies ten times the number you had to encounter in 1880, armed with 
the latest improved weapons and versed in the latest art of wer. The 
Matabele were a brave nation, yet how long did it take to scatter their 
people and take possession of their country ... Call your chiefs together J 
before it is too late and lay the tr:uth before them. Read them this letter 
and tell them it comes from one who would be your frie~ and theirs 
and who proves this by warning you of the danger that lies 
immediately before you and shows you a safe way to keep you and 
your country from being eaten Up ... 82 
BOA. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 
(Westport, 1972); W. McNeal, Plagues and People (New York, 1976). 
81L.N.A., S5/13, Ferreres to the Paramount Chief of Basutoland, 20 May 1896. 
82Ibid., S5/12, Ulick de Burgh to the chiefs ofBasutoland, 27 August 1895. 
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BaSotho chiefs also received intimation that the high commissioner had asked 
imperial officials in the country to gauge their likely reaction to opening their country 
to mining prospectors and white settlers. 83 A combination of this and de Burgh's letter 
had caused consternation among BaSotho chiefs, inspiring them to petition the high 
commissioner never to consider such a request.84 Despite official disavowal of any 
such designs, suspicions persisted.85 Against this background, it is understandable that 
some BaSotho suspected a malevolent connection between the intentions of mineral 
prospectors and the anti-rinderpest measures along their borders. When asked to 
remove their cattle from the cordoned area along the borders, many BaSotho 
demurred: 
This zone along the frontier, from where we have to remove our 
animals, the government will surrender this frontier to gold searchers 
who have menaced us last year.86 
The BaSotho also suspected that colonial governments and captains of labour had 
introduced the panzootic to force them out to the labour centres. This suspicion was 
rationa~ for BaSotho labollf at the labour centres was highly prized. They were 
renowned for their hard work, skill and discipline. Often. when BaSotho deserted 
from labour centres, production almost ceased. It happened in 1880 when the "Gun 
War" commenced. All BaSotho working in the diamond mines deserted en masse, 
\ 
returned home to be with their families, and protect their property. A manager of one 
. J 
of the mines reported that: 
83Ibid., S5/12. high commissioner to resident commissioner, 13 January 1895; resident 
commissioner to high commissioner, 3 February 1895. 
84Ibid., S5/13, Petition of Chiefs of Basutoland to the high commissioner, 20 September 
1896. 
85Ibid., S 1113, minutes of l895 annual pitso. 
86J oumal des Missions, 1896, 17. 
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the works at the different mines were about to come to a stand still for 
want of labour ... caused by the wholesale desertion of the British 
Basutho.87 
Now, on the eve of the rinderpest, two other mass desertions of BaSotho workers 
occurred. They caused panic in the labour centres as evidenced by the large numbers 
of labour touts who descended on the BaSotho countryside earnestly re-recruiting 
BaSotho labourers. 
This high value atta,?hed to BaSotho workers had infused in them a spirit of 
independence and worker consciousness. This enhanced their bargaining power when 
negotiating terms of employment. It is not surprising, then, that many BaSotho saw in 
the rinderpest, a deliberate attempt by the captains of labour to undermine their ability 
to bargain for the best terms of employment. They were notorious for spurning 
organised recruitment, preferring to fmd erp.p]oyment on their own, or through their 
chiefs. If recruited through a recruiting company, they insisted on a specific contract 
before departing from home. The contract had to stipulate the level of wages, duration 
of the contract and conditions of work. Should the employer breach any of the terms 
of the contract, BaSotho workers simply deserted. They sought employment as gangs 
under a supervisor, usually a son of a chief: who bargained for them and represented 
their interests. They also had the potential support of the imperial administration. The 
, 
latter could bolster BaSotho demands for higher wages and better conditions of work 
J 
as part of the wage they earned at labour centres paid the hut-tax on which the 
colonial administration largely depended for revenue. 
The reef gold mines were especially unpopular among BaSotho migrants. Recruiting 
agents often experienced vexing problems with recruiting and keeping recruits on the 
jo b. 88 In 1892, for example, a recruitment agent presented an attractive scheme to the 
870.20-81,20, see also ib.i!!., 130. 
88Por the unpopularity of the reef mines among African wor1<.ers generally, and the reasons 
for it, see especially P. Harris, Work, Culture, and Identity:. Migrant Labourers in 
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colonial administration. He would start a recruiting agency in Basutoland. It would 
place about eight thousand workers under a six-month contract with different gold-
mining companies in the reef. A headman would take charge of each gang and ensure 
that wages were duly paid. The agency would pay for the return transport of recruits, 
and pay the chiefs a commission per head of a recruited labourer from their villages. 89 
''No purpose would be served by such an agency", replied the resident commissioner, 
for, "all attempts hitherto made to recruit native labourers in large parties in 
Basutoland [had] been only very modestly successful". 90 Responding to a similar 
. 
offer during the same period, the assistant commissioner for Berea stated that 
"although he [had] communicated [the offer] to all the chiefs in the district, there had 
bee~ no response whatever".91 
The BaSotho also knew that the white settl~rs envied their country and had persisted 
in agitating for it to be opened to white settlement. Their country was an autonomous, 
though not independent, "native" territory administered through hereditary chiefs. The 
chiefs prohibited land alienation resolutely. Basutoland, therefore, offended the 
sensibilities of neighbouring white settlers and thwarted their demands for land and 
labour. 
J 
Mozambique and South Africa, c. 1860-1910 (Johannesburg, 1994); Jeeves, "Control of 
Migratory Labour". Jeeves, "Over-reach".P. Richardson and J.J. Van Helten, "Labour in the 
South African Gold Mining Industry, 1886-1914", in Marks & Rathbone, Industrialization 
and Social Change, 77-98; _also various evidence to the South African Native Affairs 
Commission in South African Native Affairs Commission. 1903-5, 4 vols (Cape Town, 
1905); also Report of the Transvaal Labour Commission. Together with Minority Report: 
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (Johannesburg, 1903). 
89L.N.A., S7/113/8, Donovan to assistant commissioner, Mafeteng, 15 July 1892. 
~bid., resident commissioner to assistant commissioner, Mafeteng, 27 July 1892. 
9IIbid., S7/11116, assistant commissioner, Berea, to resident commissioner, 24 December 
1892. 
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The imperial policy of retaining tribalism and rule by hereditary chiefs also threatened 
white settler interests. While the frontier of conquest and dispossession was 
advancing, white settlers had come to identify tribalism and chieftainship as the locus ' 
of African resistance. Accordingly, they became militant advocates for the destruction 
of tribalism and chiefly rule. 92 
The exasperation of white settlers reached its peak in the years immediately preceding 
the rinderpest. It was aired in the press. White settlers agitated for Basutoland to be 
. 
opened to white settlement and for the destruction of tribalism. "A Wasted country" 
announced the heading of an article on the first page of a Free State daily newspaper: 
The more the present stage of BasutoIand is considered, the stronger is 
the conviction forced upon one that it is in reality a wasted country. 
Thousands and thousands of acres of magnificent soil are lying idle, 
and thousands of acres are only part}a1ly cultivated by the native in the 
roughest and most meagre style. Were all those great stretches of 
meadowland fully cultivated, grain sufficient to supply the whole of 
South Africa would assuredly be produced.93 
In 1895, the settler press was vehemently castigating the imperial government's 
policy of "indirect rule". It asserted that it was "doing incalculable harm to all 
sections of the BasutoS".94 It also condemned the policy of governing the country 
through the chiefs as "officialdom jog-trot".9S 
I 
92For a more detailed discussion of these notions, see LT. Evans, "The Political Economy of 
a State Apparatus: The Department of Native Affairs in the Transition from Segregation to 
Apartheid in South Africa, unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1986; 
for a discussion of the implementation of these notions in the early boer republics of the Free 
State and Transvaal, see M. Mamdan~ Citizen and Subject, 91-2. 
9>rhe Express, 22 January 1897. 
94Cape Mercury, 27 June 1895; see also Wynberg Times, 22 June 1896 and Cape Times. 17 
July 1895. 
95Cape Times, 17 July 1895. 
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Against this background, it is understandable why many BaSotho saw sinister motives 
in the rinderpest phenomenon. lbat local Europeans failed to view these reactions in a 
wider context is puzzling. They were hardly a generation removed from the tumuh 
occasioned by the European epidemics of the nineteenth century. Ranger has offered a 
useful explanation to assist in understanding the complexities of the colonial 
mentality. He observed that colonial officials suffered from a constant feeling of 
incapacity to understand their colonised subjects and to fathom the impact of the 
colonial system on them. While times were normal, and the ''native'' appeared to be 
under control and l;>ehaving the way he was supposed to, the colonial administrator 
could convince himselr that he knew his "native" well, believing that the native was 
quite simple. Once you understood him. it would be simple to control him. The 
colonised, in his tum, acted in a manner that appeared to confirm this knowledge by 
playing "the native" he was supposed to be.96 During a crisis, however, it no longer 
suited Africans to play the "native", no longer benefIted him to continue to conceal 
his real nature, and the impact of colonial pressures on him. 
This might explain why most occasions of African expression, of discontent led to 
military pacifIcation, followed by a commission to enquire into the motives of the 
rebellion and to explore further the "native" psychology.97 In such circumstances, 
colonial officials felt despondently that their control of the ''native'' had slipped, and 
that regaining it required an enquiry into his psyche. 1 
I 
This seems to have been the predicament of imperial officials in Basutoland in the 
aftermath of the Makhaola disturbance. The legitimacy of imperial rule and the need 
96Ranger, "From Humanism to the Science of Man: Colonialism in Africa and the 
Understanding of Alien Societies", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 26 (1976), 
115-142. 
97C.Achebe, Morning Yet On Creation Day (London, 1973), especially, 5; see also e.g. 
similar colonial response to the Shona-Ndebele and Tswana uprisings of 1896, in Ranger, 
Revolt; Saker and Aldridge,-The Origins". 
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to affrrm its authority in the region remained of paramount importance. This was 
especially necessary following the damage inflicted on imperial prestige by the 
Jameson Raid. 
A prime concern was the border dispute with the Cape colony. A crisis on the borders 
challenged the main responsibility of the imperial government in the country - that of 
securing the Basutoland borders.98 The government could achieve this only through 
strenuously avoiding an incident that might expose the imperial authorities' inability 
, 
to "preserve order and keep engagements to neighbouring states and thus manifesting 
[our] impotence to [our neighbouring] states.,,99 A disturbance on the BaSotho border 
thus caused an international embarrassment. Failing to bring the culpable individuals 
to justice would jeopardise imperial prestige. 
A second concern was the mishandling of a colonial officer. "In intimidating and 
touching the person or property of an officer," Lagden wrote to Lerotholi, "those 
guilty of it were guilty of acts of violence towards me as representing the High 
Commissioner and toward~- the Queen's government".100 So few and isolated were 
colonial officials throughout the country that they constantly felt insecure, especially 
during a period of crisis and general uneasiness. An attack on one sent shock waves 
through the ranks of the local colonial elite. 1 
I 
Lagden was anxious that the disturbance signalled a rebellion against imperial rule. 
Such an uprising by a strong, well-armed, and quasi-independent nation boded ill for 
the imperial presence in the country. It would confirm the persistent denunciation of 
imperial rule of Basutoland by the settler press. It would further justify the constant 
98c.o. 48/5 I 0, original draft by Sir Hercules Robinson, attached to correspondence between 
Derby and law officers, 2 January 1884 
"'1bid., 171225, high commissioner to resident commissioner, 16 December 1897. 
l~.N.A., SS12/2/5, resident commissioner to paramount chlef, 23 December] 896. 
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clamour from neighbouring settler states for pacification of the BaSotho and 
confiscation of their land. The Makhaola disturbance did draw negative coverage in 
the colonial press. 101 An editorial in the Star used the opportunity of the disturbance to 
advocate for the reannexation of "this patch of territory" to the Cape Colony. 102 
The imperial administration, however, had to be seen by the BaSotho to be dealing 
impartially with this border dispute. Its authority and prestige among the BaSotho 
depended on its ability to protect their country against foreign intrusion. "Whatever 
, 
confidence on the part of the BaSotho has been established towards government," 
Lagden averred on a later, similar occasion, "has been mainly due to the fact that we 
have stood by their rights without respect to colour, as being subjects of the 
Queen". t03 
Careful decisions were therefore essential In quelling the disturbance, imperial 
officials avoided the use of force. The absence of a military force in the country sig-
nificantly reduced the available options. "Government", Lagden wrote despondently 
to the high commissioner during the anxious days of the disturbance, ''has no force 
but public opinion with which to work and public opinion is liable to be misled either 
wilfully or accidentally. Government is neither armed nor protected".I04 
Consequently, the imperial government pinned its hopes on a negotiat~ settlement. 105 
.I 
IOISee e.g. Ibid., S5/14, resident COmmISSioner to assistant comIDlSSloner , Mafeteng, 
undated, in response to assistant commissioner, Mafeteng, to resident commissioner, undated, 
but received on 18 January 1897; see also ibid., telegrams from Reid to Cape Times, The 
Advertiser, Cape Argus, and The Johannesburg Star, enclosed in resident commissioner to 
high commissioner, 22 January 1897. . 
102Star, 21 January 1897. 
103Lagden Papers, Lagden to Milner, 20 December 1897. 
I04L.N.A., S5/14, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 16 January 1897. 
~ 
105c.0. 417/224, minute by Earl Selboume, 26 February 1897, on Rosmead to Chamberlain, 
28 January 1897; also L.N.A., S5/24, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 16 
January 1897 
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Lagden and the staff of the Colonial Office agreed that if they had to use force, they 
would need a massive military campaign to quell the prevailing "restlessness." They 
also saw that a small show of force would be ineffective, if it did not actually 
precipitate a rebellion. 106 
There were other considerations. At the turn of the century, Basutoland bad come to 
take on some strategic significance in the region. It was situated in a strategic position 
that would aid British military movements in a conflict with the boer republics. The 
Colonial Office was aware ofthis advantage. The parliamentary under-secretary at the 
Colonial Office observed that "to have to smash the BaSotho would be simply disas-
trous. Their potential value on the flanks of the Orange Free-State is immense". 107 
Subsequent events during the South African War were to vindicate these sentiments. 
The BaSotho were to become a major asset to the British war-effort in four areas. 
Firstly, they provided the labour essential for the conduct of the war. Secondly, they7 
became the essential backbone of the network of intelligence necessary for the 
successful operation of the war. Thirdly, they were the major suppliers of horses in a 
war whose entire mobility depended on remount horses. Lastly, the country offered 
refuge to British civilians and troop retreats during critical periods of the war. lOS 
Furthermore, Lagden was aware that crushing the BaSotho would only und~re the 
acquisitive intentions of white colonists. Indeed, he blamed the latter for the 
sensational rumours that the BaSotho were at the head of an impending all-out 
African rebellion. Their purpose, he thought, was to incite the BaSotho to a rebellion 
I06Ibid., S5/]4, resident commissioner to high commissioner, ]6 January 1897. 
I07c.O. 417/224, minute by Earl Selborne, 26 February 1897, on Rosmead to Chamberlain, 
28 January 1897 .. 
I08L.N.A., S3/2/I11-6, papers on the Anglo-Boer War. 
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that would justify their destruction, thus opening their country to white settlement.109 
Sentiments expressed in the press seemed to confirm this apprehension. After 
cataloguing periodic rumours of "native risings" so prevalent during successive 
Christmas seasons, including the Makhaola episode, a reporter from the Daily Express 
reminded his readers ofa statement that a former governor of the Cape, Sir Benjamin 
d'Urban, had made: "as long as there is a native chief left in South Africa, so long 
will there be native wars".110 A more sensational sentiment appeared in an editorial of 
the influential TraI!Svaal newspaper, the Star. It justified the view that the prevalent 
African "restlessness": though ''vexatious and regrettable, cannot be looked upon as 
an unmixed misfortune". It could be exploited to achieve the consolidation of the 
colonial enterprise and the firm subjugation of Africans. III 
Therefore, the imperial administration rel~ed on what had now become policy pm: 
excellence - using the authority of the paramount chief to quell the disturbance. Now, 
however, the government was in a quandary. The authority of the paramount chief 
was weak and wavering, requiring the support of the same imperial administration 
that sought to use it. What is more, the culprits were the paramount chief's own sons, 
and their excuse of acting on their father's instruction compounded the problem. 
Lagden was anxious about the factionalism that the disturbance ~as creating. He 
I 
already suspected that it had all the hallmarks of a disruptive dynastic factionalism. 
"Undoubtedly", he thought, ''these tbree chiefs (Maama, Jonathan and Masupha) 
encouraged Lerotholi's sons to insubordination in order to weaken their father's 
position, secretly urging [sic] the rinderpest...as levers ... ". 112 
l~agden papers, Mss Afr.S. 210 (i), resident commissioner to high commissioner, 16 
January 1897 
Il<>Oaily Express, 2 December 1896. 
11l"Restive Natives", Star, 21 January 1897. 
112Ibid., S5/14, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 16 January 1897. 
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Thus, he attempted a risky three-pronged strategy. He would use the only effective 
authority available - that of the paramount chief. Simultaneously, he would exploit 
existing dynastic rivalries to localise the scope of the disturbance. Finally, he would 
avoid pressing the latter strategy beyond the point where it would disturb the fragile 
political equilibrium. I 13 Therefore, he leaned on the paramount chiet: reminding him 
of his responsibility as "the chief policeman of the government", and of his role to 
maintain law and order. I 14 He then tried the culprits at a full pitso attended by all the 
principal chiefs. This would enable him to avoid making a judgement himself. It 
, 
would also rescue him from the odium of an unpopular decision. Furthermore, it 
would expose the "true facts" relating to the disturbance. He had reason to know that 
the paramount chief, 
whose mood of late had been very obstinate and surly had, in order to 
screen his sons and disguise their unruly conduct, withheld from the 
nation correspondence that had lately passed between us and so 
distorted it as to raise false and alarming issues in the native mind. lIS 
The presence of other chiefly factions would also enable Lagden to manipulate the 
prevailing dynastic jealousies to his advantage. 
Lagden also strove to avoid disturbing the existing equilibrium of power within the 
chiefly hierarchy. Although insisting on including the other chiefs in securing a 
verdict, he used a different strategy to decide a suitable sentence. F~r the latter, he 
I 
summoned "an inner council of senior counsellors and some old chiefs," deliberately 
excluding any of the principal chiefS ''whose presence might have lent colour of 
partiality." 116 After this council had recommended a sentence of imprisonment, 
Lagden displayed his magnanimity by waiving the sentence, considering it 
I13Ibid. 
114see, for example, Ibid., S81212/5, resident commissioner to paramount chief, 25 
December 1896 
115Ibid., S5114, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 16 January 1897 .. 
"'bid. 
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the most judicious course to send [Makhaola] away with nothing more 
than a reprimand as it was essential to the balance of power not to 
weaken the paramount chief s faction further by any studied humili-
at io n. 1 17 
For his part, Lerotholi typically saw the affair within the context of contemporary 
dynastic conflicts. Thus, his immediate strategy was three-pronged: to stand behind 
his sons, to redirect attention away from the affair, and to defuse factionalism. No 
sooner did the court fine his fugitive sons for their part in the disturbance, than 
Lerotholi, to Lagden's, chagrin, restored them to their former positions. Justifying his 
actions, he asserted that since he believed that both he and the resident commissioner 
had pardoned them, "matters were now settled."IIs 
Throughout, he attempted strenuously to frustrate Lagden's strategy of including the 
other chiefly factions to contain the disturbance. 119 Instead, he set up his own tribunal 
to try his sons for mishandling an imperial official. It consisted of his brothers and 
counsellors. 120 Simultaneously, he sought to deflect attention from the affair by 
reporting sensational rumOurs of menacing preparations in areaS under the jurisdiction 
of those chiefs who contested his position as paramount chief. The other chiefs, in 
their turn, exploited the disturbance in pursuit of their own factional interests. 
Intending to discredit the paramount chiefs faction in the eyes ,of the imperial 
administration, they most likely urged the young men on, even as they doggedly 
disavowed involvement in the disturbance. 121 
1J7Ibid., resident commissioner to high commissioner, 22 February 1897. 
118Ibid., S7/3/12, paramount chief to resident commissioner, 28 February 1897. 
lI'1:bid., S7/3/12, paramount chief to resident commission, 30 December 1896. 
J2<1bid., S7/3/12, paramount chief to resident commissioner, 30 December 1896. 
121E.g. ibid., Jonathan 10 resident commissioner, 14 January 1897; S4/1/4, resident 
commissioner's diary, 21 January 1897. 
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The rinderpest crisis, coupled with accompanying political disturbances, provides a 
convenient point of entry for understanding the complex processes of interaction 
between coloniser and colonised. In Basutoland, the British colonial presence was 
unusual - the BaSotho themselves had invited it. This complicated relations between 
the coloniser and the colonised; it masked behaviour that the rinderpest crisis helped 
to expose. 
What emerges from the crisis brought on by the Makhaola disturbance is the 
weakness of both the local and the colonial states, and their mutual dependence. Both 
had to '''walk the tight rope". They could best achieve this through What Marks, in 
, , 
explaining similar complex ambiguities in early twentieth century Natal, bas called 
"the art of colonial misunderstanding." "The workings of the colonial misunders-
tanding," she has observed, 
mean that the words and actions of individuals are both deliberately 
and accidentally ambiguous, as the colonised don the mask of 
deference before their conquerors, and conquerors assume the garb of 
authority before the subjugated. 122 
Similarly, Lagden and Lerotholi misunderstood each other, "deliberately" or "acci-
dentally". The Makhaola disturbance unleashed an extraor~ exchange of 
J 
correspondence between the two, each blaming the other for the affair. Lerotholi 
persisted in asserting that he had ordered the cordon on the border on the 
"misunderstanding" that it had been required by the imperial administration itself. 123 
Lagden, in turn, denied responsibility, denouncing the deployment of the cordon as 
"outrageous and "unwarrantable". 124 He further claimed that his instructions had been 
"misunderstood". 
122S. Marks, The Ambii\lities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism. and the 
State in Twentieth Century Natal (Braamfontein, 1986), 
I~.N.A., S7/3112, paramount chief to resident commissioner,25, 26,27,28,30 December 
1896. 
124Ibid., resident commissioner to paramount chief, 23 December 1896. 
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Only when Lagden threatened imperial abandonment of the country did Lerotholi 
yield, playing the only remaining card of submission and deference, blaming the 
entire affair on "misunderstanding". "I caused these children to make mistakes", he 
sought to assuage the resident commissioner "because I thought I am carrying out the 
orders given me, whereas I did not comprehend it".12S 
Even before its outbreak in Basutoland, rinderpest formed the backdrop to political 
restlessness. It also shook colonial officials out of their complacent belief that they 
knew the BaSotho well and had succeeded in winning their complete confidence and 
trust. The officials became aware of latent disaffection when they had believed that 
none existed. The Makhaola disturbance warned Lagden of the urgency of ascer-
taining if there was "any suppressed national movement against government, and if 
there was any change desired in the colonial status.,,126 
At the pitso called to ascertain this feeling, the assembled chiefs and counsellors 
donned the mask of deference. They "unanimously" declared themselves well 
--
contented with the existing situation, disowned the conduct of Lerotholi's children 
and expressed their desire for peace. 127 
Despite their grievances, most BaSotho knew that they had to stand in good stead 
with the imperial administration, upon which the security of their country'rested. 
Indeed, the best that the imperial administration could do in strengthening its policy of 
"masterly inactivity" was to threaten the withdrawal of imperial protection. This 
strategy always worked. "Why is it we are being killed so much by government," 
'25Ibid., S7/3/5, paramount chief to resident commissioner, 1 January 1897. 
'21bid., S5/14, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 16 January 1897. 
127C.0. 417/224, minutes ofpitso held at Maseru on 12 January 1897, encl. in Ro~mead to 
- Chamberlain, 28 January 1897. -
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panicked Lerotholi when the press began circulating rumours of the imminent 
termination of imperial rule in the country: 
What is our fault? This matter of the boys which the nation has nothing 
to do with, is it one for which the government can kill us for. Where I 
see that these matters have become serious is because I also see the 
newspapers say that we ought to be given over to the colonial people; 
what is the reason for government already wishes to abandon us? We 
are the people of the Queen, we are a peaceable people, we have no 
plan nor a single bad thought, we are only trusting to government. 128 
, 
For the imperial government, then, the success of its administration in Basutoland, 
and the maintenance of its prestige in the region, depended on establishing and 
maintaining a working relationship with the local elite. It could best achieve this by 
walking the tight rope. In their turn, the BaSotho were caught in a similar quandary. 
Walking the tight rope and donning the mask was both essential for their survival, 
;-=. 
given the emerging colonial landscape, the closing frontier of white settlement, and 
the ambitions and schemes of white settlers. 
--
While heightened tension, alarm and restlessness met the news of the approaching 
catastrophe, public responses changed when the panzootic began sweeping through 
the BaSotho herds. The initial response was to conceal its presence; this was followed 
by panic, cattle-owners fleeing with their infected herds. 
J 
The sight of many carcasses was gruesome and heartbreaking, shocking the cattle-
owners. A missionary vividly described the sight: 
Along the way, we saw a most lamentable spectacle that one may 
imagine. In a certain place twice as big as our bedrooms, sixteen head 
of oxen lay dead in the stream. There was a little black calf: terribly 
lean and thin, sadly pulling itself among these decaying corpses. There 
were 66 dead animals many of which were fat bulls ... How could such a 
spectacle not wreck the imagination of these poor Blacks ... ?129 
128L.N.A., 8/2/2/5, paramoont chief to resident commissioner 
I~. Dieterlen, 14 July, Journal des Missions, 1897,597. 
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There is some evidence that some lost their minds while others committed suicide. 
When asked if she remembered the rinderpest, an informant exclaimed: 
How can I not? The man, who set up our initiation lodge lost so many 
cattle during the rinderpest, he fled from the village in fright and was 
never heard of. 130 
Other informants remembered being told stories of relatives who had lapsed into 
temporary insanity, returning to the village after recovery.131 Many tried to aIIeviate 
distress by setting out to enjoy their last days' contentment. Gluttony, alcoholism and 
conviviality were options. The 1897 harvest brought an abundant sorghum crop, most 
of it finding its way to the brewing pot. "The harvest is beautiful", a missionary 
ex~laimed despondently, "they drink too much joala [local Sotho beer]; they dance, 
amuse and degrade themselves". 132 
Churchyards were desecrated as BaSotho beer flowed during baptismal feasts. When 
Lerotholi informed the resident commissioner of the upcoming baptismal feast of his 
second son, Griffith, Lagden ''prayed'' that ''your sons and enemies may not poison 
you with drink". The paramount chief responded revealingly: 
I fmd that it is not well that I should go, as your words have 
intimidated me, when you say that my sons may give me drink and 
also my enemies ... Now on account of this word of yours I am no 
longer going because I hear that there is plenty of beer comfng from 
Nkuebe's, etc. Now I do not like to be mentioned as having been 
present in such drunkenness ... and my name will be spoilt and so bb 
disgraced. 133 • 
He did attend the occasion, with predictable consequences. 
13~nterview with 'Matsekoa Motleleng, Thabang, Mokhotlong, 18 May 1978. 
l31public interview with five informants at 'Mamazibuko, Butha-Buther, 21 to 28 April 
1978. 
132Journal des missions, 1897, 599-600. 
133L.N.A., S7/3/14, paraIiiount chief to resident commissioner, 19 November 1897. 
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3.1: A Tragic scene during the rinderpest outbreak 
(Courtesy ofOnderstepoort Veterinary Library) 
J 
The BaSotho shared this Epicurean response with other African societies in Southern 
Africa. 134 The remark of the acting magistrate of East Griqualand captured the 
essence of the prevailing wisdom observed everywhere: "Let us eat, drink and be 
merry, for tomorrow we die." 135 Here, again, historical parallels with societies 
separated by space and time are striking. Quite contrary to the prejudicial comments 
134See, e.g., L.M.S., Box 53, Jacket B, H. Williams, Molepolole 12 October 1896; 
U.S.P.G., vol. B, letter~of Rev. Markham, Ipolela Mission. NataL 30 June 1897; Ibid .. letter 
of3! December 1897; G.42-98, report from Tsolo, 127; I~id., 121. 
135Ibid., 121. 
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of contemporary Europeans, who identified this reaction with African ''barbarism'', 
this response was common for people facing such crisis. Boccaccio attests it in The 
Decameron, describing public responses to the Black Death in fourteenth-century 
Florence: 
athers ... held that plenty of drinking and enjoyment, singing and free 
living and the gratification of the appetite in every possible way, letting 
the devil take the hindmost, was the best preventative of such a 
malady; and as far as they could, they suited the action to the word. 
Day and night, they went from one tavern to another, drinking and 
carousing unrestrainedly. At the least inkling of something that suited 
them, they ran'wild in other people's houses, and there was no one to 
prevent them, for everyone had abandoned all responsibility for his 
belongings as well as for himself, considering his days numbered .... 136 
Historians have also shown that this response was common in similar situations 
regardless of culture or historical epoch.~During the Black Death in the medieval 
western and Mediterranean world, Renouard has observed a similar pattern: people 
"giving themselves over to sensual pleasures free of care", and abandoning 
themselves to "debauchery, gluttonously satisfying all their appetites". He concluded 
that the crisis of the Black Death caused a "wave of immorality [which] shook the 
entire west". 137 
, 
While the rinderpest drove some BaSotho in this direction, it propelled others to the 
I 
opposite one, towards spiritual means of consolation and escape. Christianised 
BaSotho were steeped in the Christian eschatological tradition that viewed disease as 
an expression of the wrath of the Almighty. In this tradition, an epidemic was a divine 
scourge, a retribution for the sins of humankind. Repentance and prayer were 
therefore the appropriate and prime recourse. They remind us of the public 
136G. Boccaccio, The Decamerog, trans. F. Winwar (New York, 1955), xxv-xxvi 
J37y' Renouard, "The B@ck Death as a Major Event in World History", in Bowsky (ed) 
Black Death, 23-34; also E. Carpenter, "The Plague as a Recurrent Phenonenon", in ibid., 35-
7. -
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processions in Catholic Europe, and public fasts and sermons in post-Reformation 
Protestant countries during epidemics. 138 "They resolved to forsake their vices", wrote 
a noted historian, J.F.C. Hecker, in 1832, about the profound sense of contrition that 
seized Christians during the Plague, "to make restitution for past offences, before they 
were summoned hence, to seek reconciliation with their Maker, and to avert, by self-
chastisement, the punishment due to their former sins". 139 
The same themes permeated religious discourse and church sermons on the rinderpest 
, 
in Basutoland. Well ahead of the outbreak of the disease, Christian missionaries had 
tried to urge a spiritual reawakening, using the looming panzootic as a spur. On the 
one hand, they invested in such a revival the potential for averting the wrath of the 
Almighty who, in gratitude, would deliver the nation from the approaching doom 
Paradoxically, were divine intervention to spare the BaSotho the imminent crisis, 
their pride and their satisfaction would not have any limits. They 
would plunge more in the practical materialism and animalistic 
enjoyment constituting the essence of paganism. 140 
The sermons were appropriate to the day, distinguished by their apocalyptic flavour. 
Predictably, the most popular was the commentary on the Letters of St. Paul 
portending the end of the world and the Second Coming of the Messiah. "St. Paul , 
says," exhorted the local missionary paper, "once these signs are manifest, be vigilant, 
I 
J38For providential interpretations of epidemics and disease generally, see K. Thomas, 
Religion and the Decline of Magic (London, 1971), ch. 4; for specific countries and regions, 
see B. Bennassar, Recherches sur les grandes epidemimies dan Ie nord de l'Espagne a la fin 
du XVI siecle (Paris, 1969); G. Calvi, "A Metaphor for Social Exchange: The Florentine 
Plague of 1630," Representation, 13 (1986), 140; Carpenter, Une ville devant la peste: 
Orvieto et la peste noire de 1348 (Paris, 1962), 155; Slack, Impact of Plague, 229. 
J39J.F.C. Hecker, The Epidemics of the Middle Ages (trans, Babington, B.G.), 3rd ed. 
(London, 1859). 
I40Journal des Missions, 1897, 18. 
164 
for the end is at hand".141 At a ceremony dedicating a new church, a MoSotho lay 
preacher exhorted the congregation thus: 
It is hard to believe what one does not see. One believes only what one 
can see. These days we have been constantly warned about the advent 
of the dread disease. Everybody, however, has been making fun out of 
these exhortations and many continue to purchase cows and more 
cows. It is the same even unto God's judgement before which each and 
everyone will have to stand at the end of our ephemeral lives. Long 
have the messengers of God's will been urging us to prepare for the 
judgement day through retribution, conversion and belief None, 
however, his tqken heed. Even unto this call heathens refuse to be 
exhorted and they make fun. Will they believe, then, when they have 
been condemned to eternal hell just as they will believe the warnings 
about the cattle disease when they witness their own cattle dying. Was 
it not so even in the days of Noah? People around him saw him build 
the ark. They, however, continued in their worldly pleasures: drank, 
made merry, took wives and divorced until doom's day arrived. Will 
this exhortation now be heeded? Shall we persist in resisting the 
calling of Jesus Christ? If with the cattle plague we had no means of 
preparedness owing to the lack of any medical cure, with God's calling 
there is little excuse. The opportunities have been abundant, and His 
messengers have persistently and patiently exhorted US. 142 
Another popular theme of sermons seems to have been the commentary on Christ's 
counsel on the most secure repository for BaSotho's wealth. "For many," exhorted the 
same Evangelist: 
their herds were their ultimate source of happiness. They hAd, as it 
were, locked up their hearts in their cattle posts. Yet today, woe untq 
those 'who stored their treasures on earth where rinderpest could get 
them for they have lost everything they possessed. Blessed be those 
who stored their treasures in heaven, where rinderpest will never find 
them, for they have everlasting happiness. 
These proclamations did strike a chord in the minds of a people whose indigenous 
modes of explanation seemed to be dying with their diseased animals. An apparent 
resurgence of spirituality occurred when the dreaded disease first appeared. 
141Leselinyana, 1 July 1897. 
'42Ibid., 25 July 1897. 
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Missionaries did not hesitate to affirm a general awakening. The Anglican missionary 
at lllotse observed that the rinderpest was bringing "larger congregations, especially 
of heathens" to the churches, "Sunday after Sunday, than [he had] ever known 
before". He further wondered if this was "a glimpse of the silver lining of the dark 
clouds which are lingering over US.,,143 The French missionaries, in their turn, 
reported "numerous" conversions. 144 
This heightened religiosity displayed by the BaSotho was another manifestation of the 
, 
resigned response to the rinderpest crisis throughout South Africa Allover, 
missionaries claimed that they witnessing an unprecedented attendance at church 
services. Despite the black cloud hanging over their converts, many missionaries saw 
"many a bright ray [piercing] the cloud", as Rev. Williams, of the London Missionary 
Society in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, did: 
~ 
and looking on the past year, I can unhesitatingly say that from the 
standpoint of our work it has been the highest, happiest and most 
successful since I have been here. 145 
From the Cape territories, missionaries made similar claims of Christian revivals. 
Rev. J.H. Bone at Grahamstown marvelled at the unprecedented amount of offerings 
made at his church despite impoverishment all around. Rev. S. W. Cox confirmed this 
\ 
impression, remarking that despite his converts passing through a time pf great 
scarcity of food, '<the offerings of the people have been far larger during the last six 
months than ever before". 146 A similar tendency has been observed among the 
143U.S.p.G., letters received, 1897, Rev. J. Widdicombe, H1otse, 30 November 1896. 
144Joumal des Missions, 1897; For similar responses of African societies in Southern 
Africa, sec, e.g. U.S.P.G., annual reports, vol. 2, 1898; also E. Unterhalter, "Religious Change 
in Nquthu District of Zulu land in the Nineteenth Century", History Seminar Paper, School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1976. 
'45L.M.S., annual reports,-Box 2, Folder 2. 
l~.S.p.G., annual reports, 1898, vol. 2 
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African communities of Zululand. At all Christian services, especially baptis~ large 
congregations, especially of non-believers, attended. 147 
While some looked to Christianity, others turned to indigenous religion. Dieterlen 
noted this tendency: 
It appears that we are wrong to expect any religious awakening 
following this plague. Through a human eye, this pest awakens all the 
instincts of paganism, which were donnant ... 148 
The celebration of circumcision feasts accompanied this "awakening of paganism". 
Chiefs Bereng and Masupha lavishly celebrated such occasions during the height of 
the panzootic. 149 Despi~e his disgust, Dieterlen captured the current mood: "At this 
moment", he vexed, "everybody seems to make circumcision feasts ... about 148 young 
people have passed there, not far from here".lso Writing a few years later, a historian 
of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. observed that "at this time, there was 
a grcat revival of old heathen customs in Basutoland - the circumcision school and all 
the various fonns of witehcraft". 151 
This resurgence of indigenous religiosity during a time of social-crisis, however, was 
a complex syncretism between indigenous and Christian beliefs. Without a secure 
religious appeal and source of consolation, many hapless BaSotho found themselves 
flipping back and forth between contesting religions or combining ~em in a mixed 
blend. Thus, amid the bewilderment, "wonderful resurrection cases" were J widely 
147Unterhalter, "Religious Change in the Nqutu District". 
148Journal des Missions, 1897,599. 
14~.N.A., S7/3/13, Berengto resident commissioner, 5 July 1897. 
1soJoumai des Missions, 599. 
lSI C.F. Pas cor, Two Hundred Years or the S.P.G.: An Historical Account ortbe S.P.G. in 
Foreign Parts, 1801-1900, vol 1 (London, 1901),327. 
,. 
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reported.152 In one such case, people whispered about an Englishman who died, rose 
again on the fifth day, went to heaven and then returned to earth. He was rumoured to 
be preaching that: 
after dying, I went to heaven but found the door closed by millions of 
bulls that we [the English] have killed by the pest, and God sends me 
to say that the only way to open the door of heaven is to urge the 
whites to pity the Blacks by stopping the rinderpest. 153 
The devastating drought that followed the rinderpest was popularly linked to the 
murrain. Some claimed that the absence of rain was due to the death of cattle. Before 
, 
ascending to heaven, a popular story spread, the dying cattle consumed all the water 
from the lakes. 
Belief in these resurrection tales increased as they seemed to receive confirmation 
from all over southern Africa. Tales came from Umzimvubu in East Griqualand. They 
> 
alleged that a woman who died rose again. ''During her sojourn in heaven", the legend 
professed: 
it was revealed to her that the white man had in his possession two 
boxes. The first contained rinderpest. This he had already opened. The 
second po be unlocked shortly] contained locusts ''with horses' 
teeth". 15 
Another woman was rumoured to have "popped out of the grave". She also visited 
heaven from where she was sent back to inform the ''natives'' that aft~r the rinderpest 
a disease would follow among humans. To prevent it, ''natives'' were rlrged to 
inoculate themselves with bile extracted from infants sacrificed from each "kraal". 155 
152Cape Times, 23 October 1897. 
'53Journal des Missions, 1897,599-600, 
IS4Cape Times, 23 Octob~ 1897, 
'55Ibid, 
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These fables were partly responsible for the widespread anti-foreign sentiment that 
prevailed. There was a reluctance to engage in commercial transactions with 
Europeans. "They buy neither salt nor sugar in the shops", observed a European 
missionary in Basutoland, "saying that everything is poisoned.,,156 In August 1897, 
white traders experienced a drastic shortage in the supply of BaSotho grain and a 
slump in trade. A Free State farmer wrote despondently "from Basutoland I get 
reports that the natives ... are holding on to their mealies". He, however, had grasped 
only part of the reason: "The niggers are saying, 'hang your markets, we may require 
our mealies ourselves,>157 
Finally, with their cattle dead, the BaSotho settled down to a mood of resigned 
fatalism. It was manifested in constraint, tolerance and fortitude. This disposition bred 
a remarkable sense of self-blame and cont~tion. The paramount chief failed to arrive 
at the annual pitso of 1897 because he had learnt that attendants would blame the 
chiefs for the loss of cattle. Abashed, he remained at a nearby village, reportedly 
"drunk".158 Despite his absence, speakers rose in turn to thank imperial officers and to 
place the blame for the national catastrophe entirely on the BaSotho: ''Our cattle are 
dead through our own stupidity", was the typical expression of contrition: 
We cannot blame the government. I thank the government. 
Government has tried its best, anyone can see that goveI1lment is 
caring for us like a parent for its child .... Although my cattle are dead, } 
thank the government. I see that it is not deceiving us. 159 
This mood of resigned fatalism that the BaSotho displayed was prevalent among 
African communities throughout South Africa After the initial alarm had abated, the 
'56Journal des Missions, 1897,600. 
'57The Express, 3 August 1897. 
158L.N.A., S4/114, resideHt commissioner's diaries, entry for 21 October 1897. 
15'1bid., SI1I3, speech ofNtho, pitso of21 October 1897. 
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fmal response was resignation. Contemporaries noted this striking attitude of calm 
and fortitude with which most African communities bore their losses. As a missionary 
paper acknowledged, "the seeming complacency with which many natives bowed 
their heads to their losses", was "a matter of much comment".I60 These comments are 
unanimous and repetitive that we might only scrape off the dust from the top of the 
available sources by randomly selecting some of them: 
It was something remarkable to see the ~uiet resigned manner in which 
they accepted the rinderpest visitation. 16 
The natives ac~epted their losses bravely, and when the ploughing 
season came, cultivated large areas with such oxen as they had, horses 
and kaffrr hoes. 162 
A careful perusal of the reports of the Inspectors of Native Locations 
seems to show that notwithstanding drawbacks and losses during the 
past year, from the effects of drought, rinderpest and locusts, the 
natives of this district have generally held their own while in some 
respects they have shown a considerable amount of Y!1' perseverance 
and resource in their endeavour to combat these evils. 63 
The Bathlaping bear hunger and privations with eqllanimity ... I64 
They bear their troubles resignedly and cheerfully, the heathens, 
indeed, take it as a sort of fatalism. 165 
So far as can be judged from outward appearance, the peo~e go as 
before, treating their losses most philosophically." 166 
160 Christian Express, xxvii, 328, 1 October 1897 
16IU.S.p.G., vol. 2, report by Rev. Charles Taberer, 31 December 1898. 
162G.42_98, 1,33. 
1630.31_'99, 40 
1640.31_'99, report for Mafeking, 67. 
165. T ~ 
u.S.P.G., vol. B, report of Rev. B. Markhan, lpolela, 30 June 1897. 
l~atal Departmental Reports, 1898, BB 12. 
J 
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Indeed, it is generally admitted these misfortunes, coming one on top 
of the whole, were met by them with singular fortitude and 
forbearance. 167 
Yet, through it all, the natives of both Natal and Zulu land maintained 
an attitude of uncomplaining calm They submitted to their losses with 
stoical equanimity, and they prepared, as their neighbours did, to repair 
their losses and to cope with misfortune. 168 
The pattern ofBa~otho's responses to the rinderpest fits well that observed in cross-
cultural studies of socml reaction to dramatic epidemics in the past. 169 The first phase 
was that of alarm reaction. It was manifested in flight, scapegoating and political 
unrest. When relief failed to come, response moved into a second phase - the stage of 
confronting the crisis and attempting to control it. During this phase, people employed 
familiar methods for fighting the epidemic, drawing from the normal repertoire of 
activities. When these failed to stop the epidemic, or cure the disease, they used 
extraordinary means of treatment, drawn from outside the normal response to disease. 
These included using various preventive and curative agents whose therapeutic value 
was often unknown. They also tried other alternatives of reliet: including religiosity 
and mystical approaches. The final stage was that of acceptance ot: and resignation to, 
the crisis. 
T67J.A. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion. 1906 (London. 1913),92-3. 
168Sir John Robinson. A Life Time in South Africa (London, 1900),319-20. 
I 
169 H. Seyle, The Stresscof Life (New York, 1956); G. Risse, "Epidemics and History: 
Ecological Perspectives and Social Responses", in Fee & Fox (eds.), Aids: The Burdens of 
History, 33-66. -
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CHAPTER 5 
CONSEQUENCES AND AFTERMATH 
The effects of rinderpest began impinging before the outbreak of the panzootic. 
Premature and ill-advised precautions by neighbouring states paralysed trade and 
commerce. Restrictions on ox-wagon transport, military cordons sanitaires, quarantine 
measures, fumigation, disinfection, and isolation disrupted the transportation of goods. 
Unable to reach markets outside their country BaSotho producers remained with the 
unsatisfactory alternative of having to sell to unscrupulous local traders at low prices. 
Soon, however, these traders themselves became reluctant to buy produce because the -
closure of borders had shut off roads to markets. I The effects of these precautions on 
BaSotho trade were severe. The resident commissioner kept urging the high 
commissioner to prevail on the Cape government to relax their restrictions. These 
restrictions, he cautioned, were "causing much mercantile distress to traders as well as 
inconveniences to their supporting firms in the Cape Colony". 2 
Authorities, however, stiffened. these restrictions When the panzootic finally appeared 
in the country in March 1897, stringent quarantine measures upset normal trade 
transactions. In an attempt to bolster its own anti-rinderpest regulations, the 
neighbouring Free State government suspended the issuing of passes to BaSotho. When 
it reissued them in June 1897, it did so under strict conditions, placing armed guards on 
the border with Basutoland.3 Free State border guards frequently fired at BaSotho who 
IIbid., S3/25/1114, annual report, 1897; ibid., S51l3, resident comnnSSlOner to high 
commissioner, 8 October 1896, end copy of "protest by the traders and European inhabitants 
of Quthing against the actions of the Cape Colonial government in summarily closing the 
Telle Drift". 
- 2Ibid., S5/15, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 26 May 1897, also same, 28 
January 9 February 1897. 
3Ibid., S8/317, resident commissioner to Messers BUllett Ebdeen Co., 12 May 1897. 
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attempted to visit border stores without passes.4 The Cape government, in its turn, 
prohibited traders from transporting produce from southern Basutoland. By May 1897 
the resident commissioner was complaining that restrictions were now "harsher than 
before",s trade having almost ceased. 6 
Within Basutoland, itself: internal traffic collapsed as district chiefs took heed of the 
caution that when Athens cries Sparta should not smile. Chiefs of those districts whose 
tum of infection was yet to come, took the initiative to isolate their areas and to prohtbit 
traffic coming from those districts that were in the throes ofinfection.7 
Consequently, the value of agricultural produce exported from Basutoland fell in 1897 
compared with the last normal year in 1895.8 
5.1: Value (in pounds) of agricultural produce (wheat, mealies and Millet) 
exported: 1895 and 1897 
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Ibid., S8/317, resident commissioner to messers Bunnet Ebdeen Co., 16 November 1896. 
su,id., S5/14, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 26 May 1897. 
~riend, 28 May 1897. 
7E.g. L.N.A., S7/3/12, chief Masupha to resident commjssioner, 27 April 1897. 
8Ibid., S3/25/1112 and S3/25/1I14, annual reports, 1895 and 1897; also Friend, 6 July 1897. 
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The export figures for 1897 might seem encouraging. Most of the export, however, was 
stock local traders had accumulated when the borders were closed and the transport 0 f 
produce to markets was restricted. The traders also exported all their stock when 
. neighbouring territories reopened roads and borders. This deprived the country of 
surpluses for use in the lean years ahead. 
The BaSotho also benefited from the belated arrival of the panzootic in their country. 
They cultivated the main export crop of wheat between April and June in the lowlands 
and between August and September in the mountain region before the panzootic arrived 
to kill their oxen. Thus, they could dominate the grain market temporarily while other 
sources of supply were being devastated by the panzootic. Prices of produce were also 
consequently high.9 
Most of the cash earned from exports, however, was used to buy commodity goods, thus 
weakening the ability to survive the bleaker years ahead. A comparison of imports and 
total exports of agriCUltural produce, including wool and mohair, reveals a thin margin in 
the balance of payments: 
5.2: Comparison (in pounds) of imports and exp~rts: 1897 
I 
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~bid., S3125/1I14, annual report. year ended 30 June 1897. 
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The already worrying situation worsened in the two succeeding years as the effects of 
rinderpest were felt. The absence of ploughing cattle drastically reduced the capacity to 
produce. Touring the country early in 1898, the newly appointed high commissioner, Sir 
Alfred Milner, reported passing through a countryside clothed in lush pasture, resulting 
from the absence of cattle to graze it. He also passed through vast tracts of uncultivated 
fields, the result of the absence of cattle to plough. He noted the "smaller amount of 
cultivation, especially of wheat, the people having no cattle to plough with". 10 
The absence of draught animals limited the scale of cultivated acreage. Other factors 
exacerbated the prevailing difficulties. Owing to a general dearth of food, human energy 
was at its lowest ebb just when the method of cultivation required more labour. The 
disastrous effects of a bad harvest, especially wheat crops, worsened the already bleak 
prospects for the year 1898. It followed a devastating drought "of which no one 
remembered having seen the equal".11 Many believed that the dying cattle, before 
ascending to the ancestors, consumed all the water from lakes. They also posited that the 
skinning of the dead cattle without eating the meat outraged the ancestors. 12 
Before the results of the drought were evident in the poor harvest, the Chair of the 
Chamber of Commerce was already bewailing the likely prospects: 1 
All their reserves store having perished during the late droughts, t}le 
chances are that wheat culture will to a great extent cease for a year or 
two. Wheat is the principal purchasing power of the natives as it is grown 
for trade only and in good years represents business exchange amounting 
to £100,000. 13 
IOc.O. 417/248, A. Milner, "Notes on Journey to Berea and Leribe", in Milner to 
Chamberlain, 25 May 1898. 
llCbristian Express, xxviii, 336, 1 June 1898, 85, report of the annual missionary 
conference of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society. 
12Leselinyana, 20 August 1898. 
13 --
L.N.A., S7/7120, chairman, Chamber of Commerce, to Govt. Secretary, 3 March 1898; 
also L.N.A., S5/15, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 12 March 1898. 
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Export statistics confirmed his predictions. The wheat crop failed· in all districts. The 
value of wheat exports declined, reaching a nadir in 1899, when they collapsed: 14 
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The severe shortage of cash, which BaSotho earned from the sale of their meagre 
produce, was reflected in the dramatic drop in the amount of dutiable goods imported 
from the principal trading partner, the Free State in 1898:IS 
5.4: Value (in pounds) of dutiable goods imported from the Free State: 1895-98 
120000 
100000 
80000 
CD 
.2 60000 
til 
> 40000 
20000 
a -- -_ ..... -.. -·-----·T·-·-· .. - ... --... ----.-.-. 
Years (ending 30 June) 
[J 1895 
~ • 1897 
Ii 1896 
E! 1898 
J 
i • 
14Ibid., S3/2S/1I12, S3/25/1/13, S312511114, S3125/1115, S3125/1/16, S3/25/1I17, annual 
reports, 1894, 1895, 1890., 1897, 1898 and 189.9, respectively. 
l~.N.A., S3125/1I13, S3/25/1I14, S3/25/1/15 and S3/25/1/16, annual reports, 1895, 1896, 
1897 and 1898, respectively. 
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The closing year of the century opened with no promise of better times. The drought of 
the previous year continued unbroken throughout 1899, the southern districts suffering 
the most. Observers described the drought in southern Basutoland as "deplorable", with 
crops "entirely burnt Up".16 Only Leribe and Berea could supply the less fortunate parts 
of the country with grain. By September 1898, two months into the ploughing season, no 
rain had arrived and the situation was "getting more serious everyday". 17 
BaSotho suffered the impact of these calamities in 1899 when, to the shortage of draught 
animals was added the disastrous consequences of three successive poor harvests. The 
wheat crop, from which BaSotho earned their cash, collapsed, and many people lost 
even their seed reserve. In February 1899, a correspondent of a Free State paper was 
reporting "a rather unusual occurrence" taking place in Maseru, the colonial capital 
"Large quantities of wheat", it stated, "(had) been sold to Maseru traders by Dutch 
fanners, an incident almost unheard of up to the present".18 So threatening were the 
prospects of the following year that both the imperial government and the Chamber of 
Commerce intervened to shore up the ailing rural economy. They distributed between 
5,000 and 6,000 bags of wheat seed on loan 19 
The overall decline in the value of dutiable goods imported reflected tilt shortage of cash 
as the following chart shoWS:20I : 
16priend, 28 February 1899. 
17Ibig, 16 September 1898 
IBrbid., 28 February 1899. 
J 
1'Thid.,25 November 1899, speech of chairman, Chamber of Commerce, annual meeting, 
1898. 
20 Ibid., S3/2511112, S3/2511113, S3/2511114, S3/2511115,- S3/2511116, S3/2511117, annual 
reports, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1897, 1898 and 1899, respectively. 
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5.5: Value (in pound Sterling) of dutiable goods imported: 1894-1899 
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As elsewhere in southern Africa, the BaSotho suffered the same effects of the 
consequent dramatic escalation in the price of goods. The price of every commodity rose 
of surviving cattle, of sheep, goats and fowls, of all animal products,including milk and 
meat, and of all produce. Transport rates trebled, milk disappeared and moat became 
very scarce and dear. A sheep that.used to cost 5/- now fetched £1.21 Slaughter cattle 
themselves rose in value, from £2.6s in March 1897, to £7-9 in Basutoland22 and £15 in 
Johannesburg by October 1897?3 Free State farmers exploited the current escalation of 
2lFriend, 17 January 1899. 
uLN.A., S3/1/5/8/S; assistant commissioner, Mafeteng, to government secretary, 18 
September 1897. 
23Star, 7 October 1897,.: 6. 
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prices. They sold calves to the BaSotho at £15 per head.24 Prices of agricultural produce 
also rose steeply:25 
5.6: Comparison of produce prices, 1897 and 1898 
PRODUCT 1897 1898 
Cattle £2.10 £6.10 
Wheat 15s 35s 
Mealies 6s 20s 
Sorghum 8s 20s 
In March 1899, a Maseru trader advertised a sale of livestock at his shop to alleviate 
the effects of the high ruling prices. His sale prices, however, did little to assuage 
• 26 prospectIve customers: 
5.7: Sale Prices, 1899 
LIVESTOCK SALE PRICE 
Oxen £9.10 
Cows and Calves £8 - £8.15 
Slaughter cows £6.10 - £7.10 \ 
Hammers 15s -18s ,I 
Ewes lOs -12s 
A serious dearth prevailed.27 In September 1898 a Free State newspaper was observing 
that "Basotho [were] on the verge of starvation". The grim hunger, the report continued, 
24Diamond Field Advertiser, 12 November 1898, 14. 
2SL.N. A. , S3/25/1/14 and S3/25/1/15, annual reports, reports for Comet Spruit, 30 June 
1897 and Mohaleshoek,lune 1898; also Friend, 17 January 1899, "Basutoland Retrospect". 
26prieng, 21 March 1899. 
27Ibid., 21 March 1899;.. 
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was driving many BaSotho into the sheep kraals of white fanners in the Free State.28 
Others were said to be relieving hunger by "greedily devouring emaciated carcasses of 
dead horses". 29 Still, others were subsisting on roots and herbs. 30 
The paramount chief himself was gomg through difficulties. Unlike his more 
disadvantaged subjects, however, he could use his position to secure an advance 
payment ofhis allowance from the government.31 His problems increased when he had 
to take responsibility for burying many family members who died in 1897 and 1898, and 
to support their widows and offspring. His aunt, Senate, died in June 1897, followed in 
uncanny succession by the death of his late father's chief counsellor, Ramabilikoe, in 
June 1898, his brother, Bereng, in December 1898, and uncle, chief Mopeli.32 His 
resources strained to the limit, Lerotholi had to petition the resident commissioner to 
help him buy coffins to bury Bereng and Mopeli. 
The rinderpest entirely ruined chief Bereng. He had resolutely opposed inoculation, and 
his people suffered the same fate as they could not oppose their chief and have their 
cattle treated. When Bereng died in December 1898, his brother, the paramount chief, 
had to mobilise a sethaba-thaba (a national contribution campaign) both to meet his 
debts and to support his family.33 The nation had to suspend the custofl of mourning for 
a week as it could not afford to observe such rituals during such bad times.34 I 
~bid., 30 September 1898. 
2'1bid., 21 October 1898. 
~.N.A., S5/17, resident commissioner to high commissioner, 30 November 1898. 
31Ibid., S7/3114, paramount chief to resident commissioner, 30 November 1897. 
32Ibid.; also S4/1 resident commissioner's diaries, entries for 12 June 1897, 16 June 1898. 
33Ibid., S7/3/14, paramount chief to resident commissioner, 8 and 10 December 1898; Ibid., 
S411, resident commissioner's diaries, entries for 7 and 10 December 1898 
34Friend, 16 December 1898. 
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Still worse was the situation in Berea, which endured the worst brunt of the panzootic. 
Chief Masupha, thanks to his resolute opposition to inoculation, was ruined. In May 
1898, he was asking that payment of the hut tax be postponed while his young men went 
to the labour centres to raise cash. This was the first time the entire hut-tax depended on 
wages earned at labour centres. In time this practice would persist. It involved labour 
agents paying BaSotho labour in advance, to secure the payment of the hut-tax. The 
main condition was for the chief to supply the mines with a specific number of labourers 
while mine management paid the full hut-tax. The practice undermined the struggles of 
migrants to maintain control of their labour.35 Impoverished by the almost entire 
decimation of his cattle weahh, Masupha was unable to sustain his final resistance in 
December 1898. He paid the fine of two hundred head of cattle, imposed for his part in 
the "rebellion", in sheep, goats, horses and money, as he had no cattle left. He died an 
impoverished and broken man in July 1899, leaving his people on the verge of 
starvation. 36 
The combined effect of rinderpest and drought brought on outbieaks of human disease. 
The most common diseases related to hunger, starvation, loss of resistance, and attempts 
to ward off hunger. A common disease was famine oedema. Its unmistakable symptom 
was swollen limbs, a common condition in times of food shortag~ 37 Other diseases 
included diarrhoea, dysentery, measles, meningitis, pneumonia, scurvy, }Smallpox, 
typhoid and venereal disease. 38 The.outbreak of some of these diseases was a result of 
3sr..N.A.., S4/1, resident commissioner's diaries, entries for 21 May and 12 December 1898. 
36prieng, 4 August 1899; L.N.A., S3/2511117, annual reports, 1899. 
37 A. Keys et al., The Biology of Human Starvation, 2 vols. (Mineapolis, 1950), ii, "The Edema 
Problem". 
38F or outbreaks of these diseases in situations of food shortage, see, among others, A. Berry, 
Famine Food and the Process of Adaptation to Extreme Food Shortages (Brighton, 1979); for 
widespread outbreaks of these diseases in other regions in South Africa during this period and for 
the same reasons, see B.B.N.A., G.42-'98, summaries of reports, 4, 7, reports for East London, 
23, Komgha, 43, chief magistrate of Griqualand East, 121, Matatiele, 133, Urnzimkhulu, 136, 
Mount Ayliff, 139. 
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the loss of resistance to infection owing to malnutrition; that of others, however, was 
directly related to the very strategies to stave off hunger and destitution. Diarrhoea and 
dysentery were due to eating badly prepared meat from cattle that had died of the 
rinderpest, drinking water polluted by germs from carcasses of rinderpest-infected cattle, 
and subsisting on wild and other famine foods 
The more vulnerable members of the community - babies, weaned children, women, the 
very old and the disabled - were the most severely affected. 39 These sections of the 
community hovered between life and death. Of course the fate of babies depended on, 
and reflected, the state of health of their mothers. Without enough food to feed them, 
mothers would not have enough milk for their babies. The weaned children, however, 
suffered the most as they depended entirely on cow's mille This essential item of their 
diet had now disappeared. The crisis was.- so severe that the spouse of the Anglican 
missionary at Mohaleshoek was forced to leave the country ''to bring our little son to 
England, it being quite impossible to obtain fresh milk and food suitable for a young 
cbild".40 Children who were not so lucky contracted diarrhoea, dysentery, pulmonary 
disorders, smallpox and famine oedema. 41 
The very old, like the children, became vulnerable to diseases peculiar to decline in 
\ 
nutritional status, leading to loss of resistance to infection. Among the aged, pulmonary 
,I 
diseases, especially influenza, be~e common and fatal. Conditions were ripe for 
human epidemics to proliferate. Most threatening was the exposure of humans to 
39p or studies of how famine and food shortages reveal patterns of distribution within the 
family and the degree to which such crises affect family solidarity, see, among others, D.B. 
Jelliffe and P. Jelliffe, "The Effects of Starvation on the Functions ofthe Family and of Society", 
in G. Blix, Y. Hofvander, Bo Valghist (eds), Famine: A Symposium Dealing with Nutrition and 
Relief Operations in Times of Disaster (Stockholm, 1971; DJ. Campbell and D.D. Treanter, 
"Strategies for Coping with Food Consumption Shortages in the Mandara Mountain Region of 
North Cameroon", Social Science and Medicine, xvi (1982),2117-27. 
~etter of Mrs. Reading, Bloemfontein Mission Quarterly, 25 October 1897, 48. 
41"The Rinderpest", bid., 148-150; Report of the annual missionary conference of the Paris 
Evangelical Missional')' S_ociety, in Christian Express, xxviii, no. 336, 1 June 1898, 85-87. 
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infection from decaying carcasses strewn over the countryside, in riverbeds, pools, 
streams and water pits. Travellers to the country were reporting that "the whole country 
is but a charnel-house (sic) of dead rinderpest oxen".42 The odour was unbearable. 
Travelling through the countryside, Dieterlen described how they had to ''plug [their] 
nostrils and tried hard to hold our horses which were reluctant to wane" past decaying 
carcasses.43 His wife found that "air infected by this disgusting smell of these carcasses, 
decomposing in the sun" made it impossible for one to breathe "since the air [is] 
ponuted".44 
BUrying these carcasses or disposing of them in other ways was a mammoth task. Often, 
dead cattle had to wait long until they could be buried.45 It was difficuh to enforce the 
proclamation requiring owners of cattle to dispose of their cattle's carcasses. The few 
police officers in the country were unequalto the task of enforcing such a proclamation. 
Besides, the entire police force was engaged with high priority work related to 
inoculation and attempting to stop the disease spreading. Left to themselves, owners of 
dead cattle perceived no advantage in burying the carcasses - they preferred leaving 
them to the vuhures. Those who wished to bury the carcasses soon proved unequal to 
such a task, as herds died too fu.st for burial. The sight of such numerous carcasses, 
strewn all over the countryside, was gruesome, and shocked would-be-undertakers, 
1 
especially bereaved owners of dead cattle. 
I 
The task of burial was arduous, and required large teams of labour. People had to dig the 
graves to the required depth through ground hardened by long periods of drought. They 
also had to carry the carcasses away from where they lay, often near water sources, to 
avoid polluting water supplies. Attempts to have the chiefs mobilise communal labour to 
42Frieng, 1 October 1897. 
4).etter of Rev. Dieterlen, 15 July 1897, Journal des Missions, 1897,597. 
44Ibid, "Lesotho: Rinderpest and its Consequences", 667. 
45Ibid. 
,. 
,. 
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undertake the task were only temporarily successful. Colonial erOSIon of chiefly 
authority undermined this effort of efficacy, especially during a crisis that led to the 
progressive breakdown of community support. 
5.8: The burial of a herd of cattle that have been shnt 
(Courtesy of Onderstepoort Veterinary Library) 
5.9: The burial of a herd of cattle that have died of rinderpest 
(Courtesy of Onderstepoort Veterinary Library) 
I 
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The process of burying the carcasses was itself intricate. Each carcass had to be buried in 
quicklime, in a grave dug at least three feet deep. The grave was to be prepared at a spot 
which did not drain into a neighbouring watercourse to avoid seepage of germs into the 
water supply. It also had to be fenced, or enclosed by other means, to isolate it from 
healthy animals grazing nearby. The task of burning the carcasses could best be achieved 
by letting them decompose and dry, during which period they had to be quarantined, or 
covered in some manner. 
Even these elaborate procedures were not secure enough. It was found that burying 
carcasses at this depth and spreading coal ash and carbolic acid over the grave still 
spread the disease to animals grazing over and near the grave. Consequently, the 
government passed a regulation to increase the depth to six feet, or, preferably, to burn 
the carcasses.46 
Even when carcasses were eventually disposed of in some way, humans were still 
exposed to infection. This occurred through feeding on infected and decaying meat; it 
could also happen through the pollution of water sources by germs seeping from the 
graves of dead cattle. Both drought and heavy rains compounded an already volatile 
situation. Scarcity of water during the drought increased the concentration of bacteria. , 
Conversely heavy rains washed pollutants into sources of water supply. 
.I 
The condition of the aged and disabled hardly emerges from the sources. This fact, itself: 
should confirm Sen's theory of "entitlement", displaying social inequalities revealed by 
the crisis and revealing the class basis of suffering in it. According to this theory, the 
vulnerability of particular social groups to famine will depend on their degree of access 
to and control over vital food resources, or on their "entitlement". "Entitlement" is 
defined as "the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a 
society using the tota1i!y of rights and opportunities that he or she faces". An individual's 
46G.82-'96, Vryburg Rinderpest Conference, speech ofT.J. Krogh, Transvaal delegate, 20. 
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"exchange entitlement" will vary according to his or her occupation and place in the 
network of social, economic and legal (we should add, family) relationships. 47 At the 
micro-level of the family, the food shortage unleashed by the rinderpest must have 
revealed patterns of distribution within the family and the degree to which the crisis 
affected family solidarity.48 
In normal times, access to resources varied according to the prevalent ownership 
structure of society and position of each class, gender, and generation, even individual, 
to it. Periods of critical food shortages exacerbated this pattern, at worst, and reflected it, 
at best. In ''the struggle for scanty food", 49 the aged and the infirm would have been the 
sections of the community, or members of the family, more likely to receive less 
nutritious foods. Moreover, the old and infirm might have been abandoned as the able-
bodied people went in search of food. The severe shortages of 1897, 1898 and 1899 
caused significant human movements. "At Letsie's I found that many people had 
removed", observed Lerotholi, ''the same at Mojela's only ruins are visible, just as I kept 
informing you when they were scattering through hunger',.5o Missionaries also 
confirmed this pattern. They complained that ''the great scarcity of food in the country 
47AK. Sen, Poverty and Famine: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford, 1981); 
Sen, "The Battle to get Food", New Society, 13 October, 1983; for a suc~sful use of Sen's 
theory of "entitlement", see, among others, P. Greenough, Prosperity and Misery in Modern 
Bengal: The Famine of 1943-44 (Oxford, 1982); AK. Sen, "Starvation andJ Exchange 
Entitlement: A General Approach and Its Applications to the Great Bengal Famine", 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1 (1977), 33-59; L.A Tilly, "Food Entitlement, Famine 
and Conflict", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, xiv (1983), 333-349; W.L. Torry, 
"Anthropological Perspectives on Climate Change", in R.S. Chen, E. Boulding, and S.H. 
Schneider (eds.), Social science Research and Climate Change: An Interdisciplinary Appraisal 
(Boston, 1983), 77-114; For the application of the same theory, albeit critically, on an african 
case, see M. Vaughan, "Famine and Family Relations: 1949 in Nyasaland", Past and Present, 
108 (1985),177-205. 
48Jelliffe & Jelliffe, "The Effects of Starvation on the Functions of the Family and of 
Society; Campbell & Treanter, "Strategies for Coping with Food Consumption Shortages in 
the Mandara Mountain Region of North Cameroon", 2117-27. 
49 Sen, "The Battle to get food". 
5~.N.A, S7/3/14, paramount chiefto resident commissioner, 18. March 1899. 
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has resuhed in a general scattering of our people, who have been compelled to go away 
to work for money".51 Old age and infirmity weakened the ability of the aged and infirm 
to engage in strategies of survival. Among the aged, pulmonary diseases, especially 
influenza, became common and often fatal. 52 
The historical evidence is typically thin on the experiences of women, not only as wives, 
but also in their various economic, familial and social roles in this crisis. This lacuna in 
the contemporary evidence is perplexing, given the universal astonishment previously 
professed by Europeans at the sight of African women working in the fields. Always 
bastions of rural production even when circumstances were normal; they must have 
borne the greater burden of the muhifarious strategies for surviving this crisis. Without 
the cattle that had been responsible for bringing male labour more abundantly into 
agricuhural production originally, the demand for the labour of women must have 
peaked in the aftermath of the rinderpest. 
The ability of the BaSotho to continue agricultural production without draught animals 
evinced the enhanced role offemale labour in strategies adopted to cushion the impact of 
the rinderpest. They achieved this mainly by cultivating their fields with the traditional 
hoe, the tool of production that was most effective in female hands. Females had used it 
\ 
before the introduction ofthe ox-drawn plough, thus acquiring proficiency in wielding it. 
I 
Women already dominated agricultural labour, and the rinderpest merely helped to re-
entrench women's labour in cuhivation "The method they adopt is a primitive one", 
commented an observers "the whole stad, men, women and children, turn out armed 
with picks, and, standing in a long line, they, to the tune of a swinging Basotho air, till 
the ground".53 
5Iu.S.p.G. annual reports, vol. 2. 1898. 
52FrienQ, 8 July 1897. 
53prienQ, 16 November 1897,. 3. 
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As men sought to restock their kraals by migrating to labour centres, they left women 
wholly responsible for the production of grains and for homesteads generally. No 
evidence was found suggesting that the rinderpest crisis forced women to join their male 
counterparts as migrants. 54 Thus, females remained at home, enduring the full strain of 
the resuhant distress and bearing the greater onus of rural recovery. 
There is hardly any evidence on how women, especially those without male support - the 
unmarried, widowed, disabled, discarded, among them - coped with the distress resuhing 
from the murrain. They would certainly have fared worse. They had inferior 
"entitlement" to the available food and its production in this male dominated society. 
They were also restricted by ideological mechanisms of control and regulation. Their 
restricted mobility and socialised docility would also have precluded women from 
engaging in more daring strategies available to their male counterparts. 55 Males could 
engage in migrancy as a strategy of survival in these critical times. They could also 
54For scattered evidence of this occurring elsewhere in the region, see, e.g. B.B.N.A., G.31-
'99, reports for Herbert, 27, Taung, 65. This, however, seems to have occurred in those areas 
where females already participated in migrancy, especially among the Southern Tswana 
communities. See, e.g., C.M. Cockerton, "Less a Barrier, More a Line: The Migration of 
Bechuanaland Women in South Africa: 1850-1930", Journal of Historical Geography, 22, 3 
(1996), 291-307. 
, 
55That gender relations, especially within the family, are essentially power relations is now an 
established perspective in the abundant literature on gender relations, see e.g. M. W. O!imond and 
B. Thorme, "Ferminist Theories: The Social Construction of Gender in Families and Society", in 
P.G. Boss et a1. (eds.), Source Book of Family Theories and Methods: A Contextual Approach 
(New York, 1993),591-623; on power contestations between the genders see generally, among 
others, R.G. Parker and J.H. Gagmon (eds.), Conceiving Sexuality: Approaches to Sex Research 
in a Post Modern World (New York, 1995); P. Harvey and P. Gow, Sex and Violence: Issues in 
Rq>resentation and Experience (New York, 1994); for Africa, see, among others, T. Barnes, 
"The Fight for Control of African Women's Mobility in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1900-1939", IDw, 
17 (1992), 586-608; M. Chanock, Law. Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in 
Malawi and Zambia (Cambridge, 1985); M. Lovett, " "She thinks she's like a Man": Marriage 
and [De]Constructing Gender Identity in Colonial Buha, Western Tanzania, 1943-1960", 
Canadian Journal of African Studies, 30, i (1996), 52-68; E. Schmidt, ''Negotiated Spaces and 
Contested Terrain: Men, Women, and the Law in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1890-1939", Journal of 
Southern African Studies-, 16, iv (1990), 622-48; for gender differences in access to means of 
production, see, among others, F. Mackenzie, "Gender and _Land Rights in Murang'a District, 
Kenya", Journal of Peasant Studies, 13, 4 (1990), 609-43; N. Kabeer, "Gender Dimensions of 
Rural Poverty: Analysis from Bangladesh", 18,2 (1991), 241-62. 
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escape the prevailing rural crisis even if temporarily, owing to their greater mobility. 
They could stay at their work places, where, although not resplendent by any means, the 
food was at least available. 
The South African War, breaking out in October 1899, compounded the BaSotho food 
crisis. Its effects were ambiguous. It did offer the BaSotho a temporary opportunity to 
cushion the immediate hardships of the rinderpest and the accompanying drought, which 
they astutely exploited. 56 Besides wartime demand for, and inflated prices for, produce 
and livestock, the war created an insatiable labour market for military workers at inflated 
wages. BaSotho could thus acquire cash to recoup some of their losses and to display a 
facade of relative prosperity. 57 
When they could not acquire enough stock by honest means, BaSotho exploited the 
confusion of war by raiding across the border, returning with teams of boer cattle. They 
argued that "they were stealing from those in rebellion against the Queen". 58 Assistant 
commissioners reported extensive raids into border regions, asserting that cattle were 
being "stolen right and left from across the border',.59 Boer fiumers inundated imperial 
officials in the country with many affidavits making claims for stolen stock at the end of 
the war.60 
I 
Many Free State farmers, fearing requisitioning by the British military, had negotiated 
with friendly BaSotho chiefs to keep their cattle during the war. Much of this stock did 
56por a general discussion of the experiences of Africans in the War, see especially P. 
Warwick, Black People and the South African War, 1899-1902 (London, 1983). 
57L.N.A., S3/2, papers on Basutoland and the Anglo-Boer War. 
58e.g., The Journal, 25 January 1900. 
5ge.g. L.N.A., S3/25/1/17, annual reports, 1900, report of assistant commissioner, Leribe. 
~bid., S3/2/6/1, "papers with reference to complaints of Ficksburg farmers as to stock 
"stolen" from them being in possession ofLeribe natives". 
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not return to owners after the cessation of hostilities. This was because the offending 
chiefs were loath to reveal their treacherous dealings with the British enemy during the 
war. Desperate for cattle after the rinderpest catastrophe, many BaSotho who had boer 
cattle in their safekeeping claimed that the stock had since died, and compensated the 
owners with horseS.61 
The war, however, caused commercial and productive insecurity and disruption. It 
closed the market for BaSotho produce. The military commandeering of available 
wagons disrupted trade and the marketing ofBaSotho grain. By 1901, thousands of bags 
of grain were unsold awaiting transport.62 The high military need for animal transport 
inflated the price of livestock, especially oxen and horses. Thus, merchants were 
reluctant to purchase grain when the trade in livestock offered them such lucrative 
rewards. 
Many BaSotho sold their remaining stock to a buoyant market, setting back further the 
long-term regeneration of their herds. Others acquired cattle through bartering horses 
and small stock and through raiding boer cattle. These frantic efforts to restock, 
however, introduced equine and bovine diseases. This series of stock disasters opened 
yet another chapter in the continuing story of escalating rural deterioration in the 
\ 
twentieth century. A panzootic of rinderpest returned towards the end of hostilities. It 
I 
appeared in Maseru in May 1901 and then spread throughout the country by September, 
killing an estimated 1 ,500 cattle~63 It also accompanied a virulent form of 
pleuropneumonia that resulted from the reckless movement of stock during the war. To 
62L.N.A., S3/25/1/18, ~nnual report, 1901. 
63Ibid., S3/1/4/6, "Rinderpest Outbreak in Basutoland, 1901 "; also Ibid.: S3/1/5/8, 
miscellaneous rinderpest papers. 
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complete the pattern of the onslaught on livestock, scab and glanders broke out among 
horses, killing about 1,000 animals.64 
The influx of European and African refugees from the war into the country also stretched 
resources. At the end of the war, estimates put the number of African and loyal 
Afrikaner refugees in the country at 12,000 and 2,000 respectively.65 In September 1900 
"nearly all English residents in Ladybrand [were] in refuge in Maseru, British residents 
ofWepener [were] at Mafeteng, British residents from Ficksburg [were] seeking refuge 
at Hlotse" in BasutoJand.66 These refugees brought their stock with them Those who 
remained in the Free State still sent their stock to BasutoJand for safekeeping. Free State 
boers, too, in their bid to evade requisitioning by the British army, sent their stock across 
the border into BasutoJand, placing them under BaSotho custody. Besides spreading 
equine and bovine disease, this unregulatedJnflux of livestock caused extensive damage 
to pasture and cultivated Jand. It also led to acute overstocking.67 
The cessation of hostilities in mid-I902 ended the period of relative economic buoyancy 
and ushered in the post-war recession. The prices of produce plummeted while those of 
consumer goods soared.68 In part, the deflation in the price of grain followed a glut of the 
market. Tons of accumulated grain that could not be marketed during the war were now 
~ 
sold.69 Thus, the significant rise in the volume of grain exported from BasutoJand in 
I 
1902 and 1903 did not reflect any newly found prosperity. It represented the marketing 
64C.O., 41711328, Milner to Chamberlain, 1 June 1902; also L.N.A., S5122, report of A. 
Theiler and G. Turner. 
6~.N.A., S3/21211, return of refugees and stock, 1901-02. 
66c.O., 879170, Lagden to Milner, 9 September 1900, in Milner to Chamberlain, 12 
September 1900. 
67L.N.A., S312511118, annual report, 1901. 
68Ibid., S3/2511119, ann~l report, 1902. 
6'Thid., S312511118, annual report, 1901; The Journal, 9 October 1900. 
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of accumulated stocks. After the war, convoys of wagons were arranged to transport the 
accumulated grain. Basutoland became the main supplier of grain to the defeated boer 
farmers after the war. The significant drop in the overall volume of exports in 1904 
showed that the wartime boom was a temporary relief. 
The success or failure of coping strategies was critical to the impact of these ecological 
and pestilential traumas. As many evaluations of past famines have convincingly shown, 
coping mechanisms are the key to preventing a food shortage from deteriorating into 
famine.7o As we have seen, these strategies had weakened as the century ended.71 The 
resuh was the loss of "environmental control",72 an ability to manipulate the 
environment to deal with recurrent ecological threats. 
The very vulnerability of the country to,..a disease of Central Asian origin, and the 
rapidity with which it reached the country, testifies to the extent of Basutoland's 
integration into the wider regional, even world, economy. Restriction imposed on trade-
dislocated trade and commerce, as we have seen. 
7OSee, especially, J.H. Ausubel and A.K. Biswas (eels.), Climatic Constraints and Human 
Activity (Oxford, 1980); W. Dando, The Geography of Famine (London, 1980); R. Garcia, 
Drought and Man (London, 1981); P. Minnis, Social Adaptation to Food Stress: A Prehistoric 
Southwestern Example (Chicago, 1985); J.R.K. Robson (ed.), Famine: Its Causes, Effects and 
Management (London, 1981); P. Timmerman, Vulnerability, Resilience and the Collapse of 
Societies: A Review of Models and Possible Applications (Toronto, 1981), 17-36; G.J. Van 
Apeldoorn, Perspectives on Drought and Famine in Nigeria (London, 1981); P. Webb & J. 
Von Braun, Famine and Food Security in Ethiopia: Lessons for Africa (New York, 1994); 
T.M. Wrigley, M.J. Ingram, and F. Farmer (eds.), Climate and History: Studies in Past 
Climates and their Impact on Man (Cambridge, 1981). 
71 See 69-79 above. 
72J. Giblin, The Politics of Environmental Control in Northeast Tanzania, 1840-1940 
(philadelphia, 1992) 8-10; also J. Giblin, "The Precolonial Politics of Disease Con~ol", in G. 
Maddox, J. Giblin and LN. Kimambo (eels.), Custodians of the Land" Ecology andCulture in 
the History of Tanzania (London, 1996). 
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The rinderpest also exposed and exacerbated the weaknesses of BaSotho's coping 
mechanisms. Although they had reaped an abundant harvest in 1895, BaSotho had 
exhausted their reserves when the long drought began in 1896 and when the panzootic 
struck early 1897. They thus struggled to tide over the combined effects of rinderpest 
and the accompanying drought. They had had to sell most of their surpluses to meet their 
tax obligations and to purchase consumer goods. Those surpluses had been sold at the 
deflated price of 4/6 per muid because the large harvest had glutted the market. In the 
following lean year, as the drought took its toll, the price of a muid of mealies had 
escalated to 17/6.73 Wrthout cash, people were now forced typically to arrange for credit; 
thus entangling themselves in a web of indebtedness just as their herds began to die of 
the rinderpest. A typical example was one Lepapa who said he "[had] no food and wants 
me to let him some 22 bags of kaffir com He has three wives and a numerous family 
who he says have nothing to eat. He did"not plough as he had lost all his oxen from 
rinderpest prior to the ploughing season". 74 
Those still with some cattle sold them to purchase grain, thus reducing their productive 
capacity both during and after the crisis. Many tried to benefit from the unprecedented 
inflation in the price of cattle and cattle products and sold their surviving cattle at the 
high prices then ruling. The rise in the quantity of cattle exported wr not dramatic. It 
was, however, unprecedented especially when considering that owners would }lave sold 
most of their cattle internally to local traders in exchange for grain. Thus, cattle sales 
rose from £942 in 1897, to £3,958 in 1898, to £14,091 in 1899.75 The paramount chief 
himself revealed that he was participating in this risky strategy of survival. Pleading with 
the resident commissioner for an advance payment of his annual allowance, he stated 
that he needed the money "to buy myself some calves from people who are selling 
73See, e.g., L.N.A., S3/25/1/12 and S3/25/1113, reports for Mafeteng, 1894-5 and 1895-6. 
74Ibid., LlIll7, Charl~Steven (trader in Ficksburg) to assistant commissioner, Leribe, 27 
April 1898. 
75Ibid., S3/25/1/14, S3/25/1115, S3/25/1116, annual reports, 1897,1898 and 1899. 
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calves who are preparing themselves for the pound hut-true All my cattle have died. 
What remained I exchanged for grain".76 
Selling livestock, or using it as security, was a great risk, especially during a meagre 
grain harvest. As the nwnber of sellers of livestock increased, the price of livestock 
collapsed. Given that the price of grains rose dramatically during a time of scarcity, the 
exchange rate of livestock to grairis would usually have worked against the livestock 
seller. 77 
The persisting thin margin in the value of imports against that of exports even during 
these critical years reveals the extent of commercialisation and its effects in increasing 
the vulnerability ofBaSotho households: 78 
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5.10: Comparison of value (in Pound Sterling) of dutiable goods imported and 
agricultural produce exported: 1894-1899 
7'bid., S713114, paramount chief to resident commissioner, 30 November 1897. 
77These consequences seem widespread, see, e.g. M. Jameson, "Famines in the Greek 
World", in P. Garnsey~nd C.R. Whittaker (eds), Trade and Famine in Classical Antiquity 
(Cambridge, 1983); Van Apeldoorn, Perspectives, 45, 69; T.D. Hankins, "Responses to 
- ' Drought in Sukumaland, Tanzania, in G.F. White (ed.), Natural Hazards: Local, National, 
Global (Oxford, 1974),98-104. 
78Ibid., S3/2511112, S3/251l113, S3/25/1114, S3/2511115, S3/251l1l6, S3/251l1l7, annual 
reports, 1894, 1895,1896,1897, 1898 and 1899, respectively. 
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The BaSotho did attempt, albeit feebly, to control the fruits of their labour amid the 
shortages of these critical years. In 1897, for example, they "held on to their mealies" 
temporarily, telling local traders that they might ''require [their] mealies [them] selves". 
At the height of the scarcity of 1899, the paramount chiet: with the support of other 
chiefs, ordered a temporary boycott of shops, prohibiting any sale of grain and purchase 
of European merchandise from the traders. 79 
Relentless claims made by the colonial state on what was left of BaSotho grain, or the 
meagre cash they did earn from its sale, further undermined capacity to cope with the 
crisis. Amid general scarcity, BaSotho were still required to pay the hut-tax. In the 
critical year 1898, the revenue, mostly comprising the hut-tax, exceeded that of any 
previous year. All assistant commissioners, barring Berea, reported themselves satisfied 
with the ability of BaSotho to pay the hw:-tax even amid adversities.8o The resident 
commissioner, who, with the high commissioner, had been considering doubling the hut-
tax, was exhilarated. ''It is satisfactory", he enthused in his letter to the high 
commissioner, ''to :find that in spite of these calamities, the revenue collected exceeded 
that of any previous year".81 
This apparent ability ofBaSotho to meet their obligations amid disaster emboldened the 
~ 
colonial state to increase its demands farther. It now decided to double the hut-tax. 82 
I 
Encouraged by Lagden that BaSotho could well afford the increased hut-tax, the high 
commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner visited the country in May 1898. His purpose was to 
make an on-the-spot evaluation of whether BaSotho were self-reliant and able to pay an 
~bid., S6/5, paramount chief to resident commissioner, 11 June 1899. 
son,id., S3/25/1/15, annual reports, reports from districts. 
8IC.O. 417/248, Milner to Chamberlain, 20 June 1898, enclosing resident commissioner to 
high commissioner, 11 June 1898; also, L.N.A., S3/25/1/15, annual report, 1898. 
82Ibid., Milner to Chamberlain, 20 September 1898 
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increased tax.83 Throughout his extensive tour of the cOlmtry, Milner admitted travelling 
through countryside denuded of cattle and torched by drought. Yet, he expressed himself 
satisfied with the state of the BaSotho economy. He claimed that "the people themselves 
showed no signs of want whatsoever". He also regarded the decimation of cattle as 
''perhaps rather an apparent than a real calamity as the country was much 
overstocked".84 Remarkably, Milner was so contented with the general economic 
outlook that he was able to announce his intention to double the hut-tax. He strongly 
urged the Colonial Office to make a final decision on the proposal, arguing that BaSotho 
could pay a doubled tax. 85 
Nor would the BaSotho themselves contradict Milner's conclusions at the next pitso 
when they discussed his announcement to double the hut-tax. Speakers did show 
disbelief at the announcement. We kno'Y, however, that colonial functionaries had 
coached influential speakers to support the fait accompli. Milner had conspired for a 
consensus. He suggested to Lagden that it would be ''politic to let these arguments come, 
as far as possible, from native speakers": 
Native speakers, who need not be reported, can say, and think will say, if 
you give them the tip: look here, Basutho, let us be independent of the 
Cape. We want to manage our own affairs with the Queen's govt. alone 
over us. But if the Cape govt. keeps on having to pay for us, it will want 
to govern us. 86 ~ 
Colonial officials had also prodded some chiefs to support the decision. ''1 think you 
should try and coach the friendly chiefs", Milner suggested, "and more especially, I 
83Bodlean Library, Oxford, Milner Papers, Ms. Milner 220. 
84c.O. 417/248, A. Milner, "Notes on Journey to Berea and Leribe", in Milner to 
Chamberlain, 25 May 1898. 
81.bid., 417/228, Milnerto Chamberlain, 25 May 1898. 
~ilner Papers, Ms. Milner dept. 221, Milner to Lagden, 2 October 1898. 
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think you should have a good ta1k with Jonathan. Flatter him about his great power and 
his loyahy".87 
A careful examination of the minutes of the pitso confirms that this conspIracy 
succeeded. Speakers did Milner's bidding. The paramount chief set the tone, declaring 
that the matter of doubling the hut-tax was not for further discussion, as it was an order 
of the high commissioner. He assured the assembled delegates that he had succeeded in 
persuading the high commissioner to defer the increase till the next year, because of the 
prevailing scarcity of food. His son and heir, Letsie, followed. He proclaimed that he 
could not oppose the decision as the hut-tax was "our sleep and we sit under the shadow 
of it". He urged the pitso to obey the order as "our fathers have the right to make us do 
what they please". Thomas Set1aka, never a partisan of the chiefs, now proclaimed that 
the common people had no right to speak-as ''the chiefs have already prayed about the 
hut-tax". 88 
Out of eighty-three chiefs, headmen, counsellors and "several thousand people" who 
attended the pitso, only seventeen spoke. Of these, only eight expressed discontent. The 
fact that chiefs were the first to speak was itself against established protocol, and it 
deterred candid criticism. As chief Maa.ma reproached: \ 
87Ibid. 
This is not according to custom. Why I say this is because the resid()l11: 
commissioner speaks first, then our elder brothers, then the people. Will 
it not appear as if the people 'after the chiefs have spoken, are speaking 
against the law? Why chief do you speak first? We are afraid to speak 
after you. 89 
~.N.A., Sl113, speeGhes of Lerotholi, Letsienyana and Thomas Setlaka, pitso of 27 
October 1898. 
~id., speech of chief Maama. 
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Thus, the pitso ended without allowing delegates to discuss the full extent of the nation's 
distress. Subsequent public pressure on the paramount chief, however, spurred him to 
urge imperial officials to see sense. The country, he pleaded, was going through a critical 
food shortage; cattle were dead and those who possessed smaller stock had sold them all 
to purchase grain; it was "quite plain that some people will die". In November he met the 
resident commissioner and earnestly repeated the bleak situation. People were eating 
herbs and had no milk as the cattle were dead. He was certain that some people would be 
dying of starvation unless offered relief as no stock remained.90 Accordingly, the 
imperial administration deferred doubling the hut-tax to 1899. As Lagden was astute 
enough to know, ''raising the tax on an impoverished people would prejudice the case for 
ever". 9 I 
Other factors combined to undermine the capacity to cope with the crisis. Colonial 
incorporation and circumscription of the country within colonial boundaries enhanced 
colonial control of human movements. The requirement to obtain a pass to move across 
boundaries restricted exploitation of the extensive network of commercial and reciprocal 
contacts throughout the region that the BaSotho state had constructed over the decades. 92 
It thus undermined a major coping mechanism of exploiting interregional exchange and 
symbiotic relations across microenvironments to cushion the effects, of localised food 
shortages. I 
The ubiquitous suspicion that the BaSotho were the main conspirators in a rumoured 
preparation for a combined African rebellion against colonial regimes increased the 
vigilance of imperial officials and of the authorities in neighbouring states. Officials 
wrbid., S6/5, paramount chief to resident commissioner, 10 October 1898; ibid., S4/1/5 , 
resident commissioner's diaries, entries for 29 and 30 November 1898. 
91Milner Papers, Ms Milner dept. 221, Milner to Lagden, 14 August 1898. 
92p or the development of regional trade involving the BaSotho and theJr African 
- neighbours, including those farther afield, see Eldredge, kSouth African Kingdom, 19-27, 
150-51, and 117-19 for local trade networks. 
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infested the country with agents who spied on the arrival and movements in the country 
of any foreign African traveller. Early in 1898 paramount chief Lerotholi, his ire 
aroused, enumerated many occasions on which imperial officials and settler and colonial 
newspapers had accused him of "communicating with foreigners". "Why", he asked, "is 
it that when a person of any country rebels against government that my name is always 
in the middle?,,93 
The effects of decades of mission ideology, commercialisation and colonial legislation 
had also combined to Wldermine social ties and corrode redistributive and reciprocal 
. relationships. They had pulled yet another prop from underneath the fragile structure of 
BaSotho's subsistence security. In the aftermath of the rinderpest, patrons could not 
sustain their communities. Instead, chiefs used their own privileged positions to petition 
imperial officials, traders and missionaries for their own assistance and relief This was 
true whether it was the paramount chief himself entreating the resident commissioner to 
advance his share ofthe hut-tax,94 or the minor chief, Jeremiah Job, who entreated with 
the resident commissioner thus: 
Ahhough 1 have no right, 1 cry to you chief, 1 say that hunger has entered 
into your servant's scherm, chiefalso my father's wife who is left with us 
she too is hungering, and now we are crying to you our chiefs, our fathers 
are dead, and we have remained in your hands you chie~ you our 
resident commissioner.95 
I 
Colonial officials, traders and missionaries, however, had little interest in sustaining 
relationships of kinship or clientage. Lagden's response to the paramount chiefs plea for 
help is revealing: "I have no money to buy food for the nation", he quipped, and ''I 
~.N.A., S6/5, paramount chief to resident commissioner, 31 March 1898. 
94Ibid., S7/3/14, paramount chief to resident commissioner, 30 November 1897. 
95Ibid., S6/5, Jeremiah Job to resident commissioner, 5 December 1898. 
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recommend that people who are hungry should seek work and earn money to buy 
grain". 96 
Despite this bleak picture, the BaSotho did rise to the challenge. The mental and physical 
resilience of the BaSotho amid the massive decimation of their herds baflled 
contemporary European observers. Even Lagden, disappointed by their failure to do 
more to keep the panzootic at bay, still feh compelled to "pay tnbute to the fortitude 
with which [BaSotho] endured their Iosses".97 Europeans from every occupation 
admired BaSotho resilience, praising them for their "notorious [sic] industry". ''They are 
capable of adapting themselves to their difficulties [of drought, locusts and 
rinderpest]". 98 
The BaSotho set about doing their besr in the circumstances. Many exploited the 
advantage of the belated outbreak of the panzootic to do most of their ploughing.99 Many 
resorted to hoe cultivation. This seems to have ensured more intensive agricuhure, 
certainly in the short term, and higher value attached to the product. Hoe cultivation also 
encouraged aduh participation in agricuhure rather than the existing practice of 
depending on young boys to hold the plough. The hard labour with the hoe also 
enhanced the value of the product. 
I 
Without cattle, and always with the threat of drought, the BaSotho chose to intensify 
their energy growing familiar crops and those that could resist drought. The sorghum 
vulgare (Mabele) was the most popular. BaSotho peasants were familiar with the staple 
crop that they had previously cultivated with the hoe. Sorghum was also more resistant 
to drought and less vulnerable to locusts. So plentiful was the sorghum harvest in 1898 
"'bid., resident commissioner to paramount chief: 9 November 1898. 
97L.N.A. S1113, speech of resident commissioner, pitso of21 October 1897. 
<JSoiamond Fields Advertiser, 5 November 1898, 14. 
99Star, 9 January 1897: _ 
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that the BaSotho could not store the surplus, which instead found its way to the brewing 
pots. The reason, as we have seen, was that many bewildered people took to drink. "At 
this moment, people are afraid to withstand aflliction", observed Rev. Pascal, ''they do 
not know where they are going, they instead swim in the joala (beer) because the 
harvests have been magnificent from our side ... "lOo 
They also intensified maize production. Maize cuhivation does not require as much 
labour and technology as wheat cultivation. The maize crop also has a higher yield, and 
people chose to grow maize when the scarcity of draught oxen rendered large scale 
ploughing difficuh. Maize was also versatile, especially during a general food shortage. 
People could eat it while green. This convenience helped to tide over the peasants until 
the sorghum harvest. People could also use it to make various forms of food - whole, 
crushed, stamped, or ground. Maize also came second to wheat as a marketable grain, 
especially in the mining compounds where it fetched high prices. 
Those who had horses and donkeys trained and harnessed them, Using them as substitute 
draught animals. The steep rise in the purchasing price of these animals reflects the high 
premium they had acquired. The imperial administration assisted by distributing 
simplified forms of horse harnesses on loan. 101 Many who still had a span of oxen helped 
those who had lost all. Like every crisis, the rinderpest brought out both the hem and the 
worst in human attitudes. Families ~d kin assisted one another, family networks of 
reciprocity extending further than the extended family and including other local 
households. Many of those whose cattle survived were indebted to those whose cattle 
had died, for the bile the latter contnbuted had saved the cattle of the former. They now 
returned the favour by helping to plough the fields of those who had saved their cattle. 
The long established practice of lihalefote (half-cropping) was extended. It involved 
those who had saved a span or two ploughing for those who had lost all, and dividing the 
l~etter of Rev. 1. Pascal. 14 August 1897, Journal des Missions, 1897,600. 
101L.N.A., S/3/25/1/15, annual reports, report of government secretary, 1898. 
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harvest proportionally. Even boer farmers in the Free State who had saved a span or two 
of oxen came to the rescue and helped their BaSotho neighbours with ploughing their 
fields. 102 
Moreover, industrious efforts to rebuild herds started almost immediately. With their 
cattle dead and their capacity to earn cash simuhaneously weakened by the collapse of 
their cash-earning wheat crop, the BaSotho sold what they did have. This included wool, 
mohair and the hides of the dead cattle that they had carefully preserved for the hard 
times ahead. The value of miscellaneous goods, wool and mohair exported from the 
country rose steeply in 1898, undoubtedly because ofthe high sales of hides of the dead 
animals, as the following chart ShoWS: 103 
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102Frieng, 1 October 1897. 
I 
I03Ibid., S3/2511/11, S3/25/1/12, S3125/1/14, S3/25/1/15, -S3/2511116, annual reports, 1894, 
1895, 1897, 1898, 1899. 










































































